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SUMMARY 
In the first section of the dissertation, strike law in the Netherlands is focused upon. The 
following issues are inter alia dealt with: the historical background of the strike 
phenomenon, the right to strike and restrictions on this right, the reluctance of the Dutch 
legislature to legislate in the field of industrial action, and the directly applicable 
provisions of the European Social Charter. 
The second section of the dissertation deals with South African strike law and also starts 
off with a discussion of the historical background thereof, whereafter the provisions of the 
1995 Labour Relations Act are analysed and discussed. 
The third and last section highlights some of the major differences and points to some 
similarities between the two legal systems. It concludes that the detailed South African 
labour legislation does not provide more certainty than the Dutch judge-made law in 
respect of the law relating to strikes. 
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Industrial stoppages causes losses to the economy, and hardship to men and 
women. Everyone, except those on the lunatic fringe, wants to reduce their 
number and magnitude. But people do not go on strike without a grievance, 
real or imaginary. Sometimes they have ample justification for doing it, 
sometimes they do it wantonly. The important thing to do is to find out why 
strikes occur, and to remove their causes. 
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PREFACE 
The well-known Dutch jurist, H.L. Bakels, once stated that the strike can be seen as the 
femme fatale of labour law. I suppose that the existence of this dissertation proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that yet another jurist has succumbed to temptation. Over the past few 
decades, the law relating to strikes in South Africa and the Netherlands has been examined, 
re-examined and over-examined by a series of competent specialists and has been discussed 
in books, journals, conferences and seminars. It is my hope that this dissertation will not be 
a superfluous addition. 
Since the field of labour law is a particularly dynamic one, rapid changes threaten to date any 
new text, almost as soon as it has been written. This book reflects the law as it stands as of 
December 1997. 
I wish to thank my supervisor, Prof. P.A.K. le Roux, for his help, support and enthusiasm 
which unquestionably aided the completion of this dissertation. I am also deeply indebted to 
Prof. mr. L.H. van den Heuvel at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, who provided 
valuable insight in respect of the Dutch labour law. I would furthermore like to record my 
gratitude to my wife, Nicola, for her understanding and encouragement. 
Finally, I owe the Stichting Studiefonds voor Zuidafrikaanse Studenten a great debt of 
gratitude for having granted me a bursary to study Dutch labour law; without their financial 
assistance this dissertation would never have materialised. 
Herman Troskie 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
A usual characteristic of the ordinary employer-employee relationship is a mutual intention 
to enter into some form of continuous relationship. However, a continuous relationship is by 
nature a delicately balanced one, vulnerable to numerous outside influences which can 
impact directly on the needs and interests of parties to the relationship. This is especially 
true if a disequilibrium of power exists between the parties, as is the case in an employment 
relationship. As a result, conflicts within the employment relationship are inevitable. 
Conflict can be seen as a natural consequence of the continuous relationship between 
employer and employee. Where the dispute involves more than one employee the conflict 
can take on a collective nature which may reveal itself in concerted acts of industrial action.1 
In such conflict, the most common manifestation is the strike, which represents the worker's 
ultimate weapon against the employer. 
To "classical" legal minds the law relating to strikes is surely one of the more unsatisfactory 
areas of the law; strikers seek to force their demands upon their adversary by simply 
inflicting harm.2 Nevertheless, the individualism of legal rules places the worker at a 
disadvantage against capital. It is only when individual labour unites its power through 
collective action, that the employment relationship can be considered equal. The right to 
strike thus fulfils an essential function in the collective bargaining process: the threat of a 
strike ensures that the employer will bargain properly. In addition, the collective refusal to 
work counteracts the employer's ability to take unilateral decisions which can negatively 
affect the workforce. Kahn-Freund, who describes the main purpose of labour law as the 
redressing of any disequilibrium of power, formulates the argument as follows: 
2 
Cf Clarke, "Industrial Conflict: Perspectives' and Trends:', in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies, 1990, 179. ' 
Cf Jacobs, "The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs", in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies, 1993, 423. 
2 
"There can be no equilibrium in industrial relations without a freedom to strike. In protecting 
that freedom, the law protects the legitimate expectation of the workers that they can make 
use of their collective power: it corresponds to the protection of the legitimate ex~ectation of 
management that it can use the right of property for the same putpose on its side." 
Because of a strike 's coercive nature and delictual consequences, there has in the past been a 
reluctance to describe the freedom to strike as a right:4 no other human right has the explicit 
purpose of forcing other private individuals to do what they do not want to do. Recognition 
of the pivotal role that strikes play in the collective bargaining process has, however, 
overcome this conceptual difficulty .5 Nevertheless, the right - as opposed to the freedom - to 
strike is not an unlimited one. The means and/or purpose of a strike can cause the strike to 
be declared unlawful. The right to strike is restricted in a number of ways in both South 
African and Dutch practice today. These restrictions will be discussed in detail in the 
chapters that follow. 
As the title indicates, the purpose of this dissertation is to undertake a comparative survey of 
the law relating to strikes in South Africa and the Netherlands. Up until now, a few 
introductory remarks have been made regarding strikes in general. In order to fully compare 
the strike phenomenon as it manifests itself in South Africa and the Netherlands, it is first of 
all necessary to provide some brief background information about the two countries. It may 
be mentioned at this stage that the historical link between the two countries was one of the 
main reasons why the Netherlands was chosen for this comparative survey. 
1.2 The Two Countries 
In 1648 the Independent Republic of the United Netherlands came into existence.6 The 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Davies & Freedland,Kahn-Freunds Labour and the Law, 1983, 292. 
A freedom to strike means that the strike is legally tolerated, but no special privileges are granted: the legal limits 
of the freedom to strike are thus a consequence of the general legal order. If, however, the strike is privileged (the 
legal order evaluates the pursuit of collective interests more highly than the opposed individual obligations of the 
employment contract), one may talk of a right to strike. See Birk, "The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs", in 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial relations in Industrialised Market Economies, 1990, 270 in this regard. 
See Rycroft in Rycroft & Jordaan,A Guide to South African Labour Law, 1992, 271. 
It consisted of seven provinces of which Holland was the most important and progressive. 
3 
seventeenth century was the "golden age" of that Republic during which the arts, culture, 
commerce and the law reached a pinnacle. Extensive commercial exchanges took place 
between the Netherlands and the East via the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. The 
central government of the Netherlands appointed a trading company, the Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie (VOC), to administer the commercial relations with the East on their 
behalf, and to control the Dutch territories in India and Indonesia. 
In 1652 Jan van Riebeeck, an official of the VOC, came to the Cape to establish a 
refreshment station for the ships on their journey between the Netherlands and the East. 
Over the next almost one hundred and fifty years the temporary settlement changed into a 
fully-fledged colony. Roman-Dutch law7 took root and was applied within the gradually 
expanding boundaries of the colony. In 1806 the Dutch rule at the Cape finally came to an 
end and the British occupation commenced. The political link between South Africa and the 
Netherlands was thereby effectively terminated. 
1.2.1 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands (or Holland as it is sometimes called) is a small country on the north-
western coast of Europe, bordering Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany. It has 
approximately 16 million inhabitants compressed within a relatively small area; the 
population density is approximately 435 inhabitants per square kilometre. The densely 
populated western part of the country contains the three main cities; namely Amsterdam (the 
capital), Rotterdam (one of the largest ports in the world) and The Hague (seat of the 
government). The establishment of the European Economic Community has accentuated the 
role of the Netherlands as the gateway to Europe: easy access from the North Sea has made 
the delta of the rivers Rhine, Maas and Scheide a major centre of economic activity. As a 
result, the delta has also become a favourite location for internationally orientated industries.8 
7 
8 
The Netherlands (like the rest of Western Europe) experienced the reception of Roman law, which eventually 
merged with the local Germanic (Dutch) customary law. This led to the creation of so-called Roman-Dutch law; 
the settlement at the Cape lived a=rding to Roman-Dutch law as that was the legal system with which they were 
acquainted. Roman-Dutch law, as brought to the Cape in 1652, still forms the basis of South African common 
law. 
See Rood, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 11 (The Netherlands) 
who names large corporations such as Royal Dutch Shell (petroleum and chemicals), Unilever (foodstuffs, 
detergents) and Philips (radio, television, electronics). 
4 
The Dutch economy has experienced an almost uninterrupted expansion since World War II, 
with real national income more than doubling in the period from 1961 to 1982. However, 
two oil crises led to a decline in economic growth during the periods 1973/74 and 1978.9 
The Netherlands is a country composed of religious and political minorities, a fact which has 
dominated the country's nineteenth century history. In contrast to other countries such as 
Britain and Germany, the emancipation of the working class was preceded by an 
emancipation of religious minorities, namely the orthodox Calvinists and the Roman 
Catholics. Each minority built their own "pillar", which amounted to a denominational 
segregation of political parties, schools, trade unions, mass media, etc.10 Since World War 
II, the various minorities (Protestants, Catholics, liberals and socialists) have formed a 
number of different coalition cabinets. 
The industrial revolution, already well underway elsewhere, only reached the Netherlands in 
1860. The 1860's saw the organisation of trade unions among printers, diamond workers, 
organ-builders and railwaymen. At the beginning of this century, three federations of trade 
unions were created: the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (NVV), the Catholic Federation 
of Trade Unions (NKV), and the Protestant Federation of Trade Unions (CNV). The NVV 
and NKV merged in 1982 to form the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV). Two other 
federations of trade unions were also established: the Federation of High and Middle Level 
Employees (MHP, formed in 1974) and the General Trade Union Congress (A VC, formed in 
1992). The main federations of employers' organisations is the Federation of Dutch 
Enterprises (VNO) and the Dutch Christian Employers' Association (NCW).11 The labour 
relations system in the Netherlands is, however, characterised by harmony and co-operation 
between the relevant parties, low union membership (about 30%), institutionalised 
9 
10 
11 
Since 1980 the number of unemployed has shown a sharp increase due to the weakened economic situation. Only 
recently there has been some improvement (in 1992 the total number of unemployed was 305,000). Foreigners 
registered in the Netherlands numbered 732,900 in 1992, of which 503,900 were unemployed. See Rood, 
International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 12-14 (The Netherlands) and 
Jansen, Labor Law in the Netherlands, 1994, 1 for more detail in this regard. 
See Rood, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 15 (The Netherlands) and 
Hepple (ed), The Making of Labour Law in Europe, 1986, 328 for more detail in this regard. 
See Rood, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, Par 217-228 for more 
detail in this regard. 
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consultations between employers' organisations and trade unions on a national level, and 
institutionalised co-determination within the workplace.12 An employer is legally obliged to 
establish a so-called works council, composed of members elected by the employees. The 
employer is legally obliged to consult with the works council on several issues. There is a 
tradition of participatory relations at many levels between employers' organisations and trade 
unions, and in many companies management regularly consult with the unions.13 
In accordance with the Dutch labour relations' tradition of harmony and co-operation and 
their system of industrial democracy, the country has a relatively low incidence of strikes and 
industrial conflict,14 as can be seen from the tables below.15 
Table 1: Strike indicators (averages of 1950-1990) 
1950-62 1963-69 1970-82 1983-90 
Incidence 64.8 39.0 38.3 27.8 
Number of working days lost 96.5 
to strikes (x 1000) 
25.1 153.9 71.7 
Number of strikers (x 1000) 17.2 10.9 27.2 16.8 
12 
13 
14 
15 
See Rood, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 17-19 for a discussion on 
the Foundation of Labour (a forum for discussion of wage issues and working conditions by representatives of the 
major employers' organisations and trade unions) and the Social Economic Council (an independent body 
advising government on socio-economic policy). 
Cf Havinga, "Labour Office and Collective Dismissal in the Netherlands", in Reflexive Labour Law, 1994, 266; 
Windmuller, Labour Relations in the Netherlands, 1969, 437; Van der Ven, "Social Law in the Netherlands", in 
Fifty years of Labour Law and Social Security, 1986, 147. 
The Netherlands compares favourably with many other industrialised western countries in this respect: see Rood, 
International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, Table 9. 
Source: Central Buro of Statistics, (not published). 
6 
Table 2: Lost working days (1989-1992) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Due to strikes (x 1000) 23 .8 206.7 96.3 85.4 
Due to illness (percentage of 6.8 
total work days) 
6.8 6.4 5.8 
The Netherlands is one of the many countries which does not have an applicable statute on 
the law relating to strikes. It is the task of the judges to fill the gap left by the legislature. 
Consequently, strike law in the Netherlands is, for the greater part, judge-made law. In 
conclusion, therefore, something will have to be said about judicial organisation in the 
Netherlands. 
The Organisation of the Judiciary Act of 1827 established lower courts (kantongerechten), 
district courts (arrondissements-rechtbanken), courts of appeal (gerechtshoven) and the 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).16 No separate labour courts exist, and industrial disputes are 
heard by these ordinary courts. If time is of the essence, as is the case in most strike related 
disputes, the President of a district court can give a summary judgement. The summary 
judgement is, however, subject to appeal17 and appeal in cassation,18 but very often the 
decision of the President acts as a final judgement. It should be noted that there is no stare 
decisis rule in the Netherlands. Consequently, a court decision has only persuasive authority, 
and does not create a binding precedent. In practice, however, the Supreme Court's 
judgements are generally followed by the other courts. This is particularly true of those 
cases in which the Supreme Court provides guidelines for future cases. These guidelines 
16 
17 
18 
The Dutch Supreme Court can be compared with the French and Belgian Court of Cassation. 
The decision of a lower court judge is generally subject to appeal in a district court, whereas a decision of a 
district court given in the first instance is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeal. The latter 
court sits with three judges. 
Decisions of lower courts, district courts and courts of appeal are subject to "appeal in cassation" to the Supreme 
Court. In contrast to the ordinary appeal procedures, the Supreme Court is bound by the facts as established by 
the lower courts and is only allowed to decide questions of law. The Supreme Court normally sits with five 
judges. 
7 
will normally be taken into account by the other courts when faced with a similar case.19 
1.2.2 South Africa 
The Republic of South Africa (hereafter referred to as South Africa) is situated in the 
southern most part of the African continent, and extends from the Limpopo River in the 
north to Cape Agulhas in the south. South Africa is approximately 25 times larger than the 
Netherlands and has a total surface area of 1,127 ,200 square kilometres. The country 
consists of nine provinces and has three capitals, namely Cape Town (the legislative capital), 
Pretoria (the administrative capital) and Bloemfontein (the judicial capital). South Africa has 
an estimated total population of approximately 42 million people. Cultural and racial 
diversity have always been important features of South African society and conflict between 
the various racial groups has significantly affected political and economic development 
within the country. During the years from 1948 to approximate! y 1990 the now discarded 
policy of apartheid was in force. In 1990 the National Party government in effect repudiated 
its past policies as being unworkable and embarked on a programme of reform.20 After 
extensive negotiations the first democratic election was held on 27 April 1994, which 
election was won by the African National Congress (ANC). In 1996, South Africa's new 
Constitution,21 as well as a new Labour Relations Act,22 came into force, proclaiming a new 
era in labour relations in South Africa.23 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century the South African economy was mainly 
agricultural in nature. However, from the 1860's onwards, after the discovery of diamonds 
and gold, the mining industry developed rapidly to become one of the most important sectors 
of the economy. After World War II the manufacturing sector also grew in importance, and 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
See Rood,International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 23-27 for more detail in 
this regard. 
See Piron & Le Roux,International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 18-22 (South 
Africa) for more detail in this regard. 
Act 108 of 1996. 
Act 66 of 1995. 
See Chapter 6 for more detail in this regard. 
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today the textile industry, clothing industry, metal industry, chemical industry and food 
processing industry occupy an important position in the economy. A large and diversified 
service industry also exists and the agricultural sector continues to play an important role in 
24 the economy. 
During the last number of years the South African economy became somewhat stagnant with 
very little real growth. Various factors contributed to this, including political uncertainty, 
economic sanctions during the apartheid era, strict monetary policies, and a drop in 
productivity levels coupled with high wage increases.25 Despite advantages such as a sound 
economic infrastructure, a wealth of mineral resources, and the lifting of economic sanctions, 
the economy faces an uphill task in creating jobs for the population and in providing 
adequate housing, education and health services. 
The history of industrial relations in South Africa is also characterised by conflict between 
racial groups.26 The first documented trade union appears to have been a Carpenters' and 
Joiners' Union, founded in Cape Town in 1881. Other early unions were formed in the 
printing, engineering, iron moulding and tailoring trades, as well as the mining industry .27 
All these early unions were formed among skilled artisans.28 While skilled labour for the 
mines was provided mainly by overseas recruitment, the mine owners required large 
numbers of unskilled labourers and turned to the indigenous Black population to provide it. 
The result was a racial division of unskilled and skilled workers which led to the 
development of trade unions split along racial lines, as well as to different bargaining 
structures for different groups. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Although the government have permitted the development of a mixed economy, the economy has nevertheless 
been characterised by a high degree of state interference; see Piron & Le Roux, International Encyclopedia for 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 18 for more detail in this regard. 
Today, South Africa has an unemployment rate as high as 40%. 
See Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 42-62 for a detailed discussion of the development of 
industrial relations in South Africa. 
Although early trade unionism met with hostility from employers, the law itself placed few restrictions on the 
formation of such bodies. The right to strike was, however, restricted in a number of ways; see Chapter 5 in this 
regard. Cf also Newall, The Demand for a Living Wage, 1988, 5-12 in this regard. 
The major objective of these unions was the protection of the status of the skilled worker. However, their position 
was soon threatened by the increasing use of cheap Black labour on the mines. See Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 
Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa, 1987, 1-5 and Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 
1997, 44-46 for more detail in this regard. 
9 
Although unions catering for Black workers were never prohibited, formidable obstacles 
were placed in their way. However, despite the restrictions on the formation and activities of 
Black unions, these unions experienced phenomenal growth from the early 1970's onwards. 
As a result of this growth, coupled with the changing economic and political conditions, the 
National Party government appointed a commission of enquiry, known as the Wiehahn 
Commission, to investigate and make recommendations concerning South African labour 
law. The recommendations of the commission were the catalyst for the dramatic changes in 
South African labour law and labour relations during the 1980's.29 Unions catering for Black 
workers became entitled to register in terms of the primary act regulating collective 
bargaining and all forms of statutory discrimination in so far as labour and related rights 
were concerned were done away with. In 1985 a number of the "newer" unions (catering 
primarily for Black workers) formed the Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), which is at present the most important of the union groupings and which has 
played a major role in the ongoing transformation of the country's industrial relations.30 
Numerous employer bodies also exist within South African industry and these are mostly 
organised on an industry basis, such as the Chamber of Mines. The central employer body, 
which interacts with government and unions on main national level bodies such as the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), is Business South 
Africa.31 
The abovementioned Wiehahn Commission also recommended the establishment of an 
industrial court, and after its creation in 1979, the Industrial Court played an important role 
in the development of South African labour law by applying principles of equity rather than 
common law contractual principles. The Industrial Court was not regarded as a court of 
law32 but rather as an administrative body or quasi-judicial tribunal that exercised a wide 
29 
30 
31 
32 
See Chapter 5 for more detail on the Wiehahn Commission and its recommendations. 
The National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) and the Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDSAL) 
are some of the other important union groupings; see Newall, The Demand for a Living Wage, 1988, 12-16 and 
Piron & Le Roux, International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 27-31 for more 
detail in this regard. 
Other important bodies are the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut 
(AHi) and the South African Co-ordinating Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA). 
The Industrial Court did not form part of the normal judicial hierarchy but had certain links with the ordinary 
courts; see Piron & Le Roux,International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 40-42 
for detail on the judicial hierarchy and the application of the doctrine of precedent in South Africa. 
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variety of functions?:i In 1988, a Labour Appeal Court was created which had the power to 
review the decisions of the Industrial Court as well as to hear appeals against certain of its 
decisions. However, the 1995 Labour Relations Act changed the above system by creating a 
new Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court with increased authority and power. The 
Labour Court has the status of a provincial division of the High Court and the Labour Appeal 
Court has the status of the Supreme Court of Appeal, and they are now the only courts that 
can hear and decide labour disputes.34 
1.3 The Strike Concept 
Before the law relating to strikes in South Africa and the Netherlands can be analysed and 
discussed, it is necessary to obtain clarity on the strike concept as it has developed in the two 
countries. The important question of whether a particular industrial action is lawful or not 
will be dealt with in subsequent chapters, and only the strike concept will now be discussed. 
1.3.1 The Netherlands 
Until recently, almost no legal order which permits industrial action has been able to fully 
regulate by statute the permissibility and the limits of industrial action.35 The Netherlands is 
no exception in this regard. Fortunately, there have been efforts at an international level to 
guarantee the right to strike by means of treaties and conventions and these provide some 
guidelines as to the law surrounding strikes. In 1980, the European Social Charter was 
ratified by the Netherlands. Article 6(4) of this charter recognises "the right of workers ... to 
collective action ... ,including the right to strike ... ", and is considered by the Dutch Supreme 
33 
34 
35 
SA Technical Officials' Association v President of the Industrial Court (1986) ILl 186 (A); Medupe v Golden 
Spur (1987) ILl 376 (IC). 
The appointment process for the judges involves representatives of business, labour and the government and the 
type of disputes that may be heard by these courts has been restricted and is specifically set out in the act; see 
sections 151-183 of Act 66 of 1995 for more detail in this regard. 
In modern democracies such a statute which necessarily implies some limitation on the freedom of industrial 
action are not always politically feasible. See Birk, "The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs", in Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial relations in Industrialised Market Economies, 1990, 273 in this regard. 
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Court to be a directly binding provision.36 This article therefore forms the basis of the right 
to strike in the Netherlands; accordingly, the concepts "strike" and "collective action" will 
have to be carefully scrutinised. As no national legislation exists, one has to look elsewhere 
for definitions of the above concepts. 
The concept "strike" has over the years been defined by numerous academic writers. Tilstra, 
in her comprehensive thesis on the restriction of the right to strike in the Netherlands, lists 
the following as key elements of the strike phenomenon: 
* a cessation of work; 
*by wage-earning employees; 
* to apply pressure in order to achieve a certain goal; 
* temporary in nature; 
* with a collective character.37 
It is practicable to discuss the strike concept as it developed in the Netherlands according to 
these guidelines. 
Firstly, the cessation of work is undoubtedly the most distinctive element of any strike. 
Kahn-Freund, for example, defines the strike simply as a "concerted stoppage of work" .38 
This element distinguishes the strike from all the other forms of industrial action, such as go-
slows and work-to-rules.39 
Secondly, it is a generally accepted fact that only those employees who earn a wage or salary 
36 
37 
38 
39 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688. 
Tilstra isolates these elements from the following definition by Meijers, De arbeidsovereenkomst, 1924, 52: "Een 
werkstaking is het niet-verrichten van de arbeidsprestatie door arbeiders, gebezigd als middel om hun werkgever 
of andere personen te bewegen een bepaalde daad te doen of na te laten, met de bedoeling aan de zijde van de 
arbeiders om den arbeid wederom te verrichten zodra het beoogde doel bereikt is." See Tilstra, Grenzen aan het 
Stakingsrecht, 1994, 10. 
Davies & Freedland,Kahn-Freund'.s Labour and the Law, 1983, 293. 
A distinction can be drawn between the traditional all-out strike, involving each and every employee of a plant, 
and relay strikes, where groups of employees within the same concern take turns to strike. See Tilstra, Grenzen 
aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 10. 
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from an employer can, in the traditional sense of the word, go on strike. If no such link 
exists between employee and employer, or if there simply is no employer (as in the case of 
self-employed persons) any form of so-called industrial action cannot amount to more than 
mere mass-demonstrations .40 
Thirdly, as discussed above, the use of the strike weapon exerts pressure on an employer and 
so creates a balance of power between management and labour. This weapon will of course 
be directed towards an authoritative entity in order to achieve a certain goal. Normally, the 
employees' own employer will be in the line of fire. If, however, a third party is involved in 
the conflict, such collective action can usually be classified as a secondary or sympathy 
strike. Such a strike takes place in a workplace other than the one where the original dispute 
exists in an attempt to force the primary employer to settle the dispute. Secondary action is 
most effective when it affects the entire industry to which the primary employer belongs. A 
strike can also be a mixture of the two given cases in the sense that it is directed at the 
employer, but aimed at the government in order to prevent it from interfering with the 
conditions of employment.41 All the above actions with their various goals and objects can 
be classified as strikes, even though some of them might be regarded as unlawful .42 
Fourthly, an obvious characteristic of the strike concept is its temporary nature. The strikers 
merely want to change (or maintain) the situation they find themselves in. No mention is 
made of a termination of the employment relationship. 
Lastly, the element of collectivity forms an essential part of the strike concept. It confirms 
the fundamental character of a strike, namely the unity amongst a number of individually 
powerless persons to counteract the powers of management and thereby redress a 
disequilibrium of power. The fact that the industrial action is not organised by a union (the 
40 
41 
42 
See Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 10, who mentions actions by medical practitioners and 
advocates against proposed changes in government policy as one example of actions which do not contain the 
above strike element. 
In such a case, the striking employees' working conditions can be influenced by the government as third party, 
and one can thus not refer to this type of strike as a pure sympathy strike. See HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 in 
this regard. 
The issue of lawfulness will be dealt with in Chapter 3. 
13 
so-called wildcat strike), would not disqualify such action from being defined as a strike.43 
The mm1mum number of persons required to constitute a collectivity of workers would 
entirely depend on the circumstances of each case. In a given situation, a small number of 
employees may be able to paralyse an entire plant (the so-called bottleneck strike), and it can 
be accepted that such action would also qualify as a strike.44 Normally, however, a 
reasonable number of employees would be required to execute a successful strike. 
If the above characteristics of the strike concept are noted, it is possible to formulate the 
following working-definition of a strike in the Netherlands: a strike is the temporary 
cessation of work by a collectivity of wage-earning employees, to exert pressure on an 
employer or third party in order to achieve a certain goal.45 As mentioned above, however, 
strike law in the Netherlands is based on article 6(4) of the European Social Charter, which 
also refers to the right to "collective action". The broad concept of "collective action" will 
therefore have to be analysed as well. 
It is clear that the concept of collective action includes not only the traditional strike 
phenomenon, but also those forms of pressure which fall short of the popular notion of a 
strike, such as work-to-rules, go-slows, sit-down strikes, blockades, boycotts and pickets. 
These types of collective action are all characterised by the fact that the workers do not 
perform their duties in the normal manner. A work-to-rule is a strategy to slow down and 
disrupt the production process whereby employees meticulously adhere to their job 
descriptions or contracts of employment. A go-slow is what its name implies: workers 
43 
44 
45 
Regarding the relationship between the collectivity of workers and their trade union, compare Davies and 
Freedland, Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law. 1983, at 293: "In trying to define a strike we were careful not to 
make any reference to trade unions. We associate strikes and trade unions, but this is not a necessary association. 
The freedom to strike can be understood as a freedom of the individual or as a freedom of the organisation". 
See Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 12 where she mentions that a minimum number of two 
employees is needed if one still wants to speak of a collectivity of people in the grammatical sense of the word. 
Compare also the following definitions: Rood, Naar een Stakingswet?, 1978, 20: "Het gemeenschappelijk 
neerleggen van het werk door werknemers als pressiemiddel, met de bedoeling het werk te hervatten zodra het 
beoogde doel is bereikt."; Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 193: " ... het collectief neerleggen 
van het werk door arbeiders teneinde hun werkgever of derden tot een bepaald handelen of nalaten te bewegen en 
met de bedoeling de werkzaamheden te hervatten zodra de beoogde doeleinden zijn bereikt."; Tilstra, Grenzen 
aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 14: " ... het in collectief verband neerleggen van het werk door werknemers, als uiting 
van protest of als middel om de werkgever of derden tot een bepaald handelen of nalaten te bewegen." 
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continue to fulfil their duties, but at a pace which causes a reduction in output. A sit-down 
strike (sit-in or work-in) occurs when workers occupy the workplace, possibly continuing to 
work, but with the aim of denying management control of, or access to, work processes. Just 
like the normal strike, these are all autonomous forms of collective action.46 
However, certain types of collective action are executed in order to support other collective 
action already in operation. A well-known supportive action is the blockade of the entrance 
to a business in order to interfere with the entry and exit of non-strikers. Boycotting 
(collective refusal to hold relations with someone either as punishment, or with the view to 
coercing employers or third parties to abandon their position) and picketing (attempts by 
employees engaged in an industrial dispute either to persuade other employees to take their 
side in the dispute, or to communicate their grievance to the public) are other popular forms 
of supportive collective action.47 The above forms of industrial action can all be included in 
the concept of "collective action" as referred to in article 6(4) of the European Social Charter. 
In the chapters on the Dutch strike law, the terms "strike" and "collective action" will 
sometimes be used interchangeably: unless the context dictates otherwise, the term "strike" 
will also include the other forms of collective action. 
1.3 .2 South Africa 
Unlike the situation in the Netherlands, national legislation exists in South Africa which 
regulates the permissibility, and the limits of industrial action, and which defines the strike 
concept in some detail. 
The former Labour Relations Act48 defined a strike as: 
46 
47 
48 
See 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.3.3 for more detail in this regard. 
See 3.3.3.4 for more detail in this regard. 
Act 28 of 1956. In some early court decisions definitions of strikes were enunciated in spite of relevant statutory 
definitions: cf De Beer v Walker 1948 (1) SA 340 (T); R v Mtiyana 1952 (4) SA 103 (N); CWIU v Bevaloid (Pty) 
Ltd 1988 JU 447 (IC). 
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"any one or more of the following acts or omissions by any body or number of persons who 
are or have been employed either by the same employer or by different employers-
( a) the refusal or failure to continue work (whether the discontinuance is complete or partial) 
or to resume their work or to accept re-employment or to comply with the terms or 
conditions of employment applicable to them, or the retardation by them of the progress of 
work, or the obstruction by them of work; or 
(b) the breach or termination by them of their contracts of employment, if-
(i) that refusal, failure, retardation, obstruction, breach or termination is in 
pursuance of any combination, agreement or understanding between them, whether 
expressed or not; and 
(ii) the purpose of that refusal, failure, retardation, obstruction, breach or 
termination is to induce to compel any person by whom they or any other persons 
are or have been employed-
(aa) to agree to or to comply with any demands or proposals concerning terms and 
conditions of employment or other matters made by or on behalf of them or any of 
them or any other persons who are or have been employed; or 
(bb) to refrain from giving effect to any intention to change terms or conditions of 
employment, or, if such a change has been made, to restore the terms or conditions 
to those which existed before the change was made; or 
(cc) to employ or to suspend or terminate the employment of any person." 
This statutory definition clearly extended far beyond the popular notion of a strike,49 namely 
a concerted cessation of work in support of an industrial demand. It quite clearly envisaged 
overtime bans (if there was a contractual obligation to work overtime),50 work-to-rule51 and 
secondary strikes52 and was widely framed to ensure that all potentially disruptive conflicts 
were made subject to the statutory conciliation procedures.53 
The 1995 Labour Relations Act now defines a strike as follows: 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
"strike" means the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by 
different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in 
Cf R v Schroeder 1934 TPD 127 at 129: "In its ordinary sense the word 'strike' means a concerted refusal by 
employees to work until some grievance is remedied". 
Plascon Evans Paint (Natal) Ltd v CWIU (2) 1988 JU 231 (D); Bebe! Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a East London 
Furniture Industries v PPWA WU & others 1989 (1) SA 908 (E); SA Breweries Ltd v FA WU & others (1989) 11.J 
844 (A); NUMSA v Gearmax (Pty) Ltd 1991 11.J 778 (A). 
Cf SA Breweries Ltd v FA WU 1989 11.J 844 (A) at 851 F-G. · 
Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v MA WU 1988 11.J 995 (IC); 1990 11.J 35 (D; Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 
1992 11.J 345 (D; Metal Box SA Ltd t/a Blow Moulder v NUMSA 1992 11.J 1503 (IC); NUMSA v Firestone SA 
(Pty) Ltd 1993 11.J 101 (T). 
Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989, 72. See also Wade & Van der Walt, "Aspects of the South 
African strike definition", in Obiter, 1993, 99-126 and Wallis, Labour and Employment Law, 1992, Par 48-51 for 
more detail in this regard. 
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respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, and every 
reference to 'work' in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or 
'>4 
compulsory;-
A comparison between the definitions of a strike under the previous Act and the 1995 
Labour Relations Act reveals the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
54 
55 
56 
57 
there is no change in who qualify as strikers and the new Act only deleted the words 
"body or number of" before the word "persons"; 
the current definition has been simplified in that there has been a reduction in the 
number of actions listed as constituting strike action; however, other than the refusal 
to accept re-employment, all the additional items contained in the previous definition 
could be encompassed by the current definition, signifying no real change in 
legislative intent;55 
the current definition no longer requires that the purpose of a strike should be to 
compel an employer to do something, but merely that the purpose must be to remedy 
a grievance or resolve a dispute in respect of "any matter of mutual interest between 
employer and employee" ;56 
the definition of "work" in the current definition of a strike includes both compulsory 
and voluntary overtime work whereas only the collective refusal to perform 
compulsory overtime work could constitute a strike under the previous definition.57 
Section 213 (the definition section) of Act 66 of 1995. 
The deletion of the refusal to accept re-employment may have been effected as a result of the deletion in the 
current Act's lock-out definition ("lock-out" means the exclusion by an employer of employees from the 
employer's workplace, for the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the employer breaches those employees' 
contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of that exclusion) of a dismissal lock-out and a lock-
out in the form of a refusal to re-employ. 
The softer wording should not really make a difference to the effect of the definition. Note that protest action to 
promote or defend the socio-economic interests of workers is regulated separately by the 1995 Labour Relations 
Act (see below). 
Under the previous definition the courts have held that the collective refusal to work voluntary overtime 
constituted, at most, an unfair labour practice; see NUMSA v Gearmax (Pty) Ltd (1991) IU 778 (A); Cape Gate 
(Pty) Ltd v Namane (1990) IU 766 (IC) and Macsteel (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1990) IU 995 (LAC) in this regard. 
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In Afrox Ltd v SACWU & others (2/ 8 the Labour Court considered the definition of a strike 
in the 1995 Act. The facts can be summarised as follows: Afrox decided to introduce 
staggered shifts for certain employees at its Pretoria West branch. Its insistence in 
introducing the shifts lead to a dispute and a strike at that branch. The employees at other 
branches then also embarked on strike action in support of the strike at the Pretoria West 
branch. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain an order interdicting the "secondary" strikes 
at the other branches (see Afrox Ltd v SACWU & others (1) below), Afrox contended that the 
strike action engaged in by the workers did not fall within the definition of strike action in 
the Act since there was no grievance or dispute in respect of a matter of mutual interest. The 
reason for this was that the employees who had refused to work the staggered shifts had 
subsequently been retrenched59 and the work done by them had been taken over by an 
outside contractor. The dispute had therefore fallen away and there could thus be no strike 
which could be the subject of protection. The Court accepted this argument in principle and 
stated as follows: 
"A strike can terminate in various ways. One way for a strike to terminate is where the 
strikers abandon the strike. This normally takes the place of an unconditional return to work. 
Another possible way, for there are probably other ways ... is by the disappearance of the 
substratum. If the casus belli is removed, for example, by the employer's conceding to the 
demands of the strikers or by removing the grievance or by resolving the dispute then the 
foundations of the strike fall away. The strike is no longer functional; it has no purpose and 
it terminates. When the strike terminates so does its protection. It is not in the interests of 
labour peace for a strike action to be continued in such circumstances even in the case of a 
protected strike." 
The Court then considered the facts of the case and found that the nature of the dispute 
between the parties had changed from one in connection with staggered shifts to one about 
retrenchments and its implications for the job security of some of the employees. The Court 
pointed out that a strike over the latter issues would be unprotected by virtue of section 65(1) 
read with section 191, in terms of which this type of dispute must be referred to the Labour 
Court for adjudication.60 
58 
59 
60 
(1997) ILJ 406 (LC); Afrox Ltd v SAC WU & others (1) (1997) ILJ 399 (LC) will be dealt with below. 
Regarding the respondents counter-application that the Court grant an interim interdict restraining Afrox from 
retrenching the respondent employees, the Court found that the requirement of irreparable harm had not been 
made out and refused to grant the respondents urgent interim relief (at 414C). 
See Le Roux, "The Labour Court: some early decisions", Contemporary Labour Law, 1997, 73. 
18 
In Simba (Pty) Ltd v FAWU & others61 the Labour Court had another opportunity to consider 
the definition of a strike. The facts were as follows: Simba applied to the Labour Court for 
an order to compel the employees to stagger their lunchbreaks and to interdict them from 
taking their lunch at the same time. The Court held that section 7 of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act of 1983 was applicable, which compelled the employer to grant the 
employees a meal interval after they had worked continuously for five hours. As all the 
employees on a shift commenced work at the same time they became entitled to their 
lunchbreak at the same time. 
The Court rejected a submission that by refusing to take staggered lunchbreaks the 
employees were retarding work as envisaged by the phrase "retardation of work" and so 
constituting one of the elements of a strike as defined in section 213 of the 1995 Act.62 It 
added: 
" ... the word 'work' in the phrase 'retardation of work' in the definition of the word 'strike' in 
the new Act does not include work the performance of which beyond a certain time or at a 
particular time will be illegal. To hold otherwise would be contrary to public policy and 
would sanction a contravention of the BCEA."63 
The 1995 Labour Relations Act also defines other forms of collective industrial action which 
should be distinguished from the traditional strike concept as defined above and which 
indicates that the legislature intended to broaden the ambit of permissible employee-based 
industrial action. 
Secondary strikes are defined in section 66(1) as follows: 
61 
62 
63 
"In this section 'secondary strike' means a strike or conduct in contemplation or furtherance 
of a strike, that is in support of a strike by other employees against their employer but does 
not include a strike in pursuit of a demand referred to a council if the striking employees, 
(1997) IU 558 (LC). 
The Court stated as follows: "In SA Breweries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union 1990 (I) SA 92 (A) at IOOE-F; 
(1989) 10 IU 844 (A) the Appellate Division dealt with the meaning of the phrase 'retardation by them of the 
progress of work' in the definition of 'strike' in the 1956 Act and said: 'the legislature clearly had in mind a go-
slow or work to rule, a situation where work is done but at substantially reduced levels of activity and 
productivity'. I can see no basis, and none was suggested to me by counsel, for holding differently under the new 
Act." (at 566H-I). 
At 568H. The application for an interdict was accordingly dismissed. 
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employed within the registered scope of that council, have a material interest in that 
demand." 
A secondary strike can thus be classified as a "sympathy strike" where, for example, 
company A's employees strike in sympathy with a strike being conducted by company B's 
employees. The definition's wording is somewhat ambiguous as it could also cover a strike 
by employees A, B and Cat a company in support of a strike by employees X, Y and Z at the 
same company. However, the reference in section 66(2) to "primary employer" and 
"secondary employer" suggests that the legislature's intention was to cover only the 
traditional "sympathy strike". 
In Afrox Ltd v SACWU & others (1)64 the Labour Court considered the definition of a 
secondary strike. As mentioned above, Afrox's insistence in introducing staggered shifts 
lead to a dispute and a strike at its Pretoria West branch, followed by strike action at other 
branches which was categorised by the union as a secondary strike. The Court confirmed 
that a secondary strike involves the employees of one employer taking action in support of 
employees employed by another employer. This was not the case here as all the employees 
at the various branches were employed by Afrox. In line with this miscategorisation of the 
strike Afrox argued that the strike had to comply with the provisions of section 66(2) of the 
Act to acquire protected status. The Court rejected this submission: 
"I do not agree that the applicant is entitled to have an interdict issued in its favour against the 
employee respondents simply on the strength of the label that the union gives to that conduct 
even if, in law and in reality, that conduct is not that which the union calls it. As Shakespeare 
said, a rose by any other name would still smell like a rose. Accordingly a primary strike by 
any other name would by any other name still be a primary strike." 
The Court also rejected Afrox's second submission that, if the employees at the other 
branches were engaged in a primary strike they were nevertheless not entitled to strike as 
they were not a party to the dispute that was referred to the relevant conciliation forum. The 
prerequisite for a protected strike was that the "issue in dispute" be referred to a bargaining 
council or to the CCMA.65 The Act did not prescribe who had to refer the dispute to the 
64 
65 
(1997) IU 399 (LC). 
See section 64(1)(a) of the Act. The Court referred to the definition of the phrase "issue in dispute" in the 
definition section of the Act: "in relation to a strike or lock-out, means the demand, the grievance, or the dispute 
that forms the subject matter of the strike or lock-out". Compare also Barlows Manufacturing v MA WU (1988) 
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counsel or to the CCMA.66 Afrox's application for an urgent interdict was accordingly 
dismissed by the Court. 
Protest action67 is regulated by section 77 and defined in section 213 (the definition section) 
as follows: 
"protest action" means the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, for the purpose of promoting or defending the socio-economic interests 
of workers, but not for a purpose referred to in the definition of strike; 
The Act does not provide a definition of socio-economic interests and it appears that protest 
action is what has come to be known in South Africa as a "stayaway ".68 
Picketing is regulated by section 69 and it is noteworthy that the term "picketing" (or 
"picket") is not defined in the Act. For present purposes it can be defined as attempts by 
employees engaged in an industrial dispute either to dissuade other employees from entering 
the workplace, or to communicate their grievance to the public.69 
Against the above background, the law relating to strikes in South Africa and the 
Netherlands can now be analysed and discussed. In the first section of the dissertation, strike 
law in the Netherlands is focused on. In Chapter 2, the historical background of the strike in 
both the public and private sectors is dealt with. The right to strike and restrictions on this 
right, or, in other words, the issue of lawfulness, are discussed in Chapter 3, while the rights 
of the individual within the context of the strike are investigated in Chapter 4. The second 
section of the dissertation deals with South African strike law and also starts off (in Chapter 
66 
67 
68 
69 
ILi 995 (IC). 
See Le Roux, "The Labour Court: some early decisions", Contemporary Labour Law, 1997, 72-73 for more detail 
in this regard. 
A feature of South Africa's turbulant history has been the collective withholding of labour as a mark of protest or 
for the purpose of achieving political ends. See Wallis, Labour and Employment Law, 1992, Par 48 in this regard. 
Under the previous Labour Relations Act stayaways were totally prohibited and in many instances dismissal for 
participation in such stayaways had been held to be fair. Compare Business South Africa v COSATU & another 
(1997) ILi 474 (LAC). 
Compare Lomati Mill Barberton v PPWA WU & others (1997) ILi 178 (LC). 
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5) with a discussion of the historical background thereof. In Chapter 6, the new Labour 
Relations Act that came into operation on 11 November 1996, is focused upon. The third 
and last section of the dissertation gives a brief comparative survey of South African and 
Dutch strike law. 
A. THE NETHERLANDS 
CHAPTER 2 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
Projecting modem social concepts upon earlier centuries carries an inherent risk; if the 
background against which such phenomena existed is ignored, the possibility of an 
inaccurate representation is created. Naturally this also applies to the modem concept of a 
strike, a term which is closely linked to social, economical and political circumstances within 
a community. Therefore, when a few earlier strikes are dealt with in this chapter, the above 
necessary reservation must be born in mind. 
In this chapter, the historical development of the law relating to strikes in both the private 
sector and the public sector will be dealt with. The development in the private sector can 
conveniently be divided into four phases. 
The first phase commences with the earliest examples of strikes (1170 BC) up until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century .1 In this first phase no distinction needs to be drawn 
between the private and the public sectors. 
In the second phase (from the beginning of the nineteenth century up until 1969) the strike 
was initially seen as a phenomenon of criminal law. This approach was later replaced by a 
civil law assessment of strikes, which had the following as a point of departure: participation 
in a strike must, in principle, be regarded as a breach of the employment contract by the 
relevant employees, while the organising of a strike must be regarded as a delict committed 
by the trade union.2 
See 2.2.1. 
2 See 2.2.2. 
23 
The third phase commences in 1969 with the introduction of a bill on strikes which sought to 
regulate strikes by means of specific statutory rules. This bill played a role in the radical 
changes that took place in the jurisprudence.3 
The fourth phase starts in 1986 when the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision,4 dealt with 
the direct applicability of the European Social Charter to strikes in the Netherlands.5 The 
law relating to strikes has followed a different path with respect to civil servants, and this 
path, as well as the origins thereof, will also be discussed in this chapter. The developments 
in the public sector can be divided into two broad phases. In the first phase (from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century up until 1980), collective action by civil servants was 
generally not tolerated, and penal provisions were applicable to this action for a great part of 
that period.6 
The second phase starts in 1980 with the ratification of the European Social Charter and 
deals with the exception made with regard to the collective actions of civil servants, as well 
as the events which followed this ratification.7 
2.2 Collective Action in the Private Sector 
2.2.1 Strikes until 1811 
Even though the earlier and highly interesting forms of collective action do not assist in 
solving the unique present-day problems regarding strikes, they often indicate that, also in 
the past, the social struggle did not exist outside the field of the law .8 In the ancient world, 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
See 2.2.3. 
The Nederlandse Spoorwegen case, HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688. 
This last phase will be covered in Chapter 3, where the current position with regard to strikes will also be analysed 
and discussed. 
See 2.3.2. 
See 2.3.3. 
It should furthermore be noted that the strike is a phenomenon known to almost all the different cultures of the 
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the disparity of bargaining power between employer and employee was accentuated by far 
greater extremes of wealth and poverty, and by the institution of slavery. The jurists were 
not social reformers; they were conservative members of the wealthy class, and saw no need 
for change. 
One of the earliest recorded strikes in history occurred during the reigning years of the 
Egyptian ruler Ramses II (1198-1167 BC), when the employees of a large concern dealing 
with the treatment of corpses, went on strike in order to be paid their wages. When threats of 
imprisonment did not have the intended effect, the employees - who believed throughout that 
the gods would come to their rescue - each received the correct amount of corn.9 
Many centuries later - and probably due to the frequency of strikes - the Emperor of the 
Eastern Roman Empire, Zeno (474-491 AD), enacted a statute which held that employees in 
the construction industry could be forced to either complete their unfinished work, or pay 
damages for such unfinished work.10 
With regard to the Netherlands, the first recorded strike occurred in 1372.11 It was a 
collective action for higher wages by the "Leidse vollers" which, however, did not succeed. 
During the four centuries that followed there were a number of labour conflicts which 
sometimes ended in collective action by the workers. These were primitive and often badly 
organised forms of strike action.12 
9 
10 
11 
12 
world. 
Bolkestein, Sociale Politiek en Socia le Opstandigheid in de Oudheid, 1934, 24. 
Most of the labourers in the Roman imperium were either slaves (servi) who did not possess any legal 
competency, or emancipated slaves (Liberti) who enjoyed a very limited legal position. A freeborn (ingenuus) was 
hardly ever in the position of a labourer (work done by a freeborn was mostly in the form of locatio conductio 
operis): see Nicolas, An Introduction to Roman Law, 1962, 182 and Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law, 1976, 292 
for more information in this regard. 
In England the first arrangement relevant to strikes was created in 1349. A severe epidemic disease compelled 
King Edward Ill to enact a statute which created a type of duty to work for farming labourers. The Statute of 
Labourers of 1351 extended this duty to other industries. 
See Spruit, Stakingsrecht in het Kader van de Arbeidsovereenkomst, 1955, 8-15 for more information on these 
early examples of strikes. See also Van Kempen, Het Juridische Karakter der Werkstaking en hare Gevolgen 
i. v.m. het Ontwerp Arbeidscontract, 1907, 3; Van der Ven, Vakvereniging en Werkstaking, 1952, 297. 
25 
2.2.2 The law relating to strikes from 1811-1969 
2.2.2.1 The abolition of the coalition prohibition 
The French Code Penal, which applied to the Netherlands from 1811 up to the introduction 
of the Penal Code in 1886,13 in sections 414-416 prohibited any coalition of employers 
aimed at reducing wages in conflict with the principles of law and reasonableness, as well as 
any coalition of employees aimed at commencing striking activities.14 This so-called 
coalition prohibition was never applied to employers. Criminal prosecutions of employees 
occurred in about twenty cases - mostly where the strikes involved threats or acts of 
violence .15 
In 1872 these penal provisions against the freedom to strike were abolished.16 It was now 
possible to establish trade unions through which strikes could be more effectively 
organised.17 At that time, the correlation between the degree to which employees were 
organised, and strike action was obvious, and the lifting of the penal provisions thus had the 
effect of acknowledging a certain freedom to strike.18 In essence, the history of the law 
relating to strikes in the Netherlands therefore began in 1872, when the coalition prohibitions 
were lifted.19 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
The introduction of the Dutch Civil Code in 1838 had no significance for the law relating to strikes (the 
industrial revolution only reached the Netherlands in 1860), and contained only five sections relevant to 
labour law (sections 1583, 1585, 1637, 1638 and 1639). 
The perpetrators could be given a fine or sentenced to imprisonment. 
See Levenbach, De Vakverenigingen in het Nederlandse Recht, 1929, 15. The prohibition made it impossible for 
employees to organise themselves in a legitimate way; trade unions had no right of existence and strikes were 
therefore often inefficiently planned and executed. (The nineteenth century is commonly seen as the "labourers 
without rights" period). 
Similar developments occurred throughout almost the entire Western Europe, with Great Britain being the first 
(1824), and Italy the last (1890) to abolish the penal provisions. 
At the beginning of this century, three federations of trade unions were created: the "Nederlands Verbond van 
Vakverenigingen" (NVV), the "Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging" (KAB), that were in 1980 amalgamated to the 
"Federatie Nederlandse Vakverenigingen" (FNV), and the "Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond" (CNV). 
Drenth, Het Staldngsrecht, 1966, 4; De Jong, Een Inleiding tot het Denken over Arbeidsconjlictenrecht, 1975, 
159; Van den Berg, Fortuyn & Jaspers, De Ontwikkeling van het Staldngsrecht in Nederland, 1978, 14. 
As a result of the huge success of the Railway strike of 1903, criminal sanctions were made possible again in the 
case of strikes by civil servants or railway personnel. These sanctions (the so-called "worgwetten van Kuyper") 
were applied only once (Rb. 's-Gravenhage, 6 June 1918, NJ 1918, 876) and were abolished in 1980: see 2.3 for 
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With the disappearance of criminal sanctions, the question20 remained as to how far the 
sanctions of private law could be used against trade unions and employees.21 Some lawyers 
considered a strike to be a breach of the worker's contract of employment, and saw the union 
organising the strike as being delictually responsible22 for inducing the breach of contract.23 
However, this legal opinion was of little practical significance as employers involved in 
labour disputes did not usually resort to civil remedies. Consequently, the civil judge was 
hardly ever involved in strike conflicts and employees who took part in a strike lost their 
wages24 and ran the risk of being dismissed .25 The negotiations during a strike sometimes 
led to the granting of strikers' demands, and in such a case the wages lost during the striking 
period were paid out. In other cases, the employees had to resume their work under the old 
working conditions. 
In those cases which came before a judge, the question of whether a dismissal because of 
participation in a strike was justified was usually considered26 and the judges did not involve 
themselves with the issue of whether a strike was lawful or not.27 
20 
21 
22 
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26 
27 
more detail. 
Initially, this question was of little importance due to the small number of trade unions and the scarcity of strikes. 
Around the tum of the century, however, this situation changed dramatically - see the statistical information in 
Chapter 1. 
This question was not covered by any specific legislation. 
See HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919, 161; HR 11 November 1937, NJ 1937, 1096 and Bakels, "Enige juridische en 
maatschappelijke aspecten van de stakingsvrijheid", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1960, 633, on the developments 
that took place with respect to this delict during the 1920's and 1930's. 
The Employment Contract Act of 1907 (which did not amend the law relating to the striking weapon and which 
was incorporated in the Dutch Civil Code) lead to a Lower House debate on the question whether a strike per se 
terminated the existing employment contract. The majority of the Lower House answered this question in the 
negative. The strike does, however, give the employer a right to terminate the employment contract on the ground 
of urgent reasons created by such a strike. See Bies, De Wet op de Arbeidsovereenkomst, 1909, Part IV, 185. 
Cf sections 1638b-1638d of the Dutch Civil Code; see also Chapter 4 in this regard. 
Cf Zonderland, Recht en Plicht bi) Staking en Tegenstaking, 1974, 167. Even though trade unions started to play a 
more prominent role, they were hardly ever brought to court; see for an exception Pres. Rb. Amsterdam, 4 March 
1935, NJ 1935, 405. 
In some instances the judge felt that participation in a strike constituted a so-called "dringende reden" or urgent 
reason with reference to the employer, and that the dismissal was therefore justified. Sections 1639p of the Dutch 
Civil Code should be noted in this regard: "Voor de werkgever warden als dringende redenen ... beschouwd 
zodanige <laden, eigenschappen of gedragingen van de arbeider, die ten gevolge hebben, dat van de werkgever 
redelijkerwijze niet kan gevergd warden de dienstbetrekking te laten voortduren." See also Fase, "Het 
stakingsrecht in de particuliere sector in Nederland", Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Recht, 1982, 291. 
The lawfulness of strikes was nearly beyond dispute: even the aggravated form of the strike, namely a strike 
27 
In short, it was accepted that the trade unions and employees had a certain freedom to strike. 
The strike was not seen as a juridical phenomenon, and this often caused parties to look for 
an informal solution to industrial conflict. The Labour Disputes Act of 1923 made a useful 
contribution in this regard.28 The Act created offices for independent experts, the public 
conciliators, whose main duty was finding acceptable solutions to labour conflicts between 
parties.29 The law relating to strikes was not limited by this Act; the public conciliators 
offered their assistance on request and the parties were free to make their own choice in this 
regard.3° Consequently, the only possible limitation to the freedom to strike was the so-
called duty of peace, which was sometimes included in a collective employment 
agreement.31 
However, a fundamental change to this state of affairs came with the German invasion in 
1940. The occupying forces dissolved the federations of trade unions, and the public 
conciliators were united into a board of public conciliators,32 who also had to prescribe 
wages in order to implement the new authority's policies in the field of labour relations. An 
absolute prohibition on strike action was created.33 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
combined with a boycott, was in general perceived by the prevailing legal order as lawful. See Drenth, Het 
Stakingsrecht, 1966, 10-11 and Fortuyn, Stakingsrecht in Nederland, 1985, 31. 
Even though this Act has never been formally abolished, it did not function at all after 1940. See Rood, Naar een 
Stakingswet?, 1978, 50-54, for a discussion on both the "Arbeidsgeschillenwet 1923" as well as the less 
significant "Wet op de Kamers van Arbeid 1897". See also Molenaar, Arbeidsrecht II A, 1957, 1146 and 
Loonstra, Derden-interventie bij CA 0-conflicten, 1987, 131. 
These "Rijksbemiddelaars" could thus be compared with modern-day arbitration officers: see Chapter 5 in this 
regard. 
It should furthermore be noted that neither the "Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst" (1927) nor the "Wet 
op het algemeen verbindend en het onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomsten" (1937) created any barriers in the way of the freedom to strike. 
Such a "vredesplicht" applied only to those matters specifically regulated in the collective labour agreement. 
Unlike the practice followed in Britain today, the collective labour agreement is seen in the Netherlands as a 
legally binding agreement: cf sections 9-12 of the Collective Labour Agreement Act of 1927. 
This board of public conciliators ("College van Rijksbemiddelaars"), who were no more than an extension of the 
occupying forces and their wage policy, differed markedly from the previous independent experts appointed 
under the Labour Disputes Act of 1923. The board of public conciliators was dissolved in 1942. See Fase, 
Vijfendertig Jaar Loonbeleid in Nederland, 1980, 290 and onwards with regard to the wage policy that was 
followed in the Netherlands up to World War II. 
It is interesting to note that the establishment of an absolute rule, eg. the Mussolini-regime (1926) or the Hitler-
regime (1934), almost immediately leads to an absolute prohibition to strike. See also Rood, Naar een 
Stakingswet?, 1978, 6. 
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2.2.2.2 The first period after the war 
The period after World War II was characterised by a hannonious spirit of cooperation and 
negotiation necessitated by the need to rebuild the economy. Order had to be created from 
the economic chaos by placing emphasis on the repair of industrial machinery, the creation 
of more employment opportunities and fighting inflation. The Extraordinary Decree on 
Labour Relations that came into existence in 1945, played an important role in this regard.34 
Chapter 3 of this decree enabled the Dutch government to supervise wages and other aspects 
of labour relations35 and the legal position of labourers was in fact partially turned back to 
the pre-1872 position.36 Theoretically, as the strike did not fit into this institutionalised 
framework of central wage policy, it became an unsound and superfluous mechanism.37 In 
addition, a consensus-triangle between the government, employers' organisations and trade 
unions, made it possible to pursue a policy of low wages that left little room for wage 
'k 38 stn es. Whenever there were strikes, employers sought to prevent them by summary 
proceedings39 before the president of the district court. Claims for damages were relatively 
40 
scarce. The opposing parties probably realised that they would still have to do business 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
"Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945", in short "BBA 1945" a government order having the 
status of a statute due to the then still existing "State emergency law". See Van den Berg, Fortuyn & Jaspers, 
De Ontwikkeling van het Stakingsrecht in Nederland, 1978, 24-26. 
The "BBA 1945" reinstituted the "College van Rijksbemiddelaars". This board of public conciliators replaced the 
independent experts appointed under the Labour Disputes Act of 1923 and had a close working relationship with 
the Labour Foundation ("Stichting van de Arbeid"). See Drenth, Het Stakingsrecht, 1966, 3 and Tilstra, Grenzen 
aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 22 in this regard. 
See 2.2.2.1. 
Cf Pres.Rb. Haarlem, 12 March 1946, NJ 1946, 198; Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 17 June 1946, NJ 1946, 571; Hof 
Amsterdam, 23 January 1947, NJ 1947, 725; HR 1 February 1949, NJ 1949, 552. See also l..evenbach, De 
Nederlandse Loonpolitiek, 1955, 28; Windmuller, Labor Relations in The Netherlands, 1969, 266-378. 
The strike weapon was not only used in relation to wage issues. See Pres. Rb. Rotterdam, 24 January 1955, NJ 
1955, 100, for an example of a strike aimed at enforcing the establishment of a works council. 
The summary proceeding or "kort geding" can be compared to the South African urgent application and is 
regulated by section 289 of the "Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering". It normally takes place in front of 
only the president of one of the nineteen district courts in the Netherlands (the district courts usually have three 
judges on the bench) who then makes a preliminary finding on the facts presented by the parties. The parties may 
appeal against this finding by following the prescribed procedural rules applicable to normal (not urgent) actions 
and applications but this hardly ever happens in practice. 
This is still the case today: see Rood, "Over de betekenis van het Europees Sociaal Handvest voor het 
stakingsrecht en het onderhandelingsrecht in de private en in de publieke sector",Het Europees Sociaal Handvest, 
1982, 57. 
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with each other after the termination of the strike and liability for damages would only have 
spoiled the delicately balanced relationship between the employers' associations and the 
trade unions. These post-war developments practically ended the right to strike, and so a 
sharp decline in the frequency of strikes occurred.41 
Later, at the end of the fifties and during the sixties, the government's restrictive wage policy 
led to strong demands for greater latitude in wage negotiations, accompanied by a fast-
growing inclination to strike if the demands were not met.42 Chapter 3 of the Extraordinary 
Decree on Labour Relations was eventually abolished by the Wage Act of 1970.43 
2.2.2.3 The Panhonlibco doctrine 
In 1958 the International Transport Workers Federation organised a world-wide action in 
order to prevent the loading and unloading of ships placed under so-called "cheap" flags.44 
As a result thereof, certain Dutch trade unions organised a collective action during the period 
1-4 December 1958, whereby these ships were not unloaded by the harbour workers in 
Holland. This eventually45 led to a decision by the Dutch Supreme Court, known as the 
Panhonlibco decision,46 in which the Supreme Court ruled that employees engaged in a 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
In the 1920's the average number of working days lost annually was more than a million; in the 1930's this 
average fell to about 400,000 (most of the strikes were organised strikes). After World War II, from 1946-1960, 
the annual average dropped even further to about 80,000 working days. More than half of the strikes during this 
period were wildcat strikes. 
Even as late as 1958, the president of the district court in Amsterdam - in a case that dealt with the legal position 
of the individual striker - clearly stated that a right to strike does not exist in the Netherlands: see Pres.Rb. 
Amsterdam, 27 March 1958, NJ 1958, 245; Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 18 August 1958, NJ 1958, 452; Pres.Rb. 
Amsterdam, 10 October 1958, NJ 1958, 545. 
"Wet op de Loonvorming", Staatsblad, 1970, 69. The "BBA 1945" also contained many other regulations (for 
example a preventative check on dismissals) that fulfilled diverse functions in the process of rebuilding the Dutch 
economy after the war. Many of these provisions still exist in a somewhat modified form in the "BBA 1945". See 
for example Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 91. 
These were the flags of Panama, Honduras, Liberia and Costa Rica. This was done in order to draw attention 
to the following practice: an American or Dutch shipowner, for example, would pay a small registration fee 
and register a ship in one of the abovementioned countries, with the result that he evaded taxation in his own 
country. This practice had the effect of creating unfavourable working conditions for employees on such a 
ship, especially with regard to safety precautions (which were not regularly supervised) and insurance pay-
outs. 
See the differing decisions of the courts a quo: Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 28 November 1958, NJ 1958, 593; Pres.Rb. 
Amsterdam, 29 November 1958, NJ 1959, 8; Hof Den Haag, 17 April 1959, NJ 1959, 216. 
15 January 1960, NJ 1960, 84: the decision is named after the countries with the cheap flags. 
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strike were, in general, guilty of a breach of contract and, therefore, the union which 
organised the strike was delictually liable for inducing a breach of contract. The Supreme 
Court added an important qualification, stating that a case of breach of contract would not 
arise if, according to the prevailing ideas of justice, employees could not reasonably be 
expected to continue to work.47 This loophole, however, imposed on the trade unions the 
heavy burden of proving - in each case - the existence of a lawful reason for ceasing to 
work.48 
The Supreme Court's decision fitted in with the social climate at that time, which was on the 
whole inhospitable to industrial conflict.49 The Panhonlibco case, which was in effect a 
confirmation of all the previous attacks on the right to strike, attracted both positive and 
negative criticism. Employers' organisations obviously reacted positively: they felt that the 
decision provided sufficient freedom to strike, and that it was the duty of the judges to 
concretise the loophole created by the Supreme Court. The trade unions, however, rejected 
the decision as being fundamentally unjust50 as the collective action organised by the trade 
union was judged solely with reference to the individual labour contract, thus ignoring the 
essential collective aspects of the strike phenomenon. The trade unions therefore demanded 
statutory regulation that would ensure a definitive right to strike.51 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
The Supreme Court did not specify under what circumstances such a stoppage of work would be legally justified 
and it thus remained a matter of discretion. So for example a strike aimed at securing recognition of the union by a 
reluctant employer was deemed to be justified: Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 6 June 1969, NJ 1969, 301. 
According to the Supreme Court, the special circumstances activating the qualification were not present in this 
case. 
See Windmuller, Labor Relations in the Netherlands, 1969, 319. According to Windmuller, industrial conflict 
was associated with attempts to achieve a social revolution and strikes were seen as expressions of class 
antagonism rather than as the businesslike use of economic power for short-term objectives (at 397). 
See also De Gaay Fortman et al,Advies inz.ake wettelijke regeling van de werkstaking, 1961 in this regard. 
The academic writers also fiercly criticised the Panhonlibco decision: see for example Bakels, "Enige juridische 
en maatschappelijke aspecten van de stakingsvrijheid", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1960, 645; Orion, "Het 
stakingsrecht in verband met HR 15-1-1960, NJ 1960, 84", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1960, 306 and Van 
Esveld, De Werkstaking in onze Sociale Verhoudingen, 1962, 46. 
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2.2.3 The law relating to strikes from 1969-1986 
2.2.3.1 A bill on strikes 
In 1958, the year of the Panhonlibco strike, the Department of Justice began preparing a bill 
on strikes aimed at bringing about legal certainty in this field of the law .52 Progress was 
slow and laborious53 and it was not until 1968, after numerous discussions between diverse 
groups, that the Social Economic Council advised the govemment.54 This recommendation 
formed the basis of Bill 10111 that was submitted to the Lower House on 29 April 1969.55 
It should be noted that this bill did not intend to regulate the strike in its totality. The 
primary aim was to restore the balance of power between the employers' organisations and 
the trade unions, an equilibrium that was disturbed in 1958.56 The collectivity-idea was 
emphasised, and in the explanatory memorandum to the bill, specific reference was made to 
the collective agreement. If such a collective agreement was in force, it prevailed over the 
individual employment agreement; if a collective agreement was not in force, then the 
collective action prevailed over the obligations flowing from the individual employment 
agreement.57 Consequently, the bill virtually turned the decision of the Supreme Court 
upside down by prescribing that, in general, a union organising a strike acted lawfully. The 
duty of the employee to perform his or her work was also suspended in such a case, and 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
The first section of the bill suspended the obligation of individual workers to continue their work when taking 
part in a strike organised by a trade union. However, if the strike was aimed at forcing the employer to commit 
illegal acts or acts in conflict with a valid collective agreement, such obligation to work would not be suspen-
ded. 
See Van den Berg, Fortuyn & Jaspers, De Ontwikkeling van het Stakingsrecht in Nederland, 1978, 81-100 and 
Rood, Naar een Stakingswet?, 1978, 60-64, for more detail. 
Sociaal Economische Raad (SER),Avies inzake wettelijke maatregelen met betrekking tot de staking, 1968. 
It is interesting to note that another bill (Bill 10110), dealing with commissions of inquiry concerning strikes, was 
submitted to the Lower House simultaneously. This bill was aimed at replacing the Labour Disputes Act of 1923, 
but was eventually withdrawn in 1985: see Loonstra, Derden-interventie bij CAO-conflicten, 1987, 175. See also 
2.3.3 in connection with Bill 11001 that was submitted to the Lower House in 1970. 
The emphasis was thus on a strike as organised by a trade union; wildcat strikes were still judged according to the 
Panhonlibco doctrine. 
Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1968-1969, Bill 10111, No. 3, 4. 
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therefore he or she committed no breach of contract. According to the bill, the union58 only 
acted unlawfully, and was thus delictually liable, in the following five instances: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
if the strike was contrary to statute law or was intended to persuade the employer to 
act against the law; 
if the strike was contrary to a collective agreement which the union had entered into; 
if the strike was contrary to the existing norms concerning relations between 
(organisations of) employers and unions;59 
if there existed a manifest disproportion between the aims and the consequences of 
h "k 60 t e stn e; 
if the strike was manifestly unreasonable towards the employer. 
The bill thus shifted the burden of proof as to the unlawfulness of the strike from the union to 
61 the employer. 
Initially, the principles underlying the bill were more or less accepted by unions and 
employers alike, but this harmony did not last long. The trade unions felt that the bill left too 
little room for political and protest strikes,62 while the employers' organisations pleaded for 
rights to lock out striking workers, the stimulation of arbitration procedures and the creation 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
It should be noted that the bill only applied to unions which, according to their articles of association, were 
authorised to conclude collective agreements and which had been incorporated for at least two years. 
This provision ensures that the strike is only used as an ultimate weapon (the rules for "playing the strike game", 
for example compulsary negotiations between the parties and other formal and procedural rules, must be adhered 
to). See also 3.5 in this regard. 
The use of the word "manifest" aims to restrict interference by a judge in borderline cases in order to reduce the 
subjective element of judicial evaluation as much as possible. 
The employer could dismiss workers striking unlawfully, provided that he does not discriminate between the 
individual strikers. 
See the decision of Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 14 December 1970, NJ 1971, 72 in which a protest action was prohibited. 
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of a cooling-off period. As a result of continued resistance against it, the bill did not mature 
into an act of parliament, and was eventually withdrawn on 18 June 1980.63 
2.2.3.2 Abandoning the Panhonlibco doctrine 
Even though the bill on strikes was eventually withdrawn, it had by that time already done its 
work. Influenced by its provisions, the courts significantly tempered the Panhonlibco 
decision in their subsequent decisions. This was possible because of the qualification added 
by the Supreme Court in the Panhonlibco case, namely that a case of breach of contract by 
striking employees would not arise if, according to the prevailing ideas of justice, employees 
could not reasonably be expected to continue work. By filling this loophole with the 
principles of the bill, the judges were able to incorporate the bill into their decisions, and in 
fact move away from the Panhonlibco point of departure.64 
Other factors which played a major role in the erosion of the Panhonlibco doctrine, were the 
changes that occurred in the wage policy arena. During the sixties, the influence of the 
government on wages faded away gradually, and at the end of the decade there was in 
principle a system of free wage negotiations between employers and unions. This factual 
situation was affirmed by the legislature in the Wage Act of 1970.65 It should furthermore be 
noted that the European Social Charter (ESC) had already come into force in 1965 after five 
member states had ratified it.66 The Dutch government signed the ESC on 18 October 1961 
in Turin, Italy and even though the charter was only ratified by the Netherlands in 1980,67 it 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
There is thus no specific legislation which regulates strike action in the Netherlands today: see Chapter 3 for a 
discussion on the international rules applicable to the Netherlands. 
See Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 198. 
See Van Doom, De Beheerste Vakbeweging, 1976, 251 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 26 in 
this regard. 
Art. 6(4) of the ESC reads as follows: "With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain 
collectively, the Contracting Parties undertake: (I); (2); (3) ... ; and recognise (4) the right of workers and 
employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interests, including the right to strike, subject to obligations 
that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into." The ESC is the first international treaty to 
recognise the right of workers to go on strike: see 3.2.1. 
A possible explanation for this long delay is the fact that the Dutch law has a monistic approach to international 
law (sections 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution), and therefore the Dutch legislature would normally bring the 
national law into line with international conventions before ratifying them. See Van den Heuvel, "Some aspects of 
the European Social Charter and the right to collective action in the Netherlands", Law at the Vrije Universiteit 
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had an (indirect) effect on the Dutch jurisprudence long before it officially came into force. 
The factors outlined above, including the general public opinion of the time, combined to 
bring about a reversal of the Panhonlibco doctrine. The court of appeal in Amsterdam took 
the lead.68 The court felt that since the law relating to strikes is not regulated by statute, 
guidance has to be sought in the general sense of justice of the legal community. 
Accordingly, it expressly declared that the 1960 decision of the Supreme Court was outdated 
and that the equilibrium should be shifted.69 Thereafter strikes would be lawful in principle, 
but the surrounding circumstances could in a particular case make it unlawful.70 The 
decision of the court was convincing and well-motivated and was consequently never 
challenged before the Supreme Court.71 
The abandoning of the Panhonlibco doctrine did not, however, guarantee an unfettered 
freedom to strike. The economic recession started to take its toll, and during the 1970's the 
country was hit by the most serious wave of labour unrest since World War II. 
In 1973 conflict was caused by the trade unions' interpretation of a clause in the Central 
Agreement of 1973 that called for extra wage moderation by the most highly paid. When the 
employers unitedly refused to give in to the unions' demands they organised a strike at 
Hoogovens IJmuiden (a blast furnace) on 20 February 1973. The strike only ended on 5 
March 1973 when it was declared unlawful by the president of the district court in 
Haarlem.72 In February 1973 several other strikes were organised in the metal industry. 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
Amsterdam, 1993, 41 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Staldngsrecht, 1994, 28, for more detail in this regard. 
Hof Amsterdam, 13 April 1972, NJ 1972, 192. See also the following three decisions leading the way to the court 
of appeal in Amsterdam: Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 6 June 1969, NJ 1969, 301; Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 13 February 1970, NJ 
1970, 183; Pres.Rb. Rotterdam,4 February 1971, NJ 1971, 77. 
Cf the effect of the provisions of Bill 10111. 
This was not considered by the court to be the case, and the strike in casu was thus seen as a lawful form of 
collective action. 
In 1986 the Supreme Court had, for the first time, the opportunity to confirm the existence (in principle) of a right 
to strike (HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688). By then it had become an accepted fact, with the result that the 
decision was hardly sensational in this regard: see Chapter 3. See also Rood, "Over collectieve werknemers actie 
of: de HR terug van weggeweest", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1987, 301. 
Pres.Rb. Haarlem, 5 March 1973, NJ 1973, 120. See also the decision of the court of appeal which prohibited the 
strike on grounds of procedural considerations: Hof Amsterdam, 3 May 1973, NJ 1973, 251. 
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These conflicts did not end until a compromise was reached in April 1973. The demands of 
the unions were however only partially met.73 
A second major post-war conflict, concerning "automatic price compensation" clauses in 
collective agreements, broke out in 1977. The trade unions demanded the full restoration of 
these clauses, but the employers' organisations adamantly refused to give in to these 
demands. A dead-lock was reached, and in February 1977 widespread strikes broke out. In 
an effort to persuade the parties to go back to the negotiating table, the president of the 
district court in Utrecht prohibited the actions.74 On appeal, the court in Amsterdam declared 
the action unlawful, and ruled that the essential interests of society could be damaged by the 
strikes in the dairy industry. The court ruled that negotiations on how to avoid the negative 
effects of the strikes (dumping of milk in the canals) should have been held.75 Nevertheless, 
in the end, the employers conceded to most of the unions' demands. 
In general, the judges had considered the above strikes to be unlawful because the unions had 
not exhausted the collective bargaining process, or in other words, because the strike was not 
used as an ultimum remedium .76 The judges adopted a strict approach in respect of the 
ultimum remedium test, frequently declaring strikes unlawful and ordering parties to go back 
to the negotiating table notwithstanding the fact that an impasse had already been reached.77 
Only towards the end of the 1970's did the judges became somewhat more lenient in their 
approach. 
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See Bake ls, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 8, 1987, 79 (The 
Netherlands). 
Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 4 February 1977, NJ 1977, 79; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 8 February 1977, NJ 1977, 80; Pres.Rb. 
Utrecht, 11 February 1977, in Van den Berg, Fortuyn & Jaspers, De Ontwikkeling van het Stakingsrecht in 
Nederland, 1978, 402-406. 
Hof Amsterdam, 17 November 1977, NJ 1978, 551. See Peeters, "Hof Amsterdam zet stakingsrecht op dood 
spoor", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1978: 21 and 1979: 84 and Van den Berg, Fortuyn & Jaspers, De 
Ontwikkeling van het Stakingsrecht in Nederland, 1978, 416 in this regard. 
Cf 3.5 in this regard. 
The Dutch writers criticised the strict approach, saying that it leads to unpredictable results. Cf Peeters, "Hof 
Amsterdam zet stakingsrecht op dood spoor", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1978, 21 and Schotvanger, "De 
Amsterdamse stakingsarresten 1977", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1979, 83. 
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The above-mentioned decisions all dealt with strikes that were aimed at employers in order 
to secure better working conditions. At the end of the 1970's, however, the labour conflicts 
started to take on a new dimension. During 1980 and 1981, numerous strikes broke out as a 
result of the implementation of a number of wage regulations; these strikes were thus aimed 
at the government, while the relevant employer was seen as the third party to the conflict.7s 
In a decision by the president of the district court in Amsterdam, for example, a protest strike 
against the proposed amendment of sections 10 and 11 of the Wage Act of 1970 was dealt 
with.79 This strike fell outside the scope of the bill on strikes, but was nevertheless regarded 
by the court as being lawful.so 
2.3 Collective Action in the Public Sector 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The European Social Charter (ESC) came into operation in the Netherlands on 22 May 1980. 
However, when the Dutch government ratified the ESC, it made an exception with regard to 
the applicability of article 6(4) of the ESC to civil servants.s1 This exception was linked to 
the historical distinction that had always been drawn between civil servants and workers in 
the private sectors of the economy. Owing to this distinction, the law of strikes relating to . 
civil servants has a unique historical background which will now be investigated in order to 
see if the distinction between the private sector and the public sector can still be justified 
when it comes to the right to collective action. 
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Cf 3.3.3.1. See Rood, "Akties en loonpolitiek", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1980, 342 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan 
het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 30 in this regard. 
Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 10 March 1980, NJ 1980, 165. Cf also Pres.Rb. Arnhem, 12 March 1982, NJ 1982, 347 and 
Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 5 January 1983, NJ 1983, 749. 
See also Bertrams, "Een rechtsvergelijkende beschouwing over de politieke staking", Nederlands Juristenblad, 
1982, 889; Fase, "In verzet tegen de overheid", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1982, 301; Meeter, "Staking en 
andere collectieve acties", in Het Collectief Arbeidsrecht nader beschouwd, 1984, 71. 
In 1929, the legal position of the civil servant was for the first time statutorily regulated by the Civil Servant Act 
of 1929. Section 1(1) of this act defines a civil servant as someone who is appointed to work in the public service; 
section 1(2) defines the public service as being all services and industries which are controlled by the State and its 
public bodies. However, the exception to the applicability of article 6(4) of the ESC was not only made with 
respect to civil servants, but also with respect to "employees" of the government in the widest sense of the word. 
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2.3.2 Developments up to 1980 
In the previous century, the government mainly played a traditional "watchman" role, which 
entailed the maintenance of the legal order by means of various government authorities. The 
civil servant was seen as a "special" type of employee; he or she had a duty of obedience and 
had to have an undivided loyalty towards the state.82 Needless to say, collective actions by 
these "traditional" civil servants were out of the question and did not fit in with the 
subordinate status which they occupied in the previous century. 
When the coalition prohibition was abolished in 1872,83 the opportunity was created for civil 
servants to establish trade unions through which strikes could effectively be organised, 
thereby indirectly recognising their freedom to strike. However, this did not influence the 
general view at the time that a strike in the public sector would never occur. Even the 
legislature - when introducing the Penal Code of 1886 - thought it unnecessary to make penal 
provisions applicable to the (unlikely) refusal of work by civil servants. 
In 1903, however, this state of affairs changed. Two wide-spread strikes by Dutch railway 
personnel84 forced the legislature to add section 358bis to the Penal Code of 1886, which 
again made criminal sanctions possible in the case of strikes by civil servants and railway 
personnel.85 Even though railway workers were not classified as civil servants, the smooth 
operation of the railway service and the traditional public sector services were regarded as 
being of equal importance to the general community. Ostensibly, this dramatic intervention 
by the Dutch legislature played a small role in practice: it was applied only once86 and was 
eventually abolished in 1979. It can nevertheless be argued that section 358bis of the Penal 
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Cf Van der Pot, Nederlands Bestuursrecht, 1962, 173; Seelen, De Werkstaking van Ambtenaren, 1967, 157, 
Crince le Roy ,Ambtenarenstatus en Ambtenarenethiek; mythe of werklikheid?, 1979, Chapter 1. 
See 2.2.2.1. 
The first strike occurred in January 1903, and resulted in a huge success, while the second (April 1903) ended in a 
defeat for the trade unions. See Ruter, De Spoorwegstakingen van 1903, 1935, 260 and onwards and Bakels, 
Staken bij de Spoorwegen in 1903 en 1983, 1987, 1-5 for more details. 
These sanctions were also called the "worgwetten van Kuyper": see Seelen, De Werkstaking van Ambtenaren, 
1967, 97-134 and Rood, Collectief Ambtenarenrecht, 1989, 121-124 for more detail. 
Rb. 's-Gravenhage, 6 June 1918, NJ 1918, 876. 
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Code of 1886 fulfilled a preventative function in that a civil servant would not have easily 
transgressed this section.87 Furthermore, the period after World War II was characterised by 
a spirit of co-operation and negotiation between the government and the civil servants which 
would enable the rebuilding of the economy. Consequently, the organising of collective 
actions by trade unions was not approved of and strikes hardly ever occurred during the 
initial post-war years. 
In the years that followed, the government started moving towards a social welfare state. 
The number of civil servants increased sharply and they began occupying positions in 
divergent social and economic fields.88 As a result of this changing image of the public 
sector, the peaceful relationship between employer and employee gradually began to 
deteriorate. The government no longer fulfilled only its traditional law-enforcement function 
and the labour relations with civil servants showed more and more similarities with those in 
the private sector. This state of affairs began to undermine the use of a legal distinction 
between civil servants and private sector employees,89 and in 1952 the Kranenburg 
Commission was eventually established to investigate this problematic issue. 
The Kranenburg commission reached the conclusion that the legal status of civil servants 
should be determined unilaterally by the government. It rejected the possibility of collective 
labour agreements and advised that the criminal sanctions applicable to collective actions 
should be retained.90 In fact, the viewpoint of the majority of the Kranenburg Commission's 
members did no more than confirm the legal position of the time.91 A minority within the 
commission, however, found the distinction between civil servants and other employees to 
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Rood, Collectief Ambtenarenrecht, 1989, 122. See also Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 43-45 for 
more detail on strikers who were never prosecuted under section 358bis of the Penal Code of 1886. 
In 1870, approximately 2% of the vocational population consisted of civil servants; in 1988 that figure has 
increased to 15%: see Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 45-48. 
Van der Horst,Ambtenaar en Grondrechten, 1967, 182. 
Rapport van de Staatscommissie van advies inzake de status van de ambtenaren, 1958, 100-107: the civil servant 
was still seen as a peculiar employee under the direct authority of the state and with a singular function to fulfil in 
the general community. 
See also Jeukens, "De status der ambtenaren", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1960, 234; Van Esveld, De 
Werkstaking in onze Sociale Verhoudingen, 1962, 94 and Seelen, De Werkstaking van Ambtenaren, 1967, 157-
181. 
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be too rough and arbitrary a criterion for the adjudication of the lawfulness of collective 
action, and pleaded for the abolition of the penal provisions.92 
During the 1960's, the viewpoint of the minority of the Kranenburg Commission began to 
gain approval among the key players in the labour relations arena,93 and was instrumental in 
the 1967-amendment to the Civil Servant Act of 1929. Before 1967, the civil servants 
already had a right to organise themselves in trade unions, but these unions only had an 
ineffective right to state their opinion. The amendment now created a right for the trade 
unions to be consulted in matters of general interest to the legal position of a civil servant,94 
which automatically stressed the need for the use of the strike weapon. Wages, however, fell 
outside the scope of the amendment and thus no consultation needed to take place in this 
regard. The reason for this peculiar exception can be found in an agreement that was reached 
with the civil service unions at the beginning of the 1960's: that wages would follow the 
average rise in wages in the private sector. The results of collective bargaining on wages in 
the private sector thus also affected wages in the public sector and therefore no real need 
existed for civil servants to go on strike for higher wages. Towards the end of the 1970's this 
changed abruptly when the government - because of the oil crisis - had to abandon this link 
with the private sector.95 Unemployment increased and the need for a right to collective 
bargaining and a right to collective action became stronger and stronger among civil 
servants. The signing by the Netherlands of the ESC in 1961, and the fact that it took nearly 
twenty years for the ESC to be ratified, only contributed to the woes of civil servants.96 
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Rapport van de Staatscommissie van advies inzake de status van de ambtenaren, 1958, 108. See also Tilstra, 
Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 48. 
See Mannoury, "De status der ambtenaren '', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1960, 243; Seelen, De Werkstaking van 
Ambtenaren, 1967, 293-308 and Koopmans, "De overheid als werkgeefster", Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, 
Notariaat en Registratie, 1970, 41 for more detail. 
See Pres.Rb. 's-Gravenhage, 16 May 1980, NJ 1980, 533. 
Even today the arrears of the civil servants have not been made up; wages in the public sector appear to lag behind 
those in the private sector by as much as 12%: see Van den Heuvel, "Some aspects of the European Social Charter 
and the right to collective action in the Netherlands", Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1993, 59. 
See Rood, "Mogen ambtenaren staken?", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1978, 729 for a description of the relevant 
legal position shortly before the ESC came into operation for the Netherlands. 
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2.3.3 Developments after 1980 
The European Social Charter was signed by the Netherlands in 1961, but it only came into 
operation on 22 May 1980. This long delay between the signing and the ratification of the 
ESC can be partially ascribed to problems which surrounded collective action in the public 
sector. The ESC does not distinguish between workers in the private and the public sectors, 
and the unconditional ratification thereof would thus have resulted in an acceptance of the 
right to collective action for workers in both sectors of the economy. The implication was 
that the penal provisions against the civil servants' freedom to strike would have to be 
abolished, or that a conditional ratification would have to take place. 
After the Social Economic Council had advised the government, Bill 11001 - dealing with 
the abolition of section 358bis of the Penal Code of 1886 - was submitted to the Lower 
House in 1970.97 This bill was accepted on 21 March 1974, but the penal provisions were 
only abolished on 14 December 1979, after which the way was open for the ratification of 
the ESC.98 However, when the ratification of the ESC took place, an exception was made 
with respect to the application of article 6(4) to civil servants, with the result that their right 
"k . d 99 to stn e was not recogmse . The exception was initially intended to only be of a 
temporary nature as the government wanted to replace it within a year by a statute dealing 
with the right to strike in the public sector.JOO If the numerous problems that were 
encountered by other European countries in regulating the civil servants' right to strike are 
noted, it is not surprising that the government did not succeed in keeping its promise.J01 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
See also 2.2.3.1 in connection with Bill 10110 and Bill 10111 that were submitted to the Lower House in 1969. 
Staatsblad, 1979, 693. 
The exception reads as follows: "Goedgekeurd wordt, dat het Koninkrijk zich met betrekking tot 
Nederland .... gebonde zal achten door de artikelen ... , artikel 6 lid 4, voor wat betreft de niet in overheidsdienst 
zijnde werknemers,. .. ". Betten, "Onevenredige schade blijft hindernis voor volledige erkenning stakingsrecht", 
Sociaal Recht, 1986, 199 sees the exception as being invalid, because the ESC makes no provision for such an 
exception. The Committee of Experts, however, has accepted the exception: Conclusions VII, 1981, 39. 
The government still kept on motivating its actions by stressing the peculiar status of the civil servants, including 
the fact that the government plays the role of the employer. 
See Betten, De Stakende Ambtenaar in lnternationaal Perspectief, 1985 for more detail in this regard. 
41 
On 1 May 1980, the Toxopeus II Commission102 announced their report which contained 
suggestions for a bill regulating the collective action of civil servants.103 The suggestions by 
this state commission were mainly based on the ESC, but the right to collective action was 
restricted in a number of ways. Some categories of civil servants were not allowed to strike 
at all,104 while certain restrictions were also suggested for the remaining categories of civil 
servants .105 
However, the civil servants' associations also wanted to participate in the legislation-making 
process. This led to the introduction of a working-group which consisted of representatives 
from the government and the civil servants' associations. On 23 October 1980, the working-
group released a report which, in certain respects, markedly deviated from the report of the 
Toxopeus II Commission.106 Neither of the two abovementioned reports matured into an act 
of parliament, and in 1983 and 1984 new efforts were made by the new Minister for Home 
Affairs, Rietkerk. His point of departure was the recognition of the right to collective action, 
limited by the restrictions in article 31 of the ESC.107 There is no need, however, to expand 
on this laborious process, because even today, no bill on the collective action of civil 
servants has been submitted to the Lower House, and it seems as if no bill will be introduced 
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The Toxopeus I Commission was a state commission that investigated the legal character of the civil servants: the 
commission terminated its activities in 1973, when the government started showing an intention to 
unconditionally ratify the ESC. 
The report also contained suggestions on a bill dealing with methods - other than the strike - which could be used 
for the resolution of disputes in the public sector. These suggestions eventually led to the creation of the Advice 
and Arbitration Committee, a state committee which is still operating today. See Becking, "De Advies- en 
Arbitragecommissie Rijksdienst", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1992, 445 for more detail. See also Chapter 5 in 
this regard. 
This applied to, for example, the civil servants in the police, the fire brigade, the custom offices and the military. 
Rapport van de commissie van advies inzake de regeling van voon:.ieningen bij collectieve arbeidsgeschillen in de 
openbare dienst, 1980: see Schrama, "Rapport commissie Toxopeus-11/IAO-verdrag nr.151 ", Sociaal Maandblad 
Arbeid, 1980, 523 and Rood, "Ontwikkelingen rond de werkstaking, in het bijzonder in de publieke sector", 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 1981, 249 for more detail on the commission's report. 
Rapport van de werkgroep Aard, Structuur en Inhoud van het Overleg (ASIO), 1980: the working-group found 
the Toxopeus II Commission's list of restrictions too long, and made suggestions for a shorter list of restrictions 
on the right to strike in the public sector. 
See "Ontwerp wet collectieve acties ambtenaren", April 1984, Memorie van Toelichting for more detail. See also 
Jaspers, "Annotatiekroniek", Tijdschrift voor Ambtenarenrecht, 1985, 255 and Bellen, "Het wetsontwerp 
collectieve acties ambtenaren getoetst aan het Europees Sociaal Handvest", in Blinde vlekken in het sociaal recht, 
1986,309. 
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. h f 108 mt e near uture. 
The unsuccessful efforts of the Dutch legislature did not prevent the development of new 
ideas. Gradually, the views on the status of civil servants started to move away from 
traditional conceptions, and in 1982, two detailed and well-motivated proposals on this issue 
were made to the Dutch Lawyers Association.109 The conclusions of the two reports were in 
total opposition to the findings by the majority of the earlier Kranenburg Commission. In 
general, no justification was found for the continued legal distinction between employees in 
the private and the public sectors and the absence of the right to strike for civil servants.110 
The proposals also contained suggestions for the creation of a bilateral consultative system 
between the government and civil servants, especially with regard to conditions of 
111 . 
employment. These proposals, together with economic developments at the time, 
convinced the government that the consultation system had to be adjusted. On 4 January 
1988 the Minister for Home Affairs submitted a proposal for a new consultative system to 
the Lower House. According to this proposal - which was eventually accepted and is now 
used in practice - the government and the majority of the different boards of civil servants 
have to reach consensus before a new amendment on labour conditions can be instituted. 
This important move from consultation to consensus on issues relating to labour conditions 
was preceded by the Dutch courts' recognition of the right to strike in the public sector. In 
1982,112 four decisions were handed down in which the courts recognised collective action 
by civil servants as being lawful in principle. The penal provisions were abolished and no 
legislation has since replaced them. The courts were therefore confronted with a legal 
vacuum which could only be filled by applying general legal principles.113 Only a year later, 
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The situation with respect to national legislation is thus the same in both the private and the public sectors: the 
legislature has failed to come up with a successful formula to regulate the right to collective action. 
"Bestaat er aanleiding de rechtspositionele verschillen tussen ambtenaren en civielrechtelijke werknemers te 
handhaven?", Handelingen Nederlandse Juristenvereniging, 1982, 5-124: De Jong and 125-239: Niessen. 
See Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 58-62 for more detail in this regard. 
Obviously, such a consultation system would only be able to operate effectively if the civil servants had the right 
to collective action. 
See also Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 15 June 1979, AB 1979, 355. 
Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 11March1982, NJ 1982, 346; Pres.Rb. Arnhem, 12 March 1982, NJ 1982, 347; Centrale Raad 
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in October 1983, a storm broke out in the public sector when the government announced its 
intention to cut the salaries of civil servants 114 by 3%. This led to a number of decisions115 in 
which the right to strike in the public sector was acknowledged in principle.116 In some of 
these cases, the right to strike was expressly acknowledged, while in others there was no 
need to decide this issue as the parties to the conflict had already accepted the existence of 
such a right. Since 1983, collective action has again featured in the public sector. Judges 
have resolved the conflicts with the use of the now accepted premise that collective action in 
the public sector is lawful in principle.117 
In the light of the above decisions, the question can be asked whether the exception made at 
the time of the ratification of the ESC with respect to the applicability of article 6(4) to civil 
servants, still has a function to fulfil. 118 After all, the exception was initially intended only to 
be of a temporary nature, valid only up to the point when a statute regulating collective 
action in the public sector came into effect. No such statute has been enacted, although the 
courts have recognised the right to collective action of civil servants in principle. Surely the 
exception has no role to play anymore?119 Rood states that the recognition of the right to 
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van Beroep, 21 October 1982, AB 1983, 35; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 16 November 1982, NJ 1983, 347. See Christe, 
"Bezonken ambtelijk stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1983, 294 for more detail on these decisions. 
The "trend followers" were also affected by the government's announcement: see 3.3.3.1.1. 
See Albers et al, De Ambtenarenstakingen; grenzen in kort geding, 1983; Rood, "Novemberstorm in de publieke 
sector", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1983, 1381; Schenk, "Stakingsrecht in kort geding'', Advocatenblad, 1984, 1; 
De Jong, "De poststaking", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1984, 3 for more detail. See also De Jong, 
"Annotatiekroniek", Tijdschrift voor Ambtenarenrecht, 1984, 95 and Stellinga, "Juridische kanttekeningen inzake 
de ambtenarenstaking", Tijdschrift voor Openbaar Bestuur, 1984, 51. 
See for example Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 4 November 1983, NJ 1983, 772; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 8 November 1983, NJ 
1983, 773; Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 11 November 1983, NJ 1983, 774; Pres.Rb. Middelburg, 19 November 1983, KG 
1983, 344; Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 25 November 1983, NJ 1984, 358; Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 25 November 1983, KG 
1983, 356; Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 29 November 1983, NJ 1987, 375; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 29 November 1983, KG 
1983, 358. See also (on appeal) Hof Den Haag, 17 January 1985, NJ 1986, 222; Hof Den Haag, 17 January 1985, 
TAR 1985, 111; Hof Den Haag, 14 February 1985, NJ 1986, 221. 
Pres.Rb. Haarlem, 25 May 1985, NJ 1985, 896; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 7 November 1985, KG 1985, 366; Pres.Rb. 
Rotterdam, 21November1985, KG 1985, 386; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 21May1990, KG 1990, 194. 
In the important NS case (HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688) the court did not deal with the validity of the 
exception: it was of no direct relevance to the issues in that case - see 3.3.3.1.1 for more detail. 
See Moons, "Erkenning van een stakingsrecht van ambtenaren", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1982, 1149; Rood, 
"Novemberstorm in de publieke sector", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1983, 1384; Betten, "Onevenredige schade 
blijft hindernis voor volledige erkenning stakingsrecht", Sociaal Recht, 1986, 200; Cremers, "Ambtenaar in actie", 
Recht & Kritiek, 1987, 70; Maris, "Collectieve acties met een 'politiek element"', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 
1988, 705 for more detail in this regard. 
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collective action of civil servants is not based on article 6(4) of the ESC, even though the 
exception to that article has been circumvented. Rather, the acknowledgement of such a 
right is based on general principles of the law120 which prescribe that the difference between 
the public and the private sectors has to be as small as possible. Neither the fact that such 
action has an inherently political element, nor the fact that the damage to third parties could 
be unreasonably high, can change the fact that such collective action is in principle lawful.121 
It is thus clear that in recent years the factual legal positions of workers in the private sector 
and that of civil servants have become more or less identical. In practice, due to both the 
international trend and internal developments, civil servants enjoy the right to collective 
action. Certain categories of civil servants, such as the police and the firebrigade, will 
however be treated more strictly with regard to the application of lawfulness criteria. Special 
regard is furthermore had to issues such as possible damage to the public interest and to third 
parties. The unique position which is occupied by some civil servants will therefore cause 
the judges to be less tolerant in respect of certain collective action in the public sector. The 
lawfulness criteria are, nevertheless, in principle exactly the same as the criteria which have 
developed in the private sector since 1972. 
Because the Dutch government has decided to lift its reservation on the ratification of the 
ESC, the whole issue concerning the exception to article 6(4) of the ESC has also lost most 
of its importance.122 In the near future, civil servants will thus also be able to claim their 
right to collective action directly from article 6(4) of the ESC. Just as in the private sector, 
all the responsibility to regulate collective action in the public sector is then placed squarely 
on the shoulders of the Dutch courts. 
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The situation can thus be compared with the 1972-situation in the private sector: see 2.23.2. 
Rood, Collectief Ambtenarenrecht, 1989, 161-170. 
The intention of the government is then to statutorily regulat·~ the military's right to strike: Aanhangsel 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, No. 635, 1277. See Van den Heuvel, "Some aspects of the European 
Social Charter and the right to collective action in the Netherlands", Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
1993, 59; Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 69. See also, generally, Van der Heijden, "Post-industrieel 
arbeidsrecht'', Nederlands Juristenblad, 1993, 299. 
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Owing to the similarity between the private and the public sectors with regard to collective 
action, no distinction will be made between the two sectors when the lawfulness criteria are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 - LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the legislative efforts of the Dutch government to regulate strike 
action were dealt with.1 In 1981, the government again asked the central employers' 
organisations and workers' unions (united in the Labour Foundation) for advice on a possible 
code concerning the regulation of strikes. The Labour Foundation only responded in 1985 
and stated that they could not formulate such a code and that they would only play a 
negotiating role when a strike occurred.2 It is thus clear that the Dutch legislature has thus 
far failed to become a successful architect of the law relating to strikes. 
In 1980 the president of the Supreme Court publicly declared3 that it is also the task of the 
judges to do justice in those cases where there are no statutory guidelines, such as in the field 
of strike law .4 Government and the social parties (employers' organisations and trade 
unions) have failed to provide regulation and it is the difficult task of the judge to fill the gap. 
Consequently, strike law in the Netherlands is for the greater part, judge-made law .5 Since 
1972, the judges have developed lawfulness-criteria to assist them in determining whether a 
particular strike is lawful or not. Unfortunately, this process is hampered by the fact that the 
relevant parties to a labour conflict often bring the matter to court by way of summary 
2 
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See 2.2.3.1. 
Advies inzake een aantal aspecten van de stakingsproblematiek, 1985, 24. In effect, the employers' organisations 
and workers' unions left the question of the legality of strikes to the judges; this is still the position today. See 
Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 27. 
Dubbink, "Rechtspraak in de gevarenzone",NRC Handelsblad, 10 May 1980. 
It is not uncommon for a judge to fill a loophole left by the legislature, but the state of affairs regarding strikes is a 
special one because of its importence (no applicable statutes on a whole field of the law) and because of the 
passive attitude taken towards it by the role-players in the legislative process (the legislature has probably opted 
for a "jurisprudential" strike law). 
The Netherlands, however, is no exception in this regard. A number of Western European countries have no 
applicable statutes on the law relating to strikes: cf Betten, De Stakende Ambtenaar in Internationaal Perspectief, 
1985, 8. 
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proceedings.6 In these proceedings, time is of the essence. A judge hardly has any time to 
deal with lawfulness-issues and has to find practical solutions to the labour conflict. Some of 
these summary proceedings do of course go on appeal, but in many cases the problem has by 
then lost much of its practical significance. Naturally, a judge-made strike law also carries 
with it the inherent risk of making a judge vulnerable to accusations of preferential treatment 
in dealing with socio-economic problems. Fortunately, the judges have the invaluable 
assistance of international treaties and conventions, such as the European Social Charter, to 
guide them in their quest for justice. 
In this chapter the central question confronting the judges in the Netherlands, namely 
whether particular collective action is lawful or not, will be analysed and discussed. 
3.2 International Rules pertaining to Strikes 
Even though Dutch legislation on strikes does not exist, and even though the Dutch 
Constitution is silent on the issue of a right to strike, the judge in the Netherlands has to take 
the applicable international and European norms on collective action into account when 
adjudicating on the lawfulness of a strike.7 These norms are contained in treaties, the most 
important treaty being the European Social Charter. 
3.2.1 The European Social Charter 
After lengthy preparations, the European Social Charter (ESQ was finalised on 18 October 
1961 in Turin, Italy. The ESC came into force on 26 February 1965 after five member states 
of the Council of Europe had ratified it.8 The Council of Europe was founded shortly after 
6 
7 
8 
See 2.2.2.2 for more detail on the summary proceeding or "kort geding". 
Cf Jacobs, De Rechtstreekse Werking van Internationale Normen in het Sociaal Recht, 1985, 57 who emphasises 
the fact that the totality of international social norms applicable to the Netherlands should be looked at when 
solving a relevant legal problem. See also Heringa, Sociale Grondrechten; hun plaats in de gereedschapskist van 
de rechter, 1989, 36 in this regard. 
See 2.2.3.2. The official text of the ESC in French and in English can be found in Tractatenblad, 1962, No. 3; the 
Dutch text can be found in Tractatenblad, 1963, No. 90. 
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World War II and has supervised nearly a hundred international treaties, the most important 
of which are the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950) and the ESC.9 
"The European Social Charter is the regional equivalent of the international covenant of the 
United Nations relating to economic, social and cultural rights concluded in 1966. In Europe, 
the Social Charter has been officially defined as the 'pendant' of - or as complementary to -
the European Convention on Human Rights signed in 1950." 10 
The ESC came into operation for the Netherlands on 22 May 1980.11 Article 6 of the ESC 
reads as follows: 
"With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the 
Contracting Parties undertake: 
1. to promote joint consultation between workers and employers; 
2. to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations 
between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a 
view to the regulations of terms and conditions of employment by means of 
collective agreements; 
3. to promote the establishment and use of the appropriate machinery for conciliation 
and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes; and recognise: 
4. the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of 
interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of 
collective agreements previously entered into."12 
Article 6(4) of the ESC is said to be a landmark in international labour law, representing the 
first occasion on which the right to strike has been expressly recognised by a treaty in 
force.13 This right, as well as the other rights that flow from the ESC, are subject to a system 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The vibrant interest in the rights of individuals was not limited to post-war Europe. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) are evidence of the world-wide move that occurred in 
the direction of human rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will be 
discussed in 3.2.3. 
Wiebringhaus, "The application of the European Social Charter" in Het Europees Sociaal Handvest, 1982, 18. 
See Harris, The European Social Charter, 1984; Betten, "Het Europees Sociaal Handvest: Europa's stiefkind", 
NJCM-Bulletin, 1988, 438; Van den Heuvel, "Some aspects of the European Social Charter and the right to 
collective action in the Netherlands", Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1993, 39-48 and Tilstra, Grenzen 
aan het Staldngsrecht, 1994, 154 and onwards for more detailed information on the ESC. 
See 2.2.3.2. When the Dutch government ratified the ESC, it made an exception with regard to civil servants due 
to article 358bis of the Dutch Penal Code (which at that time was still in force) that forbids civil servants to 
participate in strikes. Even today the exception is still in force, but it is of no real. importance anymore: see 2.3 for 
more detail. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Harris, The European Social Charter, 1984, 74. See also 3.4 in connection with article 31 of the ESC's restrictions 
to the right to strike. 
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of supeivision as laid down in articles 21-29 of the Charter. Contracting parties are obliged 
to send biannual reports to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The "Committee 
of Independent Experts" is one of the supeivisory bodies which examines these reports.14 
The conclusions that result from these examinations are an important source for the 
interpretation of the ESC.15 As Kahn-Freund aptly stated: 
"This comment on the Charter by a group of trained and skilled experts in social policy, in 
labour law, in social legislation, based as it is on careful scrutiny and deliberation ... cannot 
fail to have the effect of an influential gloss, of an interpretation which, whilst not being 
'authentic' in the legal sense, is likely to enjoy a very high degree of persuasive authority." 16 
The reason why article 6(4) of the ESC is of such great importance for the Dutch law relating 
to strikes, is because the Dutch Supreme Court17 considered the article to be a directly 
binding provision. It is thus directly enforceable by the Dutch courts. 
3.2.2 The International Labour Organisation Conventions 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is a specialised organisation of the United 
Nations. The right to strike is considered to be implied in the ILO Convention on the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (Convention 87 of 1948, 
ratified by the Netherlands on 7 March 1950) and the ILO Convention on the Right to 
Organise and to Free Collective Bargaining (Convention 98 of 1949, not yet ratified by the 
Netherlands).18 These two conventions are usually referred to as the Freedom of Association 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Other supervisory bodies that can be mentioned are the "Governmental Committee" (a subcommittee of the 
"Governmental Social Committee of the Council of Europe") and the "Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe". 
In the eyes of the Dutch Supreme Court, the Committee of Experts is an authoritative source in the interpretation 
of the Charter: see HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688. 
Kahn-Freund, "The European Social Charter", in European Law and the Individual, 1976, 205. See also Betten, 
The Incorporation of Fundamental Rights in the Legal Order of the European Communities, 1985, 182; Van den 
Heuvel, "Some aspects of the European Social Charter and the right to collective action in the Netherlands", Law 
at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1993, 44-48 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 157-169 in 
this regard. 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 (this case will be dealt with in detail in 3.3.). Cf also the provisions of article 32 
of the ESC which provides as follows: "The provisions of this Charter shall not prejudice the provisions of 
domestic law or of any bilateral or multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements which are already in force, or 
may come into force, under which more favourable treatment would be accorded to the persons protected". 
Betten, The Incorporation of Fundamental Rights in the Legal Order of the European Communities, 1985, 193. 
See also Tilstra, Grenzen aan her Stakingsrecht, 1994, 140-150 for more information on these !LO Conventions. 
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Conventions.19 Convention 87 deals with the freedom of workers to form and join trade 
unions of their choice, as well as the freedom of those unions to organise their activities 
without any interference from public authorities. Convention 98 complements Convention 
87 in that it first, protects workers from acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their 
employment and second, protects worker and employer organisations against acts of 
interference from each other. 
However, the ILO Conventions are aimed at imposing obligations on national governments 
and do not, as in the case of article 6(4) of the ESC, have direct application to employers and 
employees within a state. Therefore, employers and employees cannot directly call upon the 
implied right to strike in the conventions to assist them in collective conflict issues.20 
3.2.3 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCUR) 
The ICESCUR came into being in 1966 and was ratified by the Netherlands on 11 March 
1979. It is one of two United Nations Covenants on human rights21 and contains a large 
number of provisions relating to labour, such as the right to work and the right to form trade 
unions. The right to strike is contained in article 8(1)(d): 
"The States party to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the right to strike, provided 
that it is exercised in confonnity with the laws of the particular country." 
The inclusion of article 8(1)(d) was justified as follows: 
19 
20 
21 
"It was pointed out that striking was the only method among many (sic) whereby trade 
unions could pursue their interests, stress being placed upon its character as a last resort to be 
used only when the usual conciliation procedures had failed to secure a solution; and it was 
More recently, the Convention on the Freedom of Association and Procedures for Determining Conditions of 
Employment in the Public Service (Convention 151of1978) and the Convention on the Right to Free Collective 
Bargaining (Convention 154 of 1981) were adopted. They also belong to the Freedom of Association 
Conventions: see Bellen, The Incorporation of Fundamental Right in the Legal Order of the European 
Communities, 1985, 193 for more detail. Note also Convention 135of1971 and Recommendation 143of1971 in 
this regard. 
Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 19 December 1980, NJCM 1981, 412 and Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 21 January 1982, NJ 1984, 
487. 
See also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; both the covenants are regarded as an 
elaboration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
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urged that any provision relating to striking should permit the possibility of its limitation in 
the case of public or essential services. "22 
The proviso to article 8(1)(d) is said to be ambiguous owing to the fact that the nature of the 
right to strike is not interpreted in the same way by all the states party to the covenant.23 
In the Netherlands, the ICESCUR has not played as big a role as the ESC has, also as a result 
of the fact that the Dutch Supreme Court did not want to accept article 8(1)(d) as a directly 
binding provision.24 Just as in the case of the ILO Conventions, the employees cannot 
directly call upon the ICESCUR for assistance: it is a covenant aimed at national 
governments. 
3.2.4 The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
In 1985, Betten's thesis on the incorporation of fundamental rights in the legal order of the 
European Community was published. This thesis investigated the feasibility of a charter of 
fundamental rights for the European Community, with special reference to the right to strike. 
It came to the conclusion that it would in principle be possible to construe such a charter.25 
A few years later, such a charter was indeed created. In December 1989, the Community 
Charter was signed by eleven of the twelve member states, with the exception of Great 
Britain.26 The right to strike is expressly contained in article 13 of the Charter and is clearly 
based on article 6(4) of the ESC and article 8(1)(d) of the ICESCUR. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Doc. A/2929, "Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights", 106, quoted in 
Betten, The Incorporation of Fundamental Rights in the Legal Order of the European Communities, 1985, 192. 
See Sieghart, The Lawful Rights of Mankind, 1985, 153. 
HR 6 December 1983, NJ 1984, 557. See also Christe, "Bezonken ambtelijk stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad 
Arbeid, 1983, 292-294; Maris, "Het rechtspraakbeleid van de Hoge Raad in de stakingsarresten van 1986", 
Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1987, 267; Fruytier, "Vrijheid van loononderhandelingen en art. 8 van het 
internationaal verdrag betreffende economische, sociale en culturele rechten", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1988, 
605 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 137 for more information on the ICESCUR. 
Betten, The Incorporation of Fundamental Rights in the Legal Order of the European Communities, 1985. 
Cf Van Dijk, "Is het ESH dan niet Europees?", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1989, 1412; Betten, 'Het community 
charter inzake fundamentele sociale rechten; een veiwarrende sinterklaassurprise", NJ CM-Bulletin, 1990, 3; 
Betten, "EG-Handvest van sociale grondrechten; een hol vat?", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1990, 119 and Staal, 
"Veel heisa rond Handvest; meer alibi dan hoezee! Het Gemeenschapshandvest van sociale grondrechten van de 
werkenden in de EG",NJCM-Bulletin, 1990, 14. 
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"13. The right to collective action in the event of a conflict of interests shall include the right 
to strike, subject to the obligations arising under national regulations and collective 
agreements. 
In order to facilitate the settlement of industrial disputes the establishment and utilisation at 
the appropriate levels of conciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures should be 
encouraged in accordance with national practice." 
However, the European Community Charter is not a legally binding treaty and only plays a 
guiding role with regard to the social policy within the European Community. It has 
accordingly had no major influence on the Dutch law relating to strikes.27 
3.3 The Right to Strike: Article 6(4) ESC and its Restrictions 
As stated above,28 article 6(4) of the ESC - being a directly binding provision - plays a major 
role in providing the legal basis for strikes in the Netherlands. It is therefore necessary to 
analyse the requirements and restrictions of article 6(4) of the ESC in detail. Naturally, the 
interpretation of the European Social Charter by the respective ratifying states differs in 
certain respects.29 The purpose of this study, however, is not to determine the possible 
"correct" interpretation of the Charter with respect to the right to strike, but to analyse and 
discuss the Dutch law in this regard. The emphasis will therefore be on the specific way in 
which the relevant articles of the ESC have been interpreted and applied in the Netherlands. 
3.3.1 Conflicts of interests 
Article 6(4) of the ESC speaks of "the right of workers and employers to collective action in 
cases of conflicts of interests, including the right to strike, ... ".30 The article thus contains a 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Cf Betten, in The Future of European Social Policy, 1991, 107-161 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 
1994, 150-154. 
See 3.2.1. 
The first five member states to ratify the ESC were Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, followed by Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, France, Iceland, Belgium, Greece, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Turkey, Finland, Malta, Portugal and Spain. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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restriction with regard to the purpose of the collective action, but what does a "conflict of 
interests" entail? 
If one looks at the preamble to article 6, it is clear that the conflict has to take place in the 
framework of the right to bargain collectively .31 This would normally be a conflict 
concerning the provisions of a collective agreement, e.g. concerning the amount of wages to 
be paid, or the working conditions of employees. However, a conflict of interests does not 
necessarily concern the provisions of a collective agreement. The Committee of Experts 
commented as follows: 
"Any bargaining between one or more employers and a body of employees (whether 'de jure' 
or 'de facto) aimed at solving a problem of common interest, whatever its nature may be, 
should be regarded as 'collective bargaining' within the meaning of Article 6. "32 
In formulating "collective bargaining" in such a broad manner, the Committee of Experts 
opened the door to an equally broad interpretation of the concept "conflict of interests". 
In recognising the right to collective action only in cases of conflicts of interests, the 
Committee of Experts further makes a distinction between the concepts "conflict of interests" 
and "conflict of rights". A conflict of rights is described as a dispute concerning the 
existence, validity, interpretation or violation of a collective agreement.33 Such disputes can 
be solved by the use of applicable rules of law, and the strike weapon may thus not be used. 
The French jurist, Blanc-Jouvan, gives the following definitions: 
31 
32 
33 
"Disputes over rights ... tum on the existence or the content of a right claimed by a party, that 
is, on the application or interpretation of existing law, whether it has its source in legislation, 
in a collective agreement, or in the individual contract of employment. 
Disputes over interests, often called economic interests, tum on amendments and 
improvements in existing law or even on the development of new law through the channels 
In the NS case (HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688, 3.4) the Dutch Supreme Court gave the following definition of a 
conflict of interests: "Een geschil zowel met betrekking to de belemmering in de uitoefening van het recht op 
collectief onderhandelen over de arbeidsvoorwaarden van de werknemers in dienst van de NS, welke 
voorwaarden in elk geval bij CAO plegen te warden vastgesteld, als met betrekking tot de inhoud van die 
arbeidsvoorwaarden." It is not clear whether the Supreme Court wanted to give a general definition or whether the 
definition is limited to the specific facts of the case. 
Conclusions IV, 1975, 50. Cf also Conclusions I, 1969/1970, 184 and Conclusions II, 1971, 28 in this regard. 
Conclusions I, 1969/1970, 38. 
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normally open to the parties, that is, the negotiation of collective agreements."34 
The abovementioned distinction between "conflicts of interests" and "conflicts of rights" led 
to differing decisions by the Dutch courts on the question whether collective action may be 
used if a dispute can still be solved by the use of applicable rules of law .35 The Dutch 
literature on strikes also manifest differences of opinion on this issue whether collective 
action may be used to influence the decision-making process of an employer,36 especially 
with regard to matters such as reorganisation and collective dismissals. In general, the 
majority of Dutch writers on the subject answered this question in the affirmative, and it can 
be accepted that such a conflict would be classified as a "conflict of interests" in the Dutch 
law today .37 
3.3.2 Collective agreements 
Article 6(4) of the ESC speaks of "the right of workers and employers to collective action ... 
subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into." 
It is clear that the obligations flowing from a collective agreement can stand in the way of the 
right to collective action. If a trade union, in calling a strike, fails to comply with an 
obligation contained in a collective agreement to which it is a party, the strike would most 
probably be regarded as unlawful. The abovementioned obligations are normally explicitly 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Blanc-Jouvan, contribution to Aaron (ed.), Labor Courts and Grievance Settlement in Western Europe, 1971, 8-9. 
For example, a court ruled that collective action could be used to influence a decision on proposed amendments to 
the Disability Insurance Act, even though it was possible to solve the dispute by the use of applicable rules of law 
(Pres.Rb. Haarlem, 3 October 1991, KG 1991, 351), whereas a strike against the nomination of a director of a 
company was declared unlawful as the dispute could be solved by the use of applicable rules of law (Pres.Rb. 
Utrecht, 21June1991, KG 1991, 256). Cf also Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 16 February 1990, KG 1990, 99; HR 19 
April 1991, NJ 1991, 690 and Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 28 April 1992, KG 1992, 224. 
According to Dutch law, an employer does not have an unlimited power to make organisational decisions with 
regard to employment matters. Sections 25 and 26 of the Works Council Act of 1971 provides supervisory 
information and consultation duties to be observed by employers before they are allowed to reorganise or dismiss 
employees. Special duties in this regard could furthermore be found in a collective labour agreement which 
contractually binds the employer: see also 3.3.2 in this regard. 
See the differing opinions of Peeters, "Het recht op collectieve actie van werknemers", Nederlands Juristenblad, 
1980, 71; Maris, "Stakingsrecht en belangengeschillen in het ESH'', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1983, 278; Fase, 
"Medezeggenschap en collectieve actie" in Arbeid in Kort Geding, 1983, 13; Loonstra, Gezag, Medezeggenschap 
en Collectieve Actie, 1990, Chapter 4; Duk, in De Marisbundel, 1989, 19; Luttmer-Kat, "Zijn collectieve acties 
tegen ontslagmaatregelen rechtens toegestaan?", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1989, 333; Luttmer-Kat, 
Ondernemersbesluiten onder actievuur, Inaugural lecture, 23 October 1990; Van het Kaar, Medezeggenschap bij 
Fusie en Ontvlechting, 1993, 199 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 293. 
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contained in the so-called "duty of peace" provision. It can be accepted, however, that 
collective action aimed at bringing about amendments to the agreed terms of a collective 
agreement during the course of that agreement - even if the duty of peace does not form a 
physical part of the collective agreement - are also unlawful.38 This does not apply to cases 
where there is a clause providing for interim amendments to - or the termination of - the 
collective agreement.39 Such a clause would thus directly influence the scope of the duty of 
peace and the still valid collective agreement can go back to the negotiating table, and its 
contents influenced by the use of collective action. 
A distinction can be drawn between a relative and an absolute duty of peace. A relative duty 
of peace only prohibits collective action aimed at amending the provisions of the collective 
agreement, while an absolute duty of peace covers all collective action during the duration of 
the collective agreement.40 The relative duty of peace is more common in Dutch practice 
today and has of course no application if the collective action is aimed at another party, e.g. 
the govemment.41 
3.3.3 Industrial action covered by article 6(4) ESC 
Article 6(4) of the ESC speaks of "the right of workers and employers to collective action ... , 
including the right to strike, ... " .42 The right to strike is thqs conferred on individual 
employees and not on organisations. The Committee of Experts expressed it as follows: 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
This tacit duty of peace has to do with the underlying idea behind the Collective Labour Agreement Act of 1927, 
namely that there should for a certain period (the duration of the collective labour agreement) be stability with 
respect to the conditions of labour. Cf also Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 27 August 1979, NJ 1979, 517 and Fase, CAO-
recht, 1982, 48. 
This is the so-called "openbreek-clausule". 
This is no more than a rough distinction: in practice, numerous refinements take place with the result that the two 
forms often overlap, having similar consequences. See Stolwijk, De Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst voor de 
Typografie, 153 and Mannoury, De Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst, 53. 
Cf Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 10 March 1980, NJ 1980, 165; Pres.Rb. Den Haag, 6 May 1981, NJ 1981, 542; Pres.Rb. 
Leeuwarden, 22 November 1985, NJ 1987, 71; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 25 September 1991, KG 1991, 346 and Pres.Rb. 
Groningen, 3 October 1991, KG no. 187 /91. 
(Emphasis added.) The right of employers to collective action will be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
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"Lastly, there is no provision in Article 6 or indeed any other article of the Charter that allows 
the exercise of the right to strike to be restricted to trade unions. Paragraph 6 of Part I of the 
Charter lays down the principle that 'all workers and employers have the right to bargain 
collectively'. Since therefore an ordinary group of workers without any legal status may 
engage in such bargaining, it can and should be given the right to strike under Article 6, 
paragraph 4, so that it may effectively exercise its right to bargain collectively. "43 
No distinction is thus drawn between organised and unorganised (wildcat) strikes,44 and this 
can also be reconciled with the theoretical position in the Netherlands today. However, 
wildcat strikes do not have much practical significance in the Netherlands and only a few of 
these strikes have broken out in the past; they are normally either of short duration or are 
transformed into organised strikes by the intervention of trade unions.45 It is thus difficult to 
deduce a general legal approach towards these unorganised strikes from the Dutch 
jurisprudence. 
The concept of "worker" is furthermore broadly interpreted by the Committee of Experts, 
and also includes self-employed persons and civil servants.46 The Dutch government, 
however, subscribes to a slightly narrower interpretation, stating that self-employed persons 
do not fall under the provisions of article 6(4) of the ESC.47 As mentioned above, the Dutch 
government in 1989 decided to lift its reservation on the ratification of the ESC, with the 
result that civil servants will in the near future also be included in the concept of "worker" as 
used in article 6(4) of the ESC. 
It is also clear that article 6(4) of the ESC includes more than the right to strike: the broad 
term "collective action" is used, and even though the supervisory bodies of the ESC have not 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Conclusions IV, 1975, 50. Cf also Conclusions!!, 1971, 28 and Conclusions X!!-1, 1992, 129. 
A wildcat strike is a strike that is not organised by a regular trade union, but, for example, by an ad hoc committee 
rising to a particular occasion. See Rood, "Over de betekenis van het Europees Sociaal Handvest voor het 
stakingsrecht en het onderhandelingsrecht in de private en in de publieke sector'', in Het Europees Sociaal 
Handvest, 1982, 61-62. 
See Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 205. Cf also Conclusions IX, 1985, 57. 
Conclusions !, 1969/1970, 8: "In the light of the travaux preparatoires the Committee arrived at the conclusion 
that in principle the term 'worker' was intended to cover both employed and self-employed persons, but that this 
interpretation could not be applied in all cases." 
Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1976-1977, 13873, No. 10, 4. See also Tilstra, Grenzen aan het 
Stakingsrecht, 1994, 184 and 279 in this regard. 
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specified the contents of this concept, it is a generally accepted fact that it includes more than 
the typical full cessation of work.48 
In the paragraphs that follow, the effect of article 6(4) of the ESC on the different types of 
collective action, will be discussed.49 
3.3.3.1 The "normal" strike 
In the Nederlandse Spoorwegen case,50 the Dutch Supreme Court for the first time made the 
assumption that the compilers of the ESC had the normal type of collective action in mind 
when they formulated article 6(4). This "normal type" of strike, namely the strike that is 
directed solely at the employer, would be covered by article 6(4) of the ESC, which would 
thus make it lawful in principle.51 It is clear that the judge does not only investigate the 
physical form of the collective action, but also the purpose thereof, or, against whom and 
what the strike is directed. This latter aspect formed a central part of the NS case, where the 
Supreme Court distinguished the action in casu from the said "normal type" of strike by 
noting the following peculiar aspect: the collective action in casu was physically directed 
against the employer,52 but was in fact aimed at the government.53 As will be seen below, 
the lawfulness of these types of collective action thus depends on the specific purpose of the 
action. 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Cf Collected ~ravaux preparatoires', Volume IV, 1957, 16 and Collected ~ravaux preparatoires', Volume V, 
1958, 48 in this regard. 
In the Netherlands, the different types of collective action have only become relevant during the 1980's: before 
this time, nearly all collective action was executed in the form of the traditional all-out strike. (The definitions of 
the different types of collective action have been dealt with in Chapter 1.) 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688. This case will hereafter be referred to as the NS case. 
Failure to comply with procedural rules as well as actions in conflict with article 31 of the ESC, could still 
undermine the lawfulness of a strike; these issues will be dealt with in 3.4 and 3.5. 
The action directed itself against the employer in the sense that the contracted labour was not performed as it 
ought to have been, which in tum disrupted and caused damage to the employer's concern. 
The action was aimed at the government in the sense that its purpose was to exert pressure on the government in 
order to prevent it from interfering with the conditions of employment. Cf also Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 10 March 
1980, NJ 1980, 165 and Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 16 April 1985, Recht & Kritiek, 1985, 385. 
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3.3.3.1.1 Actions aimed at government which are covered by the ESC 
The relevant facts of the NS case can be summarised as follows: in 1983 the government 
announced its intention to cut the salaries of civil servants by three percent (3%). Railway 
workers, however, were not considered as civil servants at that time but were rather 
considered to be "trend followers" .54 According to the then existing Temporary Act on the 
Conditions of Employment in the Public Sector of 1980, the Minister of Social Affairs had 
the authority to extend the proposed civil servant wage cut to workers in that sector as well -
and intended to do just that. This led to organised collective action by the railway personnel 
during the period from 17 October 1983 to 5 December 1983.55 The Railway Board started a 
summary procedure against the unions. On 4 November 1983 the president of the Utrecht 
District Court declared the action of the unions to be unlawful, and on 15 November 1984 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal expressed the same opinion. This left the way clear for a 
decision from the Dutch Supreme Court which was given on 30 May 1986.56 
As mentioned above, the purpose of these types of action is a decisive factor in determining 
their lawfulness. In the NS case, the Railway Board argued that they could not satisfy the 
demand of the unions, and that the collective action was thus not covered by the ESC. Only 
collective action flowing from collective bargaining -and not political actions against the 
government's intention - fall under article 6(4) of the ESC. In countering this argument, the 
Supreme Court inter alia analysed the ratio behind article 6(4) of the ESC. According to the 
preamble to article 6, the ratio is to ensure the effective exercise of the right to bargain 
collectively. The government's intended action would have the effect of seriously limiting 
54 
55 
56 
"Trend followers" (their terms of employment normally followed wage trends in the private sector) was the term 
commonly used for employees that fell under the Temporary Act on the Conditions of Employment in the Public 
Sector. They worked in the non-profit sector, which comprised institutions such as welfare organisations and 
hospitals. They were regarded as "hybrid" employees; even though their salaries were paid by the government, 
they were not classified as civil servants as the terms and conditions of their employment differed from those of 
the civil servants. See Van Peijpe, "Loonvorming in de collectieve sector", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1986, 358 
for more detail in this regard. 
Their actions were very successful in the sense that they disrupted railway traffic for more than a month. The 
government, however, did not give in and in the end, the unions lost the fight. 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688. In this case, the Supreme Court for the first time after the Panhonlibco decision, 
again had the opportunity to give its opinion on organised strikes. The Supreme Court made ample use of this 
opportunity; the lengthy, well-motivated decision reads more like a legal essay than a normal Supreme Court 
judgement. 
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the trend followers' right to bargain collectively. These actions are thus not purely political: 
they fall within the scope of the ESC, even though they take place in the business of an 
employer who is unable to do a thing about it. Only those actions whose purpose clearly fall 
outside the ambit of collective bargaining have no claim on the protection of the ESC. The 
Supreme Court based this argument on the view held by the Committee of Experts,57 namely 
that collective actions aimed at government policy - involving conditions of labour which are 
or ought to have been the subject of collective bargaining - are covered by the provisions of 
the ESC.58 
The Supreme Court furthermore held that the collective action had to be qualified. Even 
though the action was on the face of it directed at both the employer and the government, it 
was on closer investigation no different from the "normal type" of strike. This equation was 
possible because of the fact that the salaries of the railway personnel were mainly chargeable 
to the government, who thus fulfilled the role of material employer (in contrast with the 
Railway Board who was no more than a formal employer).59 
The argument that there was no conflict of interests in casu was thereby also effectively 
countered. The government's intended action involved not only the restriction of the right to 
bargain collectively on terms and conditions of employment (which were normally 
determined by way of a collective agreement), but also the actual conditions of employment 
(the intended wage cut by the government as material employer), which certainly qualified it 
as a conflict of interests. 
A few months after the NS case, another important decision concerning government-aimed 
57 
58 
59 
The Committee of Experts was thus seen as an authoritative source by the Dutch Supreme Court. Cf also 
Committee of Experts of the ILO, General Survey, 1983, 67: "The committee considers that 'trade union 
organisations ought to have the possibility of recourse to protest strikes, in particular where aimed at criticising a 
government's economic and social policies." 
Conclusions II, 1971, 27. See also Rood, "Over collectieve werknemers actie of: de HR terug van weggeweest", 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 1987, 301 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 90 and 318. 
See 3.4 for the related issue of restrictions imposed by article 31 of the ESC. See also Maris, "Collectieve acties 
met een 'politiek element"', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1988, 704; Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands 
Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 204 and Van den Heuvel, "Some aspects of the European Social Charter and the right to 
collective action in the Netherlands", Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1993, 57. 
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action was given by the Dutch Supreme Court in the Hoogovens case. 60 The facts can be 
summarised as follows. In March 1980, several strikes of short duration took place at the 
Hoogovens Groep BV, a blast-furnace company. Just as in the NS case, these strikes were 
also inspired by the government's intention to amend legislation directly affecting the 
employees. The trade union felt that the proposed changes to the Wage Act of 197061 
constituted an attack on the principle of wage negotiation recognised by article 6(4) of the 
ESC. At the time when the strikes occurred, however, the Dutch government had not yet 
ratified the ESC, even though the decision to sign the charter had at that stage already been 
taken.62 In giving its decision, the Supreme Court nevertheless accepted the ESC as a guide 
and accordingly decided, as in the NS case, that the action was lawful as the purpose thereof 
was to defend the right to bargain collectively. In the Hoogovens case - unlike the NS case -
the Supreme Court considered the strikes to be a "pure" form of protest action as the 
government did not fulfil the role of material employer.63 
In 1994, the Supreme Court was given another opportunity to adjudicate on the lawfulness of 
government-aimed actions.64 This time it concerned a conflict between the transport union 
FNV and the employers' organisation Scheepvaart Vereniging Zuid (SVZ), which resulted in 
several strikes of short duration at the port of Rotterdam.65 The actions were directed against 
proposed statutory amendments which aimed to reduce compensation paid by the national 
health and disability insurance schemes. 
The Supreme Court confirmed its two 1986 decisions: a collective action directed against the 
60 
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62 
63 
64 
65 
HR 7 November 1986, NJ 1987, 226. This case will hereafter be referred to as the Hoogovens case. It can be 
accepted that the essential principles involved in the NS case and the Hoogovens case were simultaneously dealt 
with by the Supreme Court: see Maris, "Collectieve acties met een 'politiek element"', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 
1988,698. 
The actions were also directed against a "wage freeze" decision taken by the Government. 
The ESC came into operation for the Netherlands on 22 May 1980: see 3.2.1. 
See also Van der Heijden, "De rechter en staken tegen de overheid; het ESH voorbij", Nederlands Juristenblad, 
1991, 1577 with regard to the protest strikes that occurred in connection with the proposed amendments to the 
Health Insurance Act of 1913 and the Industrial Disability Act of 1975 (these strikes are dealt with in 3.4). 
HR 11 November 1994, NJ 1995, 152. 
The strikes eventually spread to other locations. 
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employer, but aimed at the government, is lawful in principle, as long as it involves labour 
conditions which are or ought to have been the subject of collective bargaining.66 In the 
above situation, the employer can be classified as a third party to the conflict with the result 
that the employer's interests (in terms of article 31 of the ESC) can affect the lawfulness of 
the strike. 
The importance of this decision lies in the fact that the Supreme Court explicitly stated that 
the employer's economic interests can qualify as interests under article 31 of the ESC.67 
Article 31, the so-called public order clause, speaks of restrictions "such as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public health or morals". The 
court added, however, that the economic interests of an employer would only justify a 
restriction on the right to strike in extraordinary situations, such as when the Dutch economy 
as a whole could be weakened by the collective action.68 In addition, the court placed a 
heavy evidentiary burden on the employer who wants to qualify for protection under article 
31 of the ESC. Such employer has to prove that an immediate threat of significant damage 
. 69 
exists. By placing these qualifications on the concept of "economic interests of 
employers 11 , the court endeavoured to prevent the right to strike from becoming illusionary. 
After all, damage inflicted upon an employer constitutes an inherent characteristic of 
collective action. 
The fact that a dispute has a "political 11 element does therefore not ipso facto deprive such 
dispute of its character as a trade dispute.70 
66 
67 
68 
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The court's view is based on both article 6(4) and article 31 of the ESC. See Vegter, "Politieke staking niet snel 
onrechtmatig", Bedrijfsjuridische Berichten, 1995, 37 and Tan, "Politieke stakingen: een normaal bedrijfsrisico?", 
Advocatenblad, 1995, 70 for more detail in this regard. 
The restrictions on the right to collective action are not only found in article 6(4) of the ESC, but also in article 31 
of the ESC; see 3 .4 for more detail on these article 31 restrictions. 
The mere fact that an employer has suffered substantial damages as a result of collective action, would not be 
sufficient: such damage will be classified as a normal business risk. 
The Supreme Court formulated it as follows: " ... een onmiddellijk en concreet gevaar voor een specifieke, 
aanzienlijke schade, waarvan aard en vermoedelijke omvang, tegenover een eventuele betwisting, van de zijde 
van de werkgevers aannemelijk dienen te warden gemaakt." The employer in casu failed to prove such an 
immediate threat of significant damage to its concern. 
Compare Davies & Freedland, Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law, 1983, at 316-317: "In other words; the term 
'political strike' is not only indistinct, but also useless, because even where the strike is unquestionably 'political', it 
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3.3.3.1.2 Actions aimed at government which are not covered by the ESC 
From the three decisions above, it is clear that the Dutch Supreme Court makes an important 
distinction between collective action aimed at government policy regarding labour 
conditions (which are or ought to have been the subject of collective bargaining), and purely 
political actions aimed at government policy of a different kind.71 The definition of the 
purely political strike is thus determined in a negative way, as being those collective actions 
aimed at government policy that do not involve conditions of employment which are or 
ought to have been the subject of collective bargaining.72 However, the three Supreme Court 
decisions provided no further guidelines, directives or indications regarding the purely 
political strike. The Supreme Court only stated that the lawfulness of such a strike is left to 
the national legislation of each of the member states.73 
In the Netherlands, the elasticity of the court's future approach will depend on the scope of 
the words " ... which are or ought to have been ... " in the abovementioned formula.74 
"Conditions of employment" have previously been defined as special stipulations in a 
contract of employment, mostly regulated in a collective labour agreement.75 Consequently, 
the use of the word "ought" would probably play the major role in determining the outer 
limits of ESC-protection for government-aimed actions. 
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72 
73 
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may still be a trade dispute or it may not. How could one expect anything else in a world in which the political 
and economic spheres of life are indistinguishable? Whatever the political colour of the Government, it is 
involved in industry, and the organisations of both sides of industry are involved in government. Is not every 
major industrial problem a problem of governmental economic policy?". 
These two types of action both form the group of collective actions with - to use the terminology of the Supreme 
Court - a "political element": see HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 at 3.4. 
The Committee of Experts expressed it as follows: "Political strikes are not covered by article 6 which is designed 
to protect the right to bargain collectively, such strikes being obviously quite outside the purview of collective 
bargaining." (Conclusions II, 1971, 27). See also Conclusions IV, 1975, 136. · 
See Rood,Naar een Stakingswet?, 1978, 77 and onwards, who feels that the distinction between a political and a 
non-political strike is so vague that it cannot be an effective criterion for judging the lawfulness of a strike. 
See Nadasen,A Perspective on Strikes in South African Labour Law, 1991, 46 where he concludes that there is no 
determinative connection in the Netherlands between the characterisation "political" and a finding on the legality 
of the action, unless "political" is defined in terms of the contents of the dispute. 
See Alga (ed.), Juridisch Woordenboek, 1985, 34: "arbeidsvoorwaarden: bijzondere bedingen in een 
arbeidsovereenkomst meestal in CAO 's geregeld". 
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Even though purely political action is not protected by the ESC, it does not mean that the 
action is also automatically unlawful. Reference should be had to the previously discussed 
Panhonlibco case, which is still relevant to purely political strikes.76 If one uses the criteria 
set out by the Supreme Court in that case, purely political action could be lawful if its 
purpose is closely connected to the public interest or important moral principles. However, 
these types of cases hardly ever occur in the Netherlands and thus present no real practical 
problem.77 
3.3.3.1.3 Solidarity and sympathy strikes 
The purpose of a strike - or against whom and what the strike is directed - also plays a central 
role in determining whether a solidarity or a sympathy strike is lawful or not. In the 
Panhonlibco decision, the Supreme Court formulated the following rule in this regard: if the 
purpose of collective action falls outside the employer-employee relationship and if the 
collective action was caused by circumstances falling outside the employer's sphere of 
influence, the employees engaged in such an action would, in principle, be guilty of a breach 
of contract. Such action could, however, be lawful if the purpose of the action is closely 
connected to the public interest or important moral principles.78 Since the Panhonlibco 
decision, the Dutch Supreme Court has had no opportunity to deal with these types of 
collective action, and the current validity of the abovementioned rule, especially after the 
prominent NS case, thus remains uncertain.79 
In Dutch literature, a relatively flexible approach to solidarity and sympathy strikes is 
propagated. Betten, for example, states that the European Community should recognise the 
"right of workers to organise and to participate in a strike, which is undertaken in support of 
a lawful strike in another Member State, which affects the rights or interests of these 
76 
77 
78 
79 
HG 15 January 1960, NJ 1960, 84: see Hansma, Collectieve Actie onder de Rechter, 1986, 20. 
See Maris, "Collectieve acties met een 'politiek element"', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1988, 698 and Nadasen, A 
Perspective on Strikes in South African Labour Law, 1991, 31-46 for more detail on purely political strikes in the 
Dutch context. 
HR 15 January 1960, NJ 1960, 84: see also 2.2.2.3. and 3.3.3.1.2. in this regard. 
The international treaties are of no real assistance in this regard: cf Conclusions X-1, 1987, 76 and Tilstra, 
Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 320. 
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workers 11 _so A distinction can thus be made between "pure 11 solidarity strikes (in which the 
rights or interests of the solidarity strikers are not at all influenced by the other strike) and 
solidarity strikes in which the rights or interests of the solidarity strikers could be influenced 
by the other (or main) strike. In the first case, the solidarity or sympathy strike would most 
probably not fall under the protection of article 6(4) of the ESC; after all, there has to be a 
link between the strike and the right to bargain collectively. However, if such a link can be 
constituted, such a strike would, in principle, fall under the protection of the ESC. Such a 
distinction would also be in accordance with the lower court developments in this regard. 
The "pure" types of solidarity and sympathy action will, in general, be more easily 
condemned than those strikes (indirectly) aimed at securing better working conditions.s1 
3.3.3.2 Work-to-rule and go-slow 
In the NS case - as mentioned above - the Dutch Supreme Court for the first time made the 
assumption that the compilers of the ESC had the "normal type" of strike in mind when they 
formulated article 6(4). However, the collective action in the NS cases2 differed from the 
"normal type" of strike not only qua purpose, but also qua physical form. It consisted of 
work-to-rule and go-slow actions, as well as work stoppages of a short duration at varying 
locations (relay strikes). As mentioned above, the formulation of article 6(4) of the ESC 
(" ... the right of workers ... to collective action .. .including the right to strike ... "), leaves no 
doubt about the fact that the term "collective action" includes much more than the normal 
strike.83 Consequently, the ESC does not only give protection to the normal strike, but also 
to other forms of collective action. But how wide is the protection of the ESC in this regard? 
In the NS case, the Railway Board argued that the form of the action made them "unfair"; it 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Betten, The Incorporation of Fundamental Rights in the Legal Order of the European Communities, 1985, 225. 
See also Rood, Naar een Stakingswet?, 1978, 83; Van Schei Jen, Aspecten van lnternationaal Stakingsrecht, 1983, 
23; Jaspers, "Het overheidspersoneel en collectieve acties", in Arbeidsverhoudingen bij de Overheid, 1985, 126 
and FNV, Collectieve Actie: een recht, 1987, 23 in this regard. 
Cf Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 24 October 1972, NJ 1972, 457 and Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 11 March 1982, NJ 1982, 346. 
The collective actions in the Hoogovens case had the form of a "normal type" of strike. 
Collective action thus includes much more than a complete cessation of work. Traditionally (that is, before the 
ratification of the ESC), the Dutch courts did not easily tolerate work-to-rule and other similar actions: cf Pres.Rb. 
Den Haag, 18 August 1958, NJ 1958, 452 and Hof Amsterdam, 9 February 1967, NJ 1967, 437. 
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caused considerable damage to the employer, while virtually no financial sacrifices had to be 
made by the employees. In a normal strike (regarding working conditions), the striking 
employees have, after all, no right to claim their wages (articles 1638b and 1638d of the 
Dutch Civil Code) while, according to the Railway Board, they could in the present case still 
. h . h 84 exercise t at ng t. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument because of its unjust point of departure, namely 
the disproportional damage of the employer and the employees. The basis of the Supreme 
Court's reasoning was the risk-concept which it had already introduced in an earlier decision. 
In that case,85 which dealt with the wage claims of employees willing to work during a strike 
(or put differently, the interpretation of article 1638d of the Dutch Civil Code), the Supreme 
Court made a distinction between two fundamental types of collective action. The first type 
normally possesses the following characteristics: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
a large group of employees 
an organised collective action 
it concerns conditions of employment 
for a certain period of time. 
The second type displays the following features: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
a small group of employees 
an unorganised (wildcat) collective action 
it is of a protest nature 
for a short period of time. 
In general, the first type of action would, according to the Supreme Court, be executed at the 
risk of the collectivity of employees, while the second type would be performed at the risk of 
the employer (who would then still have to pay those employees willing to work). In the NS 
84 
85 
Cf Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 25 June 1979, NJ 1979, 518 and Hof Den Haag, 17 January 1985, NJ 1986, 222 in this 
regard. 
Wielemaker/De Scheide, HR 7 May 1976, NJ 1977, 55. This case will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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case, the action was classified as belonging to the first category ,86 and therefore, the 
employer was able to reduce the wages of all the employees (because they took part in the 
action at their own risk). However, if the employer - in order to avoid thorny issues of wage 
reduction and the amount thereof - prefers to pay the employees their normal wages, the 
balance of power between the parties could be shifted. On the other hand, this type of action 
could cause less damage to an employer than the normal all-out strike, which could restore 
the balance of power to a certain extent. 
The Supreme Court thus recognised this type of action as being lawful in principle, even 
though it contains elements which could disturb the equilibrium of power between the 
employer and the employees.87 These elements could, according to the Court, cause this 
type of action to be more easily condemned by a judge than the normal type of strike, on the 
basis of the disproportional damage of the employer and the employees. 
The Supreme Court's reasoning concerning the form of the collective action and its influence 
on the issue of lawfulness forms a weak part of the decision. Neither the legal basis of the 
reasoning, nor the consequences and application thereof in practice, is satisfactorily dealt 
with.88 One will thus have to wait for future decisions to fill in these details. 
3.3.3.3 The sit-down strike 
In some situations, such as when workers are confronted with the possible closure of a 
factory, there is clearly no point in using the strike weapon. An effective form of collective 
action often used in these circumstances, is the sit-down strike. In the Dutch jurisprudence, 
this form of collective action has often been condemned as being unlawful.89 The basis of 
86 
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88 
89 
It should be noted that the distinction between the two types of action makes no mention of the form of the action: 
actions such as in the NS case could thus theoretically fall within either of the two categories. 
In the NS case, this was not considered to be the case and the actions were declared lawful. 
See Betten, "Onevenredige schade blijft hindernis voor volledige erkenning stakingsrecht", Sociaal Recht, 1986, 
199 and Rood, "Over collectieve werknemers actie of: de HR terug van weggeweest", Nederlands luristenblad, 
1987, 301 for more detail. 
Cf HR 22 December 1978, NJ 1979, 372; Pres.Rb. Almelo, 19 September 1980, NJ 1981, 291; Pres.Rb. 
Amsterdam, 7 July 1981, NJ 1981, 424; Pres.Rb. Maastricht, 13 March 1982, KG 1982, 49. Sit-down strikes were 
regarded as being lawful only in exceptional circumstances: see Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 30 November 1978, NJ 
1981, 65 and Hof Den Haag, 23 April 1982, NJ 1985, 312. 
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the unlawfulness was originally sought in the infringement of proprietary rights caused by 
sit-down strikes .90 
Approximately five years after the landmark decision in the NS case, the Supreme Court was 
given the opportunity to give its opinion on the lawfulness of a sit-down strike when such a 
strike broke out at the central administration of Elka BV, a chain of supermarkets which had 
serious financial problems at the time.91 The aim of the sit-down strike was to force the two 
allegedly incompetent directors, who were also sole shareholders, to retire and sell their 
shares. The action succeeded, and the two directors claimed damages from the trade unions 
for the financial loss they suffered when they were forced to sell their shares. The trade 
unions, in tum, argued that their conduct was lawful and necessary for the continued 
existence of Elka B V. 
In giving the decision, the Supreme Court assumed - as it had for the first time in the NS case 
- that the compilers of the ESC had the "normal type" of strike in mind when they formulated 
article 6(4). By using that assumption as a point of departure, and after consulting the 
relevant case law and literature of the Charter's member states, the Supreme Court decided 
that - noting its extreme purpose and unique character - the action in casu was not covered by 
article 6(4) of the ESC.92 The Supreme Court then investigated whether the action could be 
seen as lawful according to the national rules of law93 and reached the same conclusion. The 
reason given for the finding of unlawfulness according to national law, was the fact that there 
90 
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The Dutch writers have shown a tolerant approach to the sit-down strike, regarding it as being lawful in principle: 
cf Frenkel, "Staking en bedrijfsbezetting", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1973, 71; De Gaay Fortman, "Enka-
bezetting en vennootschapsrecht'', in Verzekeringen van Vriendschap, 1974, 261; De Jong, "Enkele 
rechtsoverwegingen bij de bedrijfsbezetting'', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1974, 283; Peeters, "Het recht op 
collectieve actie van werknemers'', Nederlands Juristenblad, 1980, 70; Fase, "Medezeggenschap en collectieve 
actie", inArbeid in Kort Ceding, 1983, 20. 
HR 19 April 1991, NJ 1991, 690. This case will hereafter be referred to as the Elka case. 
The Supreme Court expressed it as follows: "Een ander in aanmerking genomen, ligt de actie van de bonden 
zover af van het evenbedoelde type van collectieve actie van werknemers, dat - bij gebreke van duidelijke 
aanwijzingen voor het tegendeel - niet valt aan te nemen dat aan stellers van art. 6 lid 4 voor ogen heeft gestaan 
een zodanige actie onder de bescherming van deze verdragsbepaling te begrijpen, terwijl rechtspraak en 
rechtsliteratuur in de verdragsstaten geen blijk ervan geven dat de in die staten omtrent art. 6 lid 4 levende 
rechtsopvattingen zich sedert de totstandkoming van het Handvest (1961) zodanig hebben ontwikkeld dat bij een 
met die rechtsopvatting strokende uitleg van de bepaling een actie als onderhavige, hetzij in 1980 dan wel thans, 
onder de bescherrning van de bepaling zou vallen." 
Article 32 of the ESC stipulates that the ESC does not interfere with the member states' national rules of law if 
these rules of law are more favourable to the party seeking protection. 
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were other legal ways and means by which the unions could have achieved their intended 
purpose. The collective action was thus not used as an ultimum remedium94 and the unions 
were ordered to pay damages to the two directors. 
The Elka case can be subjected to critique on the basis that the Supreme Court did not make 
use of the opportunity to lay down general rules regarding the sit-down strike.95 The only 
general rule which could be deduced from the case, is that not every type of collective action 
is in principle covered by the ESC. The status of a sit-down strike in relation to the ESC thus 
remains uncertain. 
One could agree with Betten96 that the Supreme Court created unnecessary difficulties for 
itself by introducing and expanding the statement that the compilers of the ESC must have 
had the "normal type" of strike in mind when they compiled article 6(4). Neither in the 
travaux preparatoires of the ESC,97 nor in the conclusions of the Committee of Experts,98 
can any indications be found that the term "collective action" should be interpreted in the 
above way. That does not mean, however, that all collective action which falls under the 
protection of article 6(4) of the ESC will automatically be classified as lawful. In the Elka 
case, the Supreme Court could have reached the same conclusion by testing whether the 
collective action (which would then be covered by article 6(4) of the ESC) was exercised 
with due care,99 and whether it would not have been disqualified by the restrictions imposed 
by article 31 of the ESC. Article 31 of the ESC could have been applicable. The unique 
character and extreme purpose of the strike led to a violation of the directors' fundamental 
proprietary rights, which justifies a restriction in terms of article 31 of the ESC. 
94 
95 
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98 
99 
The ultimum remedium-requirement is fully dealt with in 3.5. 
The Supreme Court only dealt with the facts in issue (the unique character and extreme purpose of the strike were 
both seen as aggravating factors), and it is possible that a sit-down strike which occurs in more favourable 
circumstances will be covered by the protection of article 6(4) of the ESC. 
Betten, "Hoge Raad worstelt verder met Europees Sociaal Handvest", Sociaal Recht, 1991, 200. See also Luttmer-
Kat, "De Hoge Raad en de bedrijfsbezetting", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1991, 1649 in this regard. 
See Collected ~ravaux preparatoires ',Volume IV, 1957, 440. 
See Conclusions XI, 1989, 89. 
It is clear from the travaux preparatoires of article 6(4) of the ESC that the collective action has to be exercised 
with due care; the requirement that the action has to be the ultimum remedium is explicitly included in that duty of 
care: see 3.5 in this regard. 
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3.3.3.4 Supportive actions 
The judges in the Netherlands do not readily tolerate action in support of main strikes. A 
well known supportive action is the blockade of the entrance to a business which is usually 
done in combination with a strike 100 in order to interfere with the entrance of employees who 
are willing to work. In principle, such a blockade is regarded as unlawful. It causes 
disproportional damage to the employer while, in addition, it leads to an unjustified 
infringement of the rights of employees who are willing to work.101 An exception to this rule 
would only be made in special circumstances, for example if the effect of a strike would 
otherwise totally be weakened.102 Such an exception occurred in a case in which the 
blockade consisted of the hauling up of the gangplank of a ship. The blockade was not 
aimed at employees willing to work, but at a new group of crew members who were 
supposed to replace the strikers. Such a replacement would, however, have enabled the ship 
to sail away, effectively ending the strike. Thus owing to these highly exceptional 
circumstances, the blockade was not declared unlawful.103 
Picketing however, which obviously causes nuisance and inconvenience, is in itself regarded 
as lawful. The fact that willing employees could thereby arrive late for work would not 
make the picketing unlawful.104 Rood effectively summarised the current situation with 
respect to supportive action as follows: the striking employees may, by means of peaceful 
action, try to convince the willing employees to also take part in the strike. Such peaceful 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
The use of a blockade as an independent form of collective action will nearly always be seen as unlawful: cf Hof 
Amsterdam, 14 December 1989, NJ 1991, 78 and Pres.Rb. Assen, 2 March 1990, KG 1990, 108. 
Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 13 May 1980, NJ 1980, 403; Hof Den Haag, 14 November 1980, NJ 1982, 72; Pres.Rb. 
Amsterdam, 26 March 1982, NJ 1982, 214; Hof Den Haag, 23 April 1982, NJ 1985, 312; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 17 
December 1985, KG 1986, 134; Pres.Rb. Dordrecht, 29 April 1986, KG 1986, 221; Pres.Rb. Almelo, 14 June 
1986, KG 1986, 295; HR 7 November 1986, NJ 1987, 226; Hof Den Haag, 22 May 1987, NJ 1988, 646; Pres .Rb. 
Rotterdam, 15 January 1988, KG 1988, 80; Hof Den Haag, 15 January 1988, NJ 1989, 672. 
Hof Den Haag, 22 May 1987, NJ 1988, 646: " ... dat een recht om te staken in beginsel niet impliceert het recht om 
de toegang van het bedrijf waartegen de staking zich keert te blokkeren. Een uitzondering op dat beginsel kan ... 
slechts onder zeer bijzondere omstandigheden warden geaccepteerd, zoals indien onder de gegeven 
omstandigheden anders het stakingsrecht in feite geheel, althans nagenoeg geheel zou warden ontkracht." 
HR 16 December 1983, NJ 1985, 311. See also Hof Den Haag, 14 November 1980, NJ 1982, 72 in this regard. 
Pres.Rb. Dordrecht, 29 April 1986, KG 1986, 221. See also Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 1 December 1983, in Albers et al, 
De Ambtenarenstakingen, 1983, 112 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 106 in this regard. 
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action would include picketing at the entrance to a business and the distribution of pamphlets 
in connection with the strike, but not the blockade of the entrance to a business.105 
3.4 Article 31 ESC Restrictions 
The restrictions on the right to collective action are not only found in article 6(4) of the ESC. 
The Appendix to the ESC also contains inter alia the following declaratory stipulation: 
"It is understood that each Contracting Party may, insofar as it is concerned, regulate the 
exercise of the right to strike by law, provided that any further restriction that this might place 
on the right can be justified under the terms of Article 31." 
Article 31 - which accordingly plays an important restrictive role - is the so-called public 
order clause and reads as follows: 
"l. The rights and principles set forth in Part I when effectively realised, and their effective 
exercise as provided for in Part II, shall not be subject to any restrictions or limitations not 
specified in those Parts, except such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the 
protection of public interest, national security, public health or morals. 
2. The restrictions permitted under this Charter to the rights and obligations set forth herein 
shall not be applied for any purpose other than that for which they have been prescribed." 
As mentioned above, strike law in the Netherlands is for the greater part judge-made law.106 
The question whether article 31 of the ESC requires restrictions to be prescribed by statute 
was answered in the negative by both the Committee of Experts 107 and the Dutch Supreme 
Court.108 The phrase "except such as are prescribed by law" in article 31 of the ESC can thus 
105 
106 
107 
108 
Rood, Naar een Stakingswet?, 1978, 170. Another form of collective action, namely the boycott, has not yet been 
dealt with. The boycott hardly ever occurs in the Netherlands and the courts have thus not had the opportunity to 
formulate general rules in this regard: see Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 18 September 1981, in Meeter, in Het Collectief 
Arbeidsrecht nuder beschouwd, 1984, 89 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 108. 
See 3.1 in this regard. Jacobs, "Stakingsrecht voor spoorwegpersoneel", NJ CM-Bulletin, 1986, 632 points out that 
in most of the countries which have ratified article 6(4) of the ESC, the restrictions on the right to strike are 
imposed by the judge and not the legislature. 
Conclusions I, 1969/1970, 38 and Conclusions VIII, 1984, 97. See also Collected 'travaux preparatoires ',Volume 
IV, 1957, 70 and 427. 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 under 3.2: "Verdragsstaten die de toepassing en nadere begrenzing van art. 6 lid 
4 en art. 31 aan de jurisprudentie overlaten, schenden dusdoende - mits de rechtspraak de door laatstgenoemde 
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be read as "except such as are prescribed by the courts".109 More problematic, however, is 
the precise scope of these restrictions: they are vaguely formulated and no real assistance can 
be gathered from the documentation compiled by the ESC's supervisory bodies in this 
regard.110 It should be noted, however, that the Committee of Experts indicated that a person 
engaged in "essential services" is prohibited from striking in terms of the article 31 
restrictions. It defined "essential services" as "services whose interruption would jeopardise 
the existence or well-being of the whole or part of the population" .111 
Article 31 of the ESC refers to "public interest, national security, public health or morals" 
and in a given situation, one or more of these (public) interests could necessitate the 
restriction of the right to strike.112 However, the most important category of restrictions 
contained in article 31 seems to be those restrictions that "are necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". In the Dutch jurisprudence, 
this problematic category has been widely interpreted: not only the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the parties, but also their private (economic and commercial) interests can 
necessitate a restriction of the right to strike.113 This wide interpretation has its roots in the 
following independent lawfulness-criterion which has been developed by the courts since 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
artikel getrokken grenzen eerbiedigt - het Yerdrag niet." 
Cf Jacobs, "Noot bij HR 30-05-1986", NJCM-Bulletin, 1986, 632; Hansma, Collectieve Actie onder de Rechter, 
1986, 16; Maris, "Het rechtspraakbeleid van de Hoge Raad in de stakingsarresten van 1986", Sociaal Maandblad 
Arbeid, 1987, 268; Yan Veen, "De grenzen van het stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1987, 446. 
Cf Schut, "Collectief actierecht tegenover rechten van derden", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1988, 1473 and Tilstra, 
Grenzen aan het Staldngsrecht, 1994, 226 and onwards, who seek assistance in this regard from the comparable 
articles 8-11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
1950. See also Heringa, Sociale Grondrechten, 1989, 121 who propagates a narrow interpretation of the article 31 
restrictions. 
Conclusions N, 1975, 8. Cf also the following extract from Conclusions Xl/-1, 1992, 25: "While the Committee 
has accepted that, in a particularly serious economic situation or to maintain essential services, a government 
might be able to set certain limits to collective bargaining, any total ban on the right to bargain collectively or on 
the right to strike over an extended period of time cannot be accepted and in any such situation, covering the 
whole or part only of the work-force, a government must justify its actions on the basis of Article 31 ". 
See for example Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 2 May 1986, KG no. 180/86 (a strike in the dairy industries was forbidden 
because of its possible negative environmental consequences) and HR 22 November 1991, NJ 1992, 508 
(collective actions executed by nursing staff were held to be lawful, but certain limitations were placed on the 
actions: the protection of the public health played a major role in this regard). Cf also Hof Amsterdam, 28 March 
1985, NJ 1985, 759 and Hof Den Haag, 12 December 1985, NJ 1987, 375. It should also be noted that the Dutch 
government intends to statutorily regulate the military's right to strike in the near future (Aanhangsel Handelingen 
Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, No. 635, 1277). 
The "others" referred to in article 31 of the ESC is also widely interpreted to include an employer that can be 
classified as a third party to the conflict, such as in the Hoogovens case. 
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1972. If there exists an obvious disproportion between the purpose and the consequences of 
the strike, such a strike can be declared unlawful. 
This criterion can in the first place be applied to the employer. A certain amount of damage 
is, however, an inherent and often inevitable consequence of a strike. The employer, being 
directly involved in the conflict, can also limit his own damages by giving in to the demands 
of the strikers. Therefore, highly exceptional circumstances will have to be present in order 
for a strike to be classified as unlawful on the grounds of the employer's damages.114 
However, in some cases - and this is where the restrictions imposed by article 31 of the ESC 
becomes relevant - the employer is not able to do anything about the demands of the strikers, 
for example if the collective action is aimed at the employer, but directed at the government. 
Owing to the fact that the employer can then actually be classified as a third party to the 
conflict, the extent of the damage can play a more prominent role in the application of the 
b . d l wf l . . 115 a ovementlone a u ness-cntenon. 
Since the 1980's, losses suffered by third parties to the conflict have played an important role 
in determining the possible lawfulness of a strike. "Third parties" can be defined as follows: 
those people who are not directly involved in the conflict surrounding collective action, but 
whose rights and freedoms can be influenced thereby. Examples are the general public, 
contractual partners of the employer, willing employees and the government. In principle, 
the courts have treated the losses of third parties on the same basis as those of the employer. 
Even though third parties cannot limit their losses by giving in to the demands of the strikers, 
their losses form an integral part of the strike phenomenon. Losses suffered by third parties 
are compared with the purpose of the strike and special attention is given to the strike 's 
114 
115 
Cf Hof Amsterdam, 13 April 1972, NJ 1972, 192; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 10 March 1980, NJ 1980, 165; Pres.Rb. 
Amsterdam, 21October1981, NJ 1982, 33; Hof Amsterdam, 15 November 1984, NJ 1985, 758; Hof Den Haag, 
17 January 1985, NJ 1986, 222; HR 7 November 1986, NJ 1987, 226. 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688: " ... redelijke toepassing van de desbetreffende bepalingen mede de werkgever te 
beschouwen als 'derde' in de zin van artikel 31 wiens rechten - onder omstandigheden - een beperking in de 
uitoefening van het stakingsrecht kunnen rechtvaardigen.". In the NS case, the court did not go into this issue in 
detail, because the collective action in casu was not classified as "pure" protest action (the government fulfilled 
the role of material employer). However, in HR 11 November 1994, NJ 1995, 152 the employer was regarded as 
a third party to the conflict (as in the Hoogovens case). The court explicitly stated that (in exceptional 
circumstances) the employer's economic interests can qualify as interests under article 31 of the ESC (see 
3.3.3.1.1 for more detail in this regard). 
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duration and magnitude in order to decide whether the strike should be declared as unlawful 
on the grounds of the losses caused to third parties.116 
In 1997, the Supreme Court was given another opportunity to deal with the restrictions 
imposed by article 31 of the ESC. It concerned a conflict between the transport unions CNV 
and FNV and the employers' organisation NV Verenigd Streekvervoer Nederland (VSN). 
The VSN, which owns practically all the Dutch bus companies, was concerned about 
competition from other public transport companies and proposed to its workers a system of 
increased flexibility in working hours in an effort to reduce ticket prices. The unions were 
unhappy about the aforesaid proposal and no agreement could be reached between the 
parties, which eventually led to a six day strike during January 1995. The employer in casu 
was not a "third party" to the conflict and approached the court on the basis of the 
infringement of the rights and freedoms of "others", namely the approximately one million 
passengers conveyed each day on buses throughout the country. The Supreme Court 
confirmed the decisions of the courts a quo 117 which provided that the workers may only 
strike between 10:00 and 15:00, i.e. not during peak traffic hours. The court did not find it 
necessary to decide whether the striking workers were engaged in a so-called essential 
service, and stated that there was an urgent social need118 for article 31 restrictions in the 
. 119 
cucumstances. 
116 
117 
118 
119 
For example, in Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 25 September 1991, KG 1991, 346 the court stressed the rights and freedoms of 
the general public (as well as the employer as a third party to the conflict) and declared collective action during 
peak hours in the public transport industry unlawful (cf also Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 16 November 1983, KG 1983, 
346; Pres.Rb. Middelburg, 19 November 1983, KG 1983, 344; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 29 November 1983, KG 
1983, 358; Hof Den Haag, 12 December 1985, NJ 1987, 375; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 25 September 1991, KG 
1991,345). 
Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 24 January 1995, JAR 1995, 33 and Hof Amsterdam, 23 November 1995, JAR 1995, 270. See 
Tan, "Staking'',Arbeidsrecht, 1996, 18 for more detail on the decisions of the courts a quo. 
The court emphasised the "carefulness" prescribed by society in respect of the person and property of others and 
referred in this regard to section 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code, which provides as follows: "(!) Hij die jegens een 
ander een onrechtmatige daad pleegt, welke hem kan warden toegerekend, is verplicht de schade die de ander 
dientengevolge lijdt, te vergoeden. (2) Als onrechtmatige daad warden aangemerkt een inbreuk op een recht en 
een doen of nalaten in strijdt met een wettelijke plicht of met hetgeen volgens ongeschreven recht in het 
maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt, een en ander behoudens de aanwezigheid van een rechtvaardigingsgrond. (3) 
Een onrechtmatige daad kan aan de dader warden toegerekend, indien zij te wijten is aan zijn schuld of aan een 
oorzaak welke krachtens de wet of de in het verkeer geldende opvattingen voor zijn rekening komt". 
The court expressed it as follows: "Naar Nederlands recht...komen deze in de rechtspraak ontwikkelde vereisten 
erop neer dat moet kunnen warden vastgesteld dat de staking ... in zodanige mate inbreuk maakt op de in het eerste 
lid van art. 31 ESC aangewezen rechten van derden of algemene belangen dat beperkingen, maatschappelijk 
gezien, dringend noodzakelijk zijn. Onbeperkte uitoefening van het grondrecht is dan jegens alien die daarvan 
schade ondervinden, onrechtmatig, oak jegens de werkgever". See Boonstra, "Staken, de Bond tegen de rest van 
Nederland",Arbeidsrecht, 1997, 15 for more detail. 
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In Dutch practice today, the serious violation of the private (economic) interests of the 
employer and/or third parties could thus - under certain circumstances as outlined above -
justify a restriction of the right to strike. 
In Dutch literature, the last-mentioned category of article 31 restrictions has led to numerous 
discussions on what should be included in "the rights and freedoms of others" and especially 
whom these others are and whether or not these rights would include the economic interests 
of the "others" .120 It is feared that the judges may go too far in allowing restrictions on the 
basis of article 31 of the ESC. If the restrictions are not applied with the utmost care, the 
practical consequences thereof could lead to an unjust infringement of the fundamental right 
to strike. Caution is therefore advisable when a Dutch judge must consider whether to 
restrict the right to collective action in terms of article 31 of the ESC or not. 
3.5 Procedural Restrictions 
Traditionally, the Dutch jurisprudence contains a number of lawfulness-criteria which were 
originally stipulated in the 1969 bill on strikes. This bill never matured into an act of 
parliament and even though it was eventually withdrawn, it had by that stage already 
influenced the law relating to strikes.121 According to the above lawfulness-criteria the judge 
had to make sure that the strike was not contrary to existing norms concerning relations 
between employers and employees and that there did not exist a manifest disproportion 
between the aims and the consequences of the strike, and that the strike was not manifestly 
unreasonable towards the employer.122 The first criterion above played a major role in 
120 
121 
122 
Betten, "Onevenredige schade blijft hindemis voor volledige erkenning stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad 
Arbeid, 1986, 199; FNV, Collectieve Actie: een recht, 1987, 16; Schut, "Collectief actierecht tegenover rechten 
van derden", Nederlands .luristenblad, 1988, 1473; Luttmer-Kat, "Misbruiktoetsing van collectieve 
werknemersacties in de civiele sector", Socia al Maandblad Arbeid, 1989, 647; Hansma, "De Hoge Raad in actie", 
Nederlands .luristenblad, 1989, 528; De Laat & Van Lierop, "Spelregels en spelbrekers in het collectieve 
actierecht", Sociaal Recht, 1990, 76; Schut, "Het recht van werknemers op collectief optreden, met inbegrip van 
het stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1990, 577; Yan der Heijden, "De rechter en staken tegen de 
overheid; het ESH voorbij", Nederlands .luristenblad, 1991, 1577 and Tilstra, Grem.en aan het Stakingsrecht, 
1994,309. 
See 2.2.3.1 in this regard. 
See Luttmer-Kat, "De toetsing van collectieve acties aan procedureregels", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1990, 77 
and De Laat & Yan Lierop, "Spelregels en spelbrekers in het collectieve actierecht", Sociaal Recht, 1990, 76. 
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restricting the right to strike and can be classified as a procedural rule that had to be obseived 
by both parties to the conflict. 
In the NS case, the Dutch Supreme Court stated that collective action which is in itself 
covered by article 6(4) of the ESC, can still be declared unlawful if weighty procedural rules 
were not adhered to. Unfortunately, it is not exactly clear what the Supreme Court meant by 
"weighty procedural rules". The court does, however, refer to "spelregels ", or in other 
words, "the rules of playing the strike game". In general, two separate rules can be drawn 
from the Dutch jurisprudence in this regard. 
In the first place, serious negotiations have to take place between the parties to the conflict. 
Only if deadlock is reached in these negotiations, may the strike be used as an ultimum 
remedium. The judge will thus have to decide whether such a deadlock does indeed exist; if 
this is not the case, the collective action will be unlawful.123 In certain circumstances, the 
judge might also order a cooling-off period between the parties.124 The ultimum remedium 
requirement is not expressly dealt with in the ESC, but it is possible to argue that the 
construction of article 6 (consultation, negotiation, mediation, collective action) implies that 
the strike may only be used as a final weapon.125 Brunner, however, disagrees with this line 
of reasoning.126 He sees the right to strike as a normal competence of employees, or in his 
own words, merely a different form of negotiation in which the judge may only interfere in 
serious cases of abuse. Nevertheless, the ultimum remedium requirement is today generally 
accepted and applied in every day practice.127 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
The judge will - preferably by way of a marginal test - determine the difficult question of whether a deadlock does 
indeed exist: cf Pres.Rb. Haarlem, 25 May 1985, NJ 1985, 896. See also the differing views of Schotvanger, "De 
Amsterdamse stakingsarresten 1977", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1979, 81 and Peeters, "Geregeld staken", 
Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1979, 90 in this regard. 
For example a twenty-day prohibition to strike: Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 4 February 1977, NJ 1977, 79. Cf also Pres.Rb. 
Rotterdam,4 February 1971,NJ 1971, 77; Pres.Rb. Haarlem,5 March 1973, NJ 1973, 120; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 11 
March 1982, NJ 1982, 346; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 17 December 1985, KG 1986, 134; Conclusions I, 1969/1970, 38; 
Wiebringhaus, "The application of the European Social Charter", in Het Europees Sociaal Handvest, 1982, 29. 
Bakels, "Collectieve acties van arbeiders", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1982, 717. See also Hansma, "Actie in de 
rechtspraktijk", Advocatenblad, 1986, 499. 
Brunner, "Het rechterlijk verbod van stakingen", Schetsen voor Bakels, 1987, 34. 
Cf Hof Amsterdam, 13 April 1972, NJ 1972, 192; Hof Amsterdam, 3 May 1973, NJ 1973, 251; Pres.Rb. Breda, 
17 January 1975, NJ 1975, 350; Hof Amsterdam, 17 November 1977, NJ 1978, 551; Hof Den Haag, 14 February 
1985, NJ 1986, 221; Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 21November1985, KG 1985, 386; Hof Den Haag, 13 March 1987, KG 
1987, 274; Pres.Rb. Breda, 19 December 1989, KG 1990, 46; Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 16 February 1990, KG 1990, 
76 
The Dutch courts have also applied the following related rule that has a direct influence on 
the application of the ultimum remedium requirement. Even when deadlock has been 
reached in the negotiations, the trade unions may not organise a strike if the conflict can still 
be resolved by means of another legal course at the parties' disposal. For example, if the 
parties have agreed to advisory arbitration in the case of a conflict, no strike may be 
organised until such time as the arbitration procedure is completed.128 
The second major "rule for playing the strike game", namely the timely announcement of the 
strike, gives the employer a final opportunity to reach a settlement with the unions. This 
requirement was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the NS case. The court classified it as a 
weighty procedural rule which could lead to the unlawfulness of collective action if it was 
not observed.129 According to the Supreme Court, the timely announcement of a strike to the 
employer130 has a dual function. In the first place, the interests of those persons relying on 
the services of the employer are protected, and secondly, unnecessary damage to the concern 
can be restricted as much as possible.131 The idea behind a timely announcement of the 
strike is not to enable the employer to eliminate all his or her damage, because then the strike 
will lose its effectiveness. The employer merely has to be able to organise security 
regulations.132 Such a timely announcement could also make it possible for an employer to 
obtain judgement on the lawfulness of the intended strike by way of a summary procedure. 
It is doubtful whether the Supreme Court wanted to create a general requirement (applicable 
to every type of collective action in any kind of concern) in this regard; it seems as if the 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
99. Unfortunately, the ultimum remedium requirement was not dealt with in the NS case; it is thus not clear 
whether the Supreme Court condones the lower court developments in this regard. 
Cf Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 20 October 1964, NJ 1964, 463; Pres.Rb. Breda, 17 January 1975, NJ 1975, 350; 
Pres.Rb. Haarlem, 25 May 1985, NJ 1985, 896; Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 17 December 1985, KG 1986, 134; HR 19 
April 1991, NJ 1991, 690. 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 under 3.8: " ... schending van een zwaarwegende procedureregel inhoudend dat de 
collectieve acties van werknemers tijdig tevoren aan de werkgever behoren te warden aangezegd." 
Normally, the strike only has to be announced to the employer: cf Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 25 November 1983, KG 
1983, 356. However, in Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 25 September 1991, KG 1991, 346, the court decided that the intended 
strikes in the public transport industry should also be announced to the general public. 
The Supreme Court expressed it as follows (under 3.8): " ... een werkgever als NS in staat te stellen zoveel als 
binnen de grenzen van de gekozen actievorm mogelijk is de belangen van het reizende publiek en van de 
belanghebbenden bij het goederenvervoer te beschermen en onnodige bedrijfsschade te voorkomen." 
Cf Pres.Rb. Amsterdam, 10 March 1980, NJ 1980, 165; Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 20 March 1980, NJ 1980, 186; 
Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 10 May 1982, KG 1982, 86; Hof Amsterdam, 15 November 1984, NJ 1985, 758. 
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court only dealt with the specific case in issue. Furthennore, as in the case of the ultimum 
remedium requirement, there is no provision in the ESC which regulates this "rule for 
playing the strike game". Consequently, it simply remains a rule of practice which will have 
to be applied and adjusted to each new set of factual circumstances.133 
It should be stressed that in applying the abovementioned procedural rules, the courts will 
always have to refrain from inquiring into the substance of the conflict between the two 
. 134 parties. 
133 
134 
The time that should elapse between the announcement and the beginning of the strike is also dependent on the 
factual circumstances of each case; a period of five days will in most cases be regarded as reasonable: see Tilstra, 
Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 87. 
Cf Luttmer-Kat, "De toetsing van collectieve acties aan procedureregels", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1990, at 83 
who argues that the abovementioned procedural rules have in a sense always been inextricably interwoven with 
the material misuse of the right to strike test and that it would be a move in the direction of legal certainty if the 
separate tests are confined to one all-embracing misuse or abuse-test. 
CHAPTER 4 - INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
4.1 Introduction 
As is evident from the previous chapters, the Dutch law relating to collective action has for 
many years been characterised by the problems surrounding trade unions, or, in other words, 
the organisers behind the strikes. These unions represented the interests and needs of the 
individual employees in their negotiations with the employers, and were consequently the 
direct target of legal action and other attempts to prevent the organising of collective action. 
In this chapter, however, the individual actors involved in the strike will be dealt with. 
Firstly, the legal position of strikers themselves1 as well as that of employees who are willing 
to work but are unable to do so2 will be analysed and discussed. Thereafter, employers' 
rights and remedies will be dealt with in detail.3 This latter issue also manifests itself in the 
form of collective action by employers themselves, but will nevertheless be dealt with in this 
chapter owing to its predominantly individual character. 
4.2 The Legal Position of Employees 
4.2.1 Striking employees 
According to nineteenth century conceptions, a strike was in principle considered to be a 
breach of the employee's contract of employment. Employees who took part in a strike lost 
their wages, ran the risk of being dismissed and, in certain circumstances, damages could 
even be claimed from them.4 It was also possible to institute legal action in order to secure 
See 4.2.1. 
2 See 4.2.2. 
3 See 4.3. 
4 See 2.2.2.1. for more detail. 
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an employee's duty to work. Such a legal claim was sanctioned by either a penal sum or, in 
certain circumstances, imprisonment as a result of the employee's debt .5 In 1960, the Dutch 
Supreme Court confirmed the above doctrine by stating that employees engaged in a strike 
were, in general, guilty of a breach of their contract of employment.6 In the years that 
followed, different factors combined to bring about a reversal of this untenable doctrine,7 
leading inter alia to the acceptance of a new doctrine on the legal position of the striking 
employees. 
According to the new doctrine - which is still followed in Dutch legal practice today - the 
rights and duties flowing from the contract of employment are suspended for the duration of 
the strike, except if the judge declares the strike unlawful.8 By using the doctrine of 
suspension, the juridical dilemma caused by the fact that an employee does not fulfil the 
obligations of his/her contract of employment, but is nevertheless not guilty of a breach of 
that contract, is effectively solved. The opinion of the Committee of Experts should also be 
noted in this regard: 
"The Committee is of the opinion that no violation of the Charter is involved in the 
application of legal provisions or principles making individual members of trade unions or 
employers' associations criminally or civilly liable in the event of their organisation resorting 
to illegal collective action, on the understanding that legislation enacted in this field be in 
keeping with the Charter."9 
The current legal position regarding striking employees in Dutch practice can be seen as 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Only in 1979 was such a claim awarded for a final time: Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 27 August 1979, NJ 1979, 517. See 
Van Peijpe, "Het stakingsverbod tegen de Rotterdamse slepers", Recht & Kritiek, 1979, 412; Albers, 
"Arbeidsconflicten", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1980, 571; Boon-Grouw, "De Rotterdamse havenstaking in 
1979", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1981, 636. Since the introduction of section 1639a of the Dutch Civil Code in 
1980, such a legal claim cannot be instituted anymore: see Cremers, "Geen dwangsom in arbeidsverhoudingen?", 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 1989, 52 for more detail in this regard. 
The Panhonlibco decision (15 January 1960, NJ 1960, 84) is discussed in 2.2.2.3. 
See 2.2.3.2 for more detail. 
See Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 4 November 1983, NJ 1983, 772. The doctrine of suspension was developed at the 
beginning of this century by French jurists: cf Jacobs, Het recht op Collectief Onderhandelen, 1986, 164-168. In 
the years that followed, this doctrine gradually started to gain some ground in the Dutch literature (cf Rood, Naar 
een Stakingswet?, 1978, 41; Fase, "Het stakingsrecht in de particuliere sector in Nederland", Tijdschrift voor 
Sociaal Recht, 1982, 305; Van der Grinten, Arbeidsovereenkomstenrecht, 1993, 260) and today this doctrine is 
generally accepted in the Netherlands. 
Conclusions I, 1969/1970, 39. 
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relatively simple: as long as employees strike they receive no wages,10 and neither are they 
entitled to social security benefits.11 Insofar as they are members of the trade union 
organising the strike, they are, however, financially supported by that union. 12 A problem 
that arises in this regard is whether the employer's duty to pay wages also lapses in the case 
of collective action other than the "normal" strike.13 In the well-known NS case, the Dutch 
Supreme Court expressed a clear opinion on the employer's duty to pay wages in the case of 
work-to-rule and go-slow action.14 The Railway Board argued that the form of the action 
made it "unfair", in that it caused considerable damage to the employer, while virtually no 
sacrifices had to be made by the employees. The court rejected this argument and held that 
the employer would be able to reduce the wages of all the employees in proportion to the 
disruption that was caused in his concern by the action. After all, the collectivity of the 
employees' actions causes damage to the employer.15 In practice, hardly any use is made of 
this possibility provided by the court, mainly because of the fact that the employers want to 
avoid the thorny issues of wage reduction and the amount thereof. However, if the employer 
prefers to pay the employees their normal wages, the balance of power between the parties 
can be shifted so much as to make the action unlawful on the basis of the disproportional 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
See section 1638b of the Dutch Civil Code. Cf also Fase, "Met de vlam in de pijp", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 
1986, 210; Jacobs, Het Recht op Collectief Onderhandelen, 1986, 164; Pres. Rb. Rotterdam, 25 May 1989, KG 
1989, 243; Pres. Rb. Den Bosch, 5 July 1990, KG 1990, 273; Ktg. Utrecht, 26 June 1996, JAR 1996, 206 (on the 
question what constitutes wages). 
Section 19(1)(1) of the Unemployment Act of 1986. On the strength of section 19(7) of the Unemployment Act of 
1986, the General Unemployment Fund is, under special circumstances, empowered to make an exception to the 
abovementioned rule: this can be of importance to employees who are willing to work, as well as to those who do 
not belong to the trade union organising the strike (see footnote below). 
See Zon-Kruysse, "Bedrijfsvereniging geen stakingskas", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1966, 83 and Martens, 
"Rechtsbescherming tegen weigering van uitkering ingeval van werkloosheid tengevolge van staking of 
uitsluiting", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1974, 504 for more detail in this regard. 
Cf Peeters, "Het recht op collectieve actie van werknemers", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1980, 72, who feels that the 
type of collective action, whether it is a work-to-rule, go-slow or sit-down strike, should not play any role in this 
regard. The employees are not entitled to their wages if they are taking part in any form of collective action. 
HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688: see 3.3.3.2 for more detail. The position with regard to the sit-down strike is 
today still uncertain: there is no clear guidance from the courts to be found, and one can thus only speculate on 
whether the courts will in future follow the approach of the Supreme Court in the NS case. 
The Supreme Court expressed it as follows: "Dit uitgangspunt is in zijn algemeenheid onjuist. Nu ook van deze 
collectieve acties van werknemers in beginsel moet warden aangenomen dat zij meer in de risicosfeer van de 
arbeiders als groep dan in die van de werkgever liggen, kan een redelijke wetstoepassing ertoe leiden te 
aanvaarden dat een werkgever die wordt geconfronteerd met personeel dat in het kader van dergelijke collectieve 
acties geheel of in telkens wisselende delen niet naar behoren of niet volledig presteert en daardoor zijn bedrijf 
ontwricht ziet, zijnerzijds tegenover het gehele personeel word! ontheven van zijn verplichting het loon over de 
betrokken periode volledig door te betalen." 
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damage of the employer and the employees. On the other hand, these types of action could 
cause less damage to an employer than the normal all-out strike, which can have the effect of 
restoring the balance of power to a certain extent. 
In 1988, the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to deal with an individual aspect of 
the law relating to strikes. It decided that, in general, lawfully striking employees no longer 
ran the risk of disciplinary action being instituted against them. Strikers cannot be 
dismissed,16 and damages caused by the strike cannot be claimed from them.17 The facts of 
the case above can be summarised as follows: in December 1985, a strike was organised by 
the FNV trade union in the transport industry. The strike also involved the blocking of 
certain roads by truck drivers. The employer of two truck drivers who participated in this 
blockade, penalised them by means of disciplinary sanctions which inter alia involved a 
degradation of their occupational status (and consequently also of their salaries). The two 
drivers instituted legal action against their employer, which eventually led to a decision by 
the Supreme Court. In this case, the court had to deal with, as the writer Jacobs calls it, the 
Achilles' heel of the doctrine of suspension. The legal opinion in the Netherlands at the time 
stated that the doctrine only applies to lawful collective action.18 The logical connection 
between the doctrine of suspension and lawful collective action causes an acute practical 
problem. How is an employee supposed to know if the action in which he is taking part will 
be judged as being lawful or not? As a point of departure, the court stated that striking 
employees may in principle accept that they are lawfully exercising their right to collective 
action as recognised in article 6(4) of the ESC. Until such time as a court has decided on the 
issue of lawfulness of any collective action, the employer cannot penalise individual 
employees by means of disciplinary sanctions.19 However, the court clearly did not want its 
16 
17 
18 
19 
According to the doctrine of suspension, the employees are no longer guilty of a breach of their contract of 
employment and therefore no dismissal can take place: cf Fase, "Het stakingsrecht in de particuliere sector in 
Nederland", Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Recht, 1982, 308 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 33-35 in 
this regard. 
HR 22 April 1988, NJ 1988, 952. Cf the differing decisions of the courts a quo: Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 17 December 
1985, KG 1986, 134; Pres.Rb. Almelo, 12 February 1986, KG 1986, 135; Hof Arnhem, 30 June 1986, KG 1987, 
206. See also Duk, "Wie staakt wordt niet gestraft", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1988, 535 and Jacobs, "De 
rechtspositie van de stakende werknemer", Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie, 1989, 21 . 
Jacobs, "De rechtspositie van de stakende werknemer", Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie, 
1989, 21. 
The possibility of disciplinary sanctions being instituted at such an early stage would have a negative effect on the 
exercise of the employees' vital and fundamental right to collective action, a right that is recognised in article 6(4) 
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statement to be seen to be of general application, and qualified it in a number of ways: 
a. the collective action has to be a "normal" action relating to terms and conditions of 
~o 
employment;-
b. the collective action has to be organised by an acknowledged trade union;21 
c. the collective action has to remain within the limits set by the trade union.22 
In addition, the Supreme Court also left an important escape route: if it was perfectly clear to 
a striking employee that his or her actions exceeded the limits of lawfulness, he or she is not 
safeguarded against disciplinary actions by the employer. It can thus be said that, even 
though disciplinary action against strikes is still possible in certain circumstances, the 
Supreme Court did not leave much room for the institution of such actions.23 
4.2.2 Employees willing to work 
Another important actor nearly always involved in collective action, is the employee who is 
willing to work but is unable to do so, either because the collective action has stopped 
production completely, or because the employee is prevented from working by pickets or 
blockades.24 The legal position of such an employee is a little more complicated than that of 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
of the ESC: see the conclusion of Mok at HR 22 April 1988, NJ 1988, 952. 
The employees taking part in a protest strike, for example, will therefore not be safeguarded from disciplinary 
actions. Cf also HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688. 
Wildcat strikes or strikes organised by trade unions that are not acknowledged in the Netherlands, are therefore 
not protected from the institution of disciplinary actions. 
The Supreme Court formulated the abovementioned rules as follows: "Voorop moet worden gesteld dat, wanneer 
een collectieve actie als de onderhavige met een doel als hier aan de orde is, op gezag van een erkende vakbond 
wordt ondernomen, de werknemers die aan deze actie deelnemen er in beginsel van mogen uitgaan dat het gaat 
om een geoorloofde uitoefening van het recht op collectief optreden, zoals dit in Nederland ingevolge art. 6 
aanhef en onder 4 ESH word! erkend, zulks tot op het tijdstip dat bekend wordt dat de rechter deze actie 
onrechtmatig heeft geoordeeld. Dit met het collectieve karakter van dit recht samenhangende uitgangspunt brengt 
mee dat in beginsel geen plaats is voor het oplegging van disciplinaire maatregelen door individuele werkgevers 
aan individuele werknemers ter zake van binnen het actieparool gebleven gedragingen van die werknemers, welke 
hebben plaatsgevonden voordat de rechter een oordeel als voormeld heeft uitgesproken." See also Tilstra, Grenzen 
aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 33-34. 
It should be noted that the Dutch Supreme Court shows a striking similarity with the German 
Bundesarbeitsgericht in this regard: see Jacobs, "De rechtspositie van de stakende werknemer", Weekblad voor 
Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie, 1989, 22. 
If the willing employee is able to go to work during the duration of a collective action and if he or she can 
83 
the striking employee. In the past, these non-striking employees were treated in the same 
way as the strikers themselves. They had no right to wages or to social security benefits, but, 
unlike striking employees, they had no union to fall back on.25 During the 1970's, however, 
a number of decisions by the Dutch Supreme Court brought about a new approach to the 
legal position of non-strikers.26 It started in 1972, when the court had to deal with a wildcat 
strike of short duration, in which employees who were willing to work were unable to do so 
because of a blockade at the entrance to the workplace. The court felt that the willing 
employees should - under these circumstances - not be penalised, and that the employer 
should bear the responsibility for those who were unable to work. In accordance with 
section 1638d of the Dutch Civil Code,27 the employer will thus have to pay the willing 
workers their normal wages for the days on which the wildcat strike and the blockade made 
it impossible for them to work.28 A year later, the court was faced with a similar problem, 
followed the same line of argument, and accordingly reached a similar conclusion.29 The 
court's way of thinking in these two decisions paved the way for the detailed and fully-
motivated Wielemaker/De Scheide judgement which was delivered on 7 May 1976.30 In this 
decision, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between two fundamentally different types of 
collective action. 
The first type normally possesses the following characteristics: 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
continue with his or her work in a productive and satisfactory way, then there is no single problem: the employer 
will have to pay the employee his or her wages. This will, however, rarely be the case. 
Hof Amsterdam, 23 January 1947, NJ 1947, 725. 
There were also some noticeable lower court decisions in this regard, i.e. Ktg. Schiedam, 7 January 1975, NJ 
1975, 304 and Rb. Rotterdam, 24 June 1977, NJ 1978, 221. 
Section 1638b of the Dutch Civil Code ("Geen loon is verschuldigd voor den tijd, gedurende welken de arbeider 
den bedongen arbeid niet heeft verricht.") is mitigated by section 1638d of the same code ("Ook verliest de 
arbeider zijne aanspraak op het naar tijdruimte vastgesteld loon niet, indien hij bereid was den bedongen arbeid te 
verrichten, doch de werkgever daarvan geen gebruik heeft gemaakt, hetzij door eigen schuld of zelfs ten gevolge 
van, hem persoonlijk betreffende, toevallige verhindering."). 
HR 10 November 1972, NJ 1973, 60. See also Leyten, "Heeft de Hoge Raad de lust tot staken aangewakkerd?", 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 1973, 3 77. 
HR 21 December 1973, NJ 1974, 142. See also Van Peijpe, "De toepassing van 1638d B .W. bij staking", Sociaal 
Maandblad Arbeid, 1975, 339. 
HR 7 May 1976, NJ 1977, 55: see 3.3.3.2 in this regard. See also HR 25 January 1980, NJ 1980, 282 and Rood, 
"Noot bij HR 25-01-1980 RvdW 24",Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1980, 404. 
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* a large group of employees 
* an organised collective action 
* it concerns conditions of labour 
* for a certain period of time. 
The second type displays the following features: 
* a small group of employees 
* an unorganised (wildcat) collective action 
* it is of a protest nature 
*for a short period of time. 
According to the Supreme Court, the first type of action would generally be undertaken at 
the risk of the employees,31 while the second type would normally be performed at the risk 
f 32 o the employer. The court based its new approach on a number of co-ordinative grounds, 
namely: 
a. the history of section 1638d of the Dutch Civil Code;33 
b. the regulation contained in section 31(1)(f) of the Unemployment Act (the employee 
who is unemployed because of a strike will in general receive no retaining payment); 
c. the idea that the solidarity of workers as a group is expressed through organised 
II . . 34 co ectlve act10n; 
d. the desirability of maintaining an equilibrium of power between the employer and his 
or her employees.35 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
In such a case, the willing employees will have no right to their wages and will in principle also loose their right 
to any social security benefits: cf section 19(l}(b) of the Unemployment Act of 1986. 
The employer will then have to pay out the wages of the employees who were willing to work and who can be 
considered as being "outsiders" to the conflict. 
The history of that section undoubtedly points to the fact that the willing employees at a strike have no right to 
wages for the duration of the strike: see Duk, "Wielemaker en Wissekerke: welke werkwillige wel?", in Het 
collectief arbeidsrecht nader beschouwd, 1984, 99. 
After all, the willing employees will normally also profit from the agreement which the trade union has - by 
means of the strike weapon - managed to reach with the employer. 
The equilibrium of power could be disturbed if the employer, who already incurs damages due to the fact that the 
business has come to a standstill because of an organised strike, also has to pay out the wages of the willing 
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These grounds, coupled with the fact that the court's guidelines do not give sufficient 
certainty in the case of numerous mixed forms of collective action (for example an organised 
protest strike of short duration), have led to much criticism in Dutch literature.36 In practice, 
however, most collective action is organised action concerning conditions of employment, 
and is clearly executed at the employees' risk. In the greater majority of strikes in the 
Netherlands, the non-strikers will therefore have no right to the wages that they would have 
earned during the strike.37 With regard to work-to-rule and go-slow actions, the willing 
employees will, due to the nature of these actions, generally not be able to satisfactorily work 
at the normal tempo, and will thus be forced to take part in the actions. In such a case, the 
employer will be able to reduce the wages of all the employees commensurately .38 
4.3 The Employer's Rights and Remedies 
If regard is had to the legal position of both striking and non-striking employees, it is clear 
that the individual position of these employees has radically improved over the last three 
decades. The doctrine of suspension has gained prominence, with the result that a strike no 
longer amounts to a breach of the employee's contract of employment.39 The inevitable 
result of these developments has been the gradual weakening of the employer's legal 
position.40 Even though striking employees have no right to claim their wages from the 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
employees: the Supreme Court particularly had a selective strike in mind, where a relatively small number of 
employees, working at a so-called "bottleneck", can close down a whole factory. 
Cf Bockwinkel, "Stakingsacties en reacties'', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1977, 159; Albers, "Loondoorbetaling 
aan werkwilligen bij staking'', Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1977, 251; Kuin, "Loondoorbetaling aan werkwilligen 
bij staking", Sociaaf Maandblad Arbeid, 1977, 496; Rood, "Over vage normen in het sociaal recht", in Gratia 
Commercii, 1981, 242; Jaspers & Van Peijpe, "Werkwilligen en stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1983, 
24; Duk, "Wielemaker en Wissekerke: welke werkwillige wel?", in Het collectief arbeidsrecht nader beschouwd, 
1984, 95; FNV, Collectieve actie: een recht, 1987, 37. 
Cf also HR 27 October 1978, NJ 1979, 184; HR 28 October 1983, NJ 1984, 168; Bijker, 
"Groepsaansprakelijkheid en staking", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1989, 71. 
See also 3.3.3.2 in this regard. 
See 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 for a detailed discussion in this regard. 
See Bakels, "De uitsluiting en het collectief overleg over arbeidsvoorwaarden", in Samenleven en Samenwerken, 
1983, 21 and Hansma, Collectieve actie onder de rechter; opmerkingen over arbeidsconflicten, 1986, 30 in this 
regard. 
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employer, they cannot be dismissed,41 and disciplinary sanctions against striking employees 
are only possible in certain prescribed circumstances.42 Moreover, section 93(1)(b) of the 
Employment Provision Act of 1990 provides that the employer may not continue production 
with the help of scab labour.43 The employer can, however, start summary proceedings44 
against the relevant trade union, in which it can ask the judge to determine the lawfulness of 
the collective action. If the judge declares the action to be unlawful, the employees will have 
to start working again. If they refuse, the unlawfulness of the collective action will cause the 
trade union to be liable for any damages brought about by the extended action. With regard 
to work-to-rule and go-slow actions, the employer can also, in certain circumstances, reduce 
the wages of all the employees who took part in such actions.45 The employer's only other 
remedy against his employees' collective action is the lock-out. 
Like the strike, the lock-out is not statutorily regulated in the Netherlands.46 The European 
Social Charter does, however, recognise the lock-out. Article 6(4) of the ESC reads as 
follows: 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
"With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the 
Contracting parties undertake: (1); (2); (3) .... ; and recognise (4) the right of workers and 
employers to collective action in case of conflicts of interests, including the right to strike, 
subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into."47 
An employee who continues to strike after a judge has declared the strike to be unlawful can, however, be 
dismissed. 
See 4.2.1 in this regard. See also Van Wijnbergen, "Collectieve acties van ambtenaren", in Ambtenarenrecht en 
arbeidsrecht. Een vergelijking, 1982, 103-108. 
The subsection provides as follows: "Het is de vergunninghouder verboden: (a) ... (b) voor zover aan hem bekend 
is of redelijkerwijs bekend kan zijn dat in een bedrijf of ondememing, of een gedeelte daarvan, een werkstaking, 
uitsluiting of bedrijfsbezetting bestaat, arbeidskrachten ter beschikking te stellen voor het verrichten van 
werkzaamheden in dat bedrijf of die onderneming, of we! dat gedeelte daarvan, waar de werkstaking, uitsluiting 
of bedrijfsbezetting heerst;" Cf also Pres.Rb. Roermond, 2 July 1996, JAR 1996, 150 where the court held that it 
was not necessary for an employer to terminate temporary employment services or replacement labour acquired 
before the strike broke out, as long as the temporary employees do not take over the work normally done by the 
workers on strike. 
See 2.2.2.2 for more detail on the summary proceeding or "kart geding". 
In order to avoid the thorny issues of wage reduction and the amounts involved, the employer could, however, 
prefer to pay the employees their normal wages: see 3.3.3.2 and 4.2.l in this regard. 
Collective labour agreements do sometimes contain provisions relating to the lock-out: see for example Olbers, 
"Vredesplicht- en openbreekclausules", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1982, 9. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Committee of Experts mentions the following about this provision: 
"It is clear from the text that this provision relates to both strikes and lock-outs even though 
the latter are not explicitly mentioned in the text of article 6, paragraph 4 of the Charter, or in 
the gloss to this provision in the Appendix. The Committee came to this conclusion because 
the lock-out is the principle, if not the only, form of collective action which employers can 
take in defence of their interests. "48 
The lock-out can be defined as the mirror image of the strike. Just as workers can withdraw 
their labour by striking, so one or more employers can withdraw the opportunity for the 
workers to work by locking them out of the premises and discontinuing the business. The 
lock-out represents the employer's ultimate economic weapon which can be used to try to 
compel the workforce to submit to the employer's offer.49 The lock-out can take two 
different forms. In the case of the defensive lock-out, the employer uses the weapon to 
defend against a collective action in the concern.so It can of course also be used as an 
autonomous weapon to secure a better position for the employer at the negotiation table. A 
lock-out does not only affect the employees, but also their trade unions, because locked-out 
workers will often be looking at their unions for financial support during such time as they 
are unable to work.s1 
In the Netherlands, however, the use of this weapon is nothing but a theoretical possibility. 
Between 1925 and 1940 the lock-out was utilised a few times, but since 1940 it has played 
no role whatsoever in the Dutch practice.s2 Even the ratification of the ESC has had no 
influence on the slumbering existence of the lock-out, and it seems as if the current state of 
affairs will not undergo any radical changes in the near future.s3 A possible explanation for 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Conclusions I, 1969/1970, 38. See also Jaspers & Van Peijpe, "Werkwilligen en stakingsrecht", Sociaal 
MaandbladArbeid, 1983, 22 in this regard. 
See Spruit, Stakingsrecht in het kader van de Arbeidsovereenkomst, 1955, 36. 
In such a case, the employer will be able to lock the willing employees out from the workplace, thereby avoiding 
the possibility that he or she later has to pay them their wages. 
See Zonderland, Recht en Plicht bij Staking en Tegenstaking, 1974, 239. 
This forms a sharp contrast with the situation in some other West-European countries: see Birk, "Die Aussperrung 
in rechtsvergleichender Sicht", Zeitschrift fhr Arbeitsrecht, 1979, 231 and Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 
1994, 182 in this regard. 
There is not much to be found on the lock-out in the Dutch literature. See, for more detail, the sources in the 
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this tolerant state of affairs can be found in the way in which employers' organisations and 
trade unions generally deal with each other in the Netherlands. Since World War II, 
collective action has in a sense become "modernised". A high degree of co-operation in 
industrial relations exists, and employees seldom resort to collective action. With such a 
peaceful social climate, it is only natural that the lock-out (with its intolerant and aggressive 
undertones) no longer has a role to play. 
abovementioned footnotes, as well as Meijers, De Arbeidsovereenkomst, met aantekeningen, 1912, 55; Van 
Esveld, "De regeling van de Werkstaking", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1973, 355; Rood, Naar een Stakingswet?, 
1978, 89; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonpolitiek, 1980, 216; Maris, "Offensieve uitsluiting", Sociaal Maandblad 
Arbeid, 1983, 726. 
B. SOUTH AFRICA 
CHAPTERS - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the historical development of the law relating to strikes in South Africa will 
be dealt with. The development can conveniently be divided into three phases. 
The first phase starts with some early examples of industrial action and ends with the passing 
of the first major statutory enactment that sought to regulate the strike phenomenon, namely 
the Industrial Conciliation Act 11of1924.1 
The second phase is characterised by the disparity between white and black trade unionism 
and ends with the far-reaching recommendations of the 1979 Wiehahn Commission.2 
The third phase commences with the restructuring of industrial legislation, specifically 
incorporating black trade unions into the dispute resolution procedures, and ends with the 
promulgation of the new 1995 Labour Relations Act.3 Even though the latter Act introduced 
far-reaching changes to the law relating to strikes, facets of the preceding law remain 
relevant, and the chapter thus ends with a short exposition of the law as it stood immediately 
before 11November1996. 
See 5.2. 
2 See 5.3. 
3 See 5.4. The relevant provisions of Act 66 of 1995 will be analysed and discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.2 Strikes until 1924 
Industrial action and strikes generally related to wages and working conditions in the early 
days. The first recorded collective action by workers in South Africa took place in Cape 
Town in 1849. An association of wage and salaried workers was formed to protect workers' 
interests and to prevent a penal colony being set up at the Cape which would have made 
convict labour available at rates of pay far lower than the wages operative at that time.4 
As discussed in Chapter 1, South African industrial relations changed dramatically after the 
discovery of diamonds in 1870 and gold in 1872. The formation of artisan unions 
comprising white skilled workers was stimulated by the rapid development of the mining 
industry. The major objective of these unions was to protect the skilled worker's status as 
their position was threatened by the many thousands of Blacks who were drawn into the 
industrialisation process as unskilled labourers on the mines.5 Many of the early conflicts on 
the mines had as their source the White workers' growing insecurity regarding their status as 
skilled workers.6 
In 1884 South Africa had its first organised strike. The miners at the Kimberley diamond 
fields objected to a regulation which required them to be stripped and searched when coming 
off duty. Five White miners died and forty were injured in the strike.7 
At the tum of the century, the White trade unions were often in conflict with management 
which resulted in hostility from, and retaliation by, employers. In 1897 White miners at 
Randfontein went on strike when management attempted to drop their wages in line with a 
decrease in the wages of Black workers. Even though the unions won the strike, the mine 
owners started to realise that they did not need skilled workers as before, and jobs were given 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Corder et al, Focus on the History of Labour Legislation, 1979, 39. 
A wildcat strike by black workers at the diamond fields in Kimberley in 1883 was one of the first recorded strikes 
in the country. 
See Finnemore & Van der Merwe, Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa, 1987, 2-4 for more detail 
in this regard. 
Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 45. 
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to semiskilled White workers or, in some cases to Black workers. The skilled workers 
responded by changing the old craft unions to industrial unions to also include the 
semiskilled White worker, and thus began to mobilise their interests on the basis of race 
rather than craft.8 
As a result of the growing friction between the unions and employers, a number of strikes 
took place between 1904 and 1908. The strike weapon was increasingly used by White 
workers in an attempt to protect the status of their jobs. A large strike by White workers at 
the Knights Deep Mine in 1907 was launched after a proposal by employers that skilled 
work should officially be extended to Blacks.9 However, the mine owners had still not 
recognised the trade unions and no real concessions were extracted from management as a 
result of this strike. 
The industrial discord on the Witwatersrand produced the Transvaal Industrial Disputes Act 
of 190910 which was specifically designed to combat strikes in the mining industry. The Act 
introduced procedural bars to unilateral action. No changes could be made by employers to 
terms and conditions of employment, and no changes could be demanded by employees, 
unless one month's notice had been given to the other party .11 The Act also provided for the 
appointment of a "Board of Conciliation and Investigation" and the implementation of 
opposed changes to working conditions had to be stayed until 30 days after the board had 
delivered its report.12 The Act demanded (upon pain of criminal sanction) that industrial 
action be delayed until the prescribed procedures had been exhausted.13 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Finnemore & Van der Merwe, Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa, 1987, 3-4. 
The white workers also protested against unsatisfactory economic and social conditions; see Nel (ed), South 
African Industrial Relations, 1997, 46 in this regard. 
Act 20 of 1909 (the Act was based on a Canadian model). The first statute which prohibited strike action by 
white workers was in fact the Transvaal Railways Regulation Act of 1908; see Lever, "Capital and Labour in 
South Africa: the Passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act 1924", SA Labour Bulletin, 1977, 3(10), 4 for a 
discussion on this statute, as well as the Railways and Harbours Service Act of 1912 which also regulated strikes 
in the railways. 
See section 5(i) of Act 20of1909. 
See section 5(ii) of Act 20 of 1909. The board of conciliation was hardly a fully-fledged conciliation forum, and 
it conducted investigations directed towards a report rather than to play a role in actual negotiations. 
See section 6(l)(b) of Act 20 of 1909. The Act's restrictive provisions were soon resisted by the trade unions. 
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However, it soon appeared that the Act's contribution towards conflict resolution was largely 
ineffectual. This was evident when White union workers started to exert pressure on the 
government to persuade it to pass regulations to protect White workers. The result was the 
Mines and Works Act of 191114 which was aimed at institutionalising racial discrimination. 
In 1913, a large strike was mounted by White workers as a result of management's refusal to 
consult with the workers or their representatives from the Transvaal Federation of Trades. 
The strike began at the Kleinfontein Mine in Benoni and subsequently spread to other mines, 
resulting in a strike involving 20 000 workers. A violent clash between government troops 
and miners resulted in the loss of twenty-one lives and thereafter an uneasy truce was 
negotiated. 
The truce was to be shortlived, and in 1914 a general strike broke out when the government 
tried to break the power of trade unions by paying off railway personnel. This time the 
government acted swiftly by proclaiming martial law and deporting nine leading strikers 
under the emergency powers.15 
The government tried to cope with the labour problems on the mines, as well as the problems 
in the growing manufacturing sector, by passing the Workmen's Compensation Act of 
1914,16 and the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1914.17 Sections 
8-12 of the latter statute introduced prohibitions on picketing in the course of industrial 
disputes and also rendered the breach of essential service employment contracts a criminal 
offence in certain circumstances. 
During these early years on the mines, the Black worker's power - in contrast to the White 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Act 12 of 1911. The Act was promulgated in an attempt to consolidate all previous legislation relating to the 
mining sector; see Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 46 for more detail in this regard. 
Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 47 states that "the 1914 strikes highlighted the problems of 
social and economic relationships between industry and labour, between skilled and unskilled workers, and 
between white and black persons". Cf Myburgh, "Dismissal of striking workers", Trends in South African Labour 
Law (Selected papers from the Labour Law Conference 1991), 1992, 131. 
Act 25of1914. 
Act 27 of 1914. Other statutes promulgated in this regard were the Factories Act of 1918, the Regulation of 
Wages, Apprentices and lmprovers Act of 1918 and the Apprenticeship Act of 1922. 
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skilled worker - was limited. Where strikes did occur, they were easily defeated, especially 
as the compounds were well controlled by police and mine management.18 Nevertheless, the 
number of strikes by Black workers between 1904 and 1910 compelled the government to 
promulgate the Black Labour Regulations Act of 1911.19 The Act attempted to place the 
recruitment and employment of Black workers on a more satisfactory basis, but made no 
provision for collective bargaining or for the redressing of grievances. A large strike 
occurred in 1920, when 71 000 miners went on strike. The strikers were forced to go back to 
work, and in the process three workers were killed by the police. Black workers did not, at 
that time, form trade unions on the mines.20 
During the period from 1914 to 1918 few Jabour problems were experienced as the country 
focused its attention and resources on World War I. However, the end of the war and the 
return of many men from Europe saw the re-emergence of old problems, which were now 
compounded by a large foreign debt, the rising cost of living and an economic depression. In 
order to contain costs in these circumstances, the mines started employing proportionally 
more Black workers who were paid significantly less than their White counterparts. 
Discontent grew steadily and in January 1922 the White miners went on strike, followed by 
engineering workers and power station personnel. The situation deteriorated rapidly, and 
following the imposition of martial law by the Smuts government, armed commandos of 
White miners clashed with troops. In the ensuing violence, about 230 persons died, nearly 
600 were seriously injured, 46 were tried and convicted of murder, and four trade unionists 
were hanged. The strike lasted ten weeks, during which the Witwatersrand was effectively 
paralysed. The government perceived the breaking of the Rand rebellion as a victory, but the 
underlying economic and political problems remained.21 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Alleged cruelty to black workers by whites was among the issues which resulted in collective action by black 
workers; see Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 46 for more detail in this regard. 
Act 15 of 1911. The term "black" is used instead of "bantu" in compliance with the change brought about by the 
Second Black Laws Amendment Act of 1978. 
Finnemore & Van der Merwe, Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa, 1987, 4 states that the black 
workers were "firstly, isolated from one another by the compound system; secondly they received no support 
from white workers who may have shared their union expertise with them; finally tribal allegiances were still 
strong". 
See Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 48 who notes that the Rand rebellion was probably the 
most critical turning point in South Africa's pattern of industrial relations as it "marked the final parting of the 
ways for black and white workers, and it produced the 'conciliation system' introduced through the 1924 
Industrial Conciliation Act". 
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5.3 The Law relating to Strikes from 1924-1979 
5.3.1 The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
The 1922 labour unrest made the Smuts government realise that new labour legislation was 
essential. Consequently, the government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924,22 
which repealed the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act of 1909. The 1924 Act was the first 
statute to provide a statutory basis for collective bargaining in South Africa and brought 
about an historic accommodation between white labour and management. White trade 
unions and employers' organisations were granted formal recognition and industrial councils 
were created to settle disputes and structure collective bargaining between unions and 
23 
employers. 
Section 12(1) of the Act provided that it would be unlawful for any trade union or other 
person to declare a strike until, where there was an industrial council, the matter causing the 
problem had been submitted to, considered and reported on by such industrial council, or 
where there was no industrial council, it had been submitted to, considered and reported on 
by a conciliation board. As pass-bearing24 Black workers were excluded from the definition 
of "employee", they were unable to form or join registered trade unions and could thus not 
make use of the Act's dispute resolution procedures. Black trade unions were, however, 
never prohibited statutorily but the inability to register under the Act meant that they had to 
22 
23 
24 
Act 11 of 1924. According to Jones & Griffiths, Labour Legislation in South Africa, 1980, 23 the Act was 
promulgated for three specific reasons: "It aimed at making provision for the prevention and settlement of 
disputes between employees and employers, following the experience of the Rand Rebellion in 1922; it formed 
part of the overall policy of providing preferential employment opportunities to white workers as opposed to 
blacks in an attempt to alleviate the "poor white" problem; it represented an attempt to appease white workers and 
muster electoral support for Smuts's government, which had waned dramatically after 1922". Smuts, however, 
lost the election and his government was replaced by a National/Labour Party coalition which instituted a 
"civilised labour policy" to stimulate the employment of whites. 
Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989 said of the 1924 Act: "Our Act, but for its blind spot 
concerning race, was one of the first and most advanced of its kind in its commitment to collective bargaining as 
the elixir of peace. And spectacularly successful it was: the rebels of the Rand were within a short period of time 
the institutional inmates of industrial councils, the captors of collective bargaining". 
In an effort to solve the problem of labour supply for the mines, the Land Act of 1913 reserved approximately 
10% of South Africa for Black ownership and forced many squatters into towns to look for work. To ensure 
cheap labour, the pass laws and regulations compelled Black male workers (Black females were not compelled to 
carry passes) to look for jobs in certain districts where employers most wanted labour. They were forced to take 
any job offered as the pass laws only permitted them a few days in which to find work in the allotted area. 
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operate outside the official collective bargaining system, relying on the common law. Thus 
began a dual system of industrial relations in South Africa that had the effect of excluding 
Black workers from political and economic power.25 
A commission of inquiry (the so-called Van Reenen Commission) was appointed in 1934 to 
investigate the updating of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. The result of the 
recommendations was the more comprehensive Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937,26 which 
aimed to create industrial peace between employers and white workers on the basis of self-
govemment and through the mechanisms of negotiation, arbitration, conciliation and 
mediation.27 
5.3.2 The Black Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 
During the 1930's and 1940's, Black trade unionism increased steadily so that by the time the 
National Party came to power in 1948,28 Black trade unions were becoming a significant 
force in industry .29 The National Party was opposed to any form of Black trade union 
activity, and decided to appoint a commission, the Industrial Legislation Commission of 
Inquiry of 1948 (the so-called Botha Commission), to investigate and report on the existing 
industrial legislation. The Botha Commission recommended that new legislation for Black 
workers be promulgated, which resulted in the Black Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
State control over industrial relations was extended with the enactment of the Wage Act of 1925 which provided 
for the unilateral determination of wages and working conditions where there was no agreement under the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. 
Act 36 of 1937. According to Part 5 of the Wiehahn Commission's report the provisions of the Act "embraced 
every undertaking, industry, trade or occupation in the private sector but excluded agricultural workers, domestic 
servants, government workers (including railway workers), and certain other categories of workers in the field of 
education, training and charitable institutions" (at 19). 
The Act caused a great deal of confusion regarding the definition of an "employee"; the Act's definition could be 
interpreted as only excluding Black males, because they were compelled to carry passes, while Black females 
were not. See Van Jaarsveld & Fourie, The Law of South Africa, Volume 13, 1995, 9 and Ne! (ed), South African 
Industrial Relations, 1997, 50 for more detail regarding the 1937 Act. 
It was largely due to developments on the labour front and the fears of conservative white workers, that the 
National Party was elected to power in 1948. It is interesting to note that in both 1922 and 1947 high levels of 
strike activity succeeded a war and preceded a change in government. 
During World War II, the changes in black worker representation forced the Minister of Labour to impose War 
Measure 145of1942, which prohibited strikes by black workers. 
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1953 .30 One of the aims of the Act was to make provision for the resolution of disputes 
which might develop between Black workers and their employers by establishing a hierarchy 
of committees whereby these workers could negotiate and communicate with their 
employers.31 However, the Act specifically prohibited strikes by Black workers as well as 
lock-outs by their employers. A general lack of unity among Black trade unions, coupled 
with the promulgation of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, resulted in the virtual 
collapse of Black unions during the 1960's.32 
5.3.3 The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 
As a direct result of the Botha Commission's investigation, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1956 was promulgated.33 The Act constituted the core of South Africa's labour legislation 
and was essentially a tightening-up of the much-amended Industrial Conciliation Acts of 
1924 and 1937. However, it went further than the 1937 Act in that it introduced far-reaching 
discrimination into labour affairs.34 The exclusion of Blacks from the Act was clearly 
stated,35 with the result that Blacks were explicitly excluded from membership of registered 
trade unions and consequently from the industrial council system.36 
Section 65 of the Act imposed limitations on the right to strike by making a strike illegal 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Act 48 of 1953; see Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 52-53 for more detail on the Act. As a 
result of the Botha Commission's investigations, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 and the Wage Act of 
1957 were also promulgated; see 5.3.3 in this regard. 
The failure of the committee system is highlighted by the fact that by 1959 only eight, and by 1969 only 26 labour 
committees were functioning in South Africa. 
Newall, The Demand for a Living Wage, 1988, 8-9. The Suppression of Communism Act defined communism 
broadly and was used effectively by the government to oppose black trade unionism. 
Act 28 of 1956. The Act's name was amended to the Labour Relations Act of 1956 after the passing of Act 57 of 
1981. 
It further entrenched the separation of races by allowing all non-Blacks ("whites, coloureds and Indians") to 
belong to registered trade unions, and by prohibiting the registration of multiracial trade unions. The Act also 
introduced a safeguard against interracial competition which became known as statutory job reservation. 
The definition section of the Act stated as follows: " ... .'employee' means any person (other than a Bantu) 
employed by, or working for any employer and receiving, or being entitled to receive any remuneration, and any 
other person whatsoever (other than a Bantu) who in any manner assists in the carrying on or conducting of the 
business of an employer. .. ". 
See Nel (ed),South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 53-58 for more detail in this regard. 
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unless the statutory dispute resolution procedures were adhered to. It set out the 
circumstances which had to prevail and the procedures which had to be followed before a 
strike was lawful.37 
5.3.4 The 1973 strikes 
During the 1960's and up until the early 1970's a calm descended on the South African 
industrial relations situation.38 In retrospect it was the calm before the storm. In early 1973 
a wave of strikes involving more than 60 000 Black workers started in Durban. The 
widespread strikes over wages took place throughout the country and demonstrated for the 
first time the de facto power of Black workers. The lack of formal and acceptable 
negotiating structures and procedures left employers without established channels of 
communication with the Black workforce. However, no one was prosecuted for striking 
illegally. The strikes underlined the major shortcomings of the existing labour legislation for 
Black workers, and resulted in the swift promulgation of the Black Labour Relations 
Regulation Amendment Act of 1973.39 For the first time it was now possible for Black 
workers to strike legally once procedures in terms of the Act were followed. 
The years 1973-1977 saw the further growth of a dualistic system, where Black workers 
were confined to a structure of employer-initiated committees with little or no bargaining 
power. In 1977, the Black Labour Relations Amendment Act was promulgated.40 The Act 
made provision for the recognition of agreements negotiated by committees, but it may be 
argued that Blacks were only marginally better off with regard to their negotiating position 
as it still proved impossible to enforce such agreements in the event of a dispute with the 
41 
employer. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
It did this by specifying when a strike could not be held. The wording of section 65 of the Act remained 
essentially the same through the years' amendments, and will be dealt with in detail in 5.4.4.1. 
It was the result of suppression rather than resolution of conflict; see Newall, The Demand for a Living Wage, 
1988, 9. 
Act 70 of 1973. The Act still attempted to discourage the development of black trade unionism and made 
provision for the following committees within companies: works, coordinating works and liaison committees. 
Act 84 of 1977. The Act sought to improve the position of black workers, particularly with respect to the 
machinery for negotiation. 
Finnemore & Van der Merwe, Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa, 1987, 7-8; Friedman, Building 
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After the 1977 Act, Black trade unionism continued to expand, and it appeared that the Act 
was not serving its purpose. The formal system was increasingly being by-passed as 
employers bargained and entered into agreements with unregistered Black trade unions. The 
dramatic growth in Black trade union membership, the 1976 Soweto uprising, calls for 
disinvestment in South Africa and the growing shortage of skilled workers, were among the 
pressures to which the government had to respond. A complete updating of the country's 
labour legislation was long overdue, and the government decided to appoint a commission of 
inquiry to investigate. 
5.4 The Law relating to Strikes from 1979-1995 
5.4.1 The amendments of 1979 and the early 1980's 
In June 1977, the South African government appointed a commission of inquiry, the 
Wiehahn Commission, to re-appraise the key labour statutes.42 Its first interim report was 
submitted in February 1979 and tabled in Parliament on 1 May 1979.43 The 
recommendations of the Commission brought about a series of legislative amendments,44 
which by 1984 had produced something of a small revolution in South African labour law. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act became known as the Labour Relations Act (but still dated 
1956). Full trade union rights were extended to every worker in South Africa, full autonomy 
was granted to unions in respect of their membership, all racial restrictions were removed 
42 
43 
44 
Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970-1984, 1987, 67; Rycroft in Rycroft & Jordaan, A 
Guide to South African Labour Law, 1992, 273; Nel (ed), South African Industrial Relations, 1997, 56-58. 
Professor N.E. Wiehahn was appointed as the chairman of the commission. In a little more than two years it 
produced a series of six reports which led to a complete overhaul of the South African labour laws. (It was the 
first commission of inquiry into labour legislation since the Botha Commission of 1948.) 
The most important recommendations were: (a) trade union rights should be granted to black workers; (b) more 
stringent requirements were needed for trade union registration; (c) job reservation should be abolished; (d) a new 
industrial court should be established; (e) a national manpower commission should be installed; (f) provision 
should be made for unfair labour practice legislation; and (g) separate facilities in factories, shops and offices 
should be abolished. Cf Van Jaarsveld & Fourie, The Law of South Africa, Volume 13, 1995, 10. 
See Act 94 of 1979, Act 95 of 1980, Act157 of 1981, Act 51of1982, Act 2 of 1983 and Act 81of1984 in this 
regard. 
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and an Industrial Court was created with unique powers in terms of its unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction. The Black Labour Relations Act of 1953 (as amended) was repealed. However, 
the fact that the Wiehahn reforms were inter alia intended to bring the emerging unions 
under statutory supervision, resulted in a number of strikes over the formal recognition of 
trade unions.45 
From the time the Industrial Conciliation Act was first promulgated until the appointment of 
the Wiehahn Commission, the legislature sought to harness the strike to the yoke of 
collective bargaining. Industrial action was made a criminal offence unless the statutory 
conciliation procedures had been exhausted.46 However, the Commission held the view that 
there should be a basic right to strike and a correlative duty on the part of employers to 
refrain from conduct which infringes such a right.47 The Commission's views were 
embodied in the post-1979 amendments, but were only tentatively supported by the 
industrial court.48 
In spite of the abovementioned reforms, the labour field was still deeply influenced by socio-
economic and political problems. Many of these problems overflowed into the labour 
relations sphere, and resulted in stayaway actions, consumer boycotts and a steep increase in 
the number of strikes.49 During the five-year period from 1983-1987 the level of strike 
activity was higher than during any other comparable period in the country's history ,50 and 
the beleaguered government was under tremendous pressure to introduce further 
amendments to the Labour Relations Act.51 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
There were 342 recorded strikes and work stoppages in 1981, compared with 207 in 1980, which itself was 
considered a year of major turmoil; see Finnemore & Van der Metwe, Introduction to Industrial Relations in 
South Africa, 1987, 8-9 and Maree (ed), The Independent Trade Unions 1974-1984, 1987, Part IV in this regard. 
See Cheadle in Brassey et al, The New Labour Law, 1987, 244 and Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations 
Act, 1989, 70 in this regard. 
See the Complete Wiehahn Report, 1982 and Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989, 70. 
Raad van Mynvakbonde v Kamer van Mynwese (1984) IU 344 (IC) at 361; MA WUv Hart (1985) IU 478 (IC) at 
494; Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989, 70. 
See Van Jaarsveld & Fourie, The Law of South Africa, Volume 13, 1995, 11 in this regard. 
The number of strikes has increased since 1980, when 207 strikes took place, by more than 400% to 948 in 1990: 
see the National Manpower Commission Annual Report, 1990, 20-22. 
The major changes produced by the series of post-Wiehahn amendments also resulted in an incoherent statute 
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5.4.2 The 1988 Labour Relations Amendment Act 
In 1986, the National Manpower Commission produced a report which proposed the 
following changes to the law relating to strikes and lock-outs: firstly, it suggested that the 
criminal sanction be removed from the statutory provisions regulating industrial action; 
secondly, it proposed that any industrial action not preceded by either statutory conciliation 
or domestic dispute procedures be regarded as unacceptable; thirdly, it suggested that the 
industrial court be empowered to enjoin unacceptable forms of industrial action.52 
The 1988 Act53 did not give effect to the above propositions. Criminal sanctions remained 
and no explicit recognition was given to domestic dispute resolution procedures. However, 
the Act introduced an entirely new unfair labour practice definition which, for the first time, 
included lawful as well as unlawful strikes and lock-outs within its ambit. A strike that was 
lawful in terms of the Act could nevertheless be interdicted on the basis that it was unfair. 
The relevant paragraphs of the definition read as follows: 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
"(!) any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work, if the employer is not directly involved in the 
dispute which gives rise to the strike, lock-out or stoppage of work;54 
(m) any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work in respect of a dispute between an employer and 
employee which dispute is the same or virtually the same as a dispute between such 
employer and employee which gave rise to a strike, lock-out or stoppage of work during the 
previous 12 months;55 
(n) any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work in contravention of section 65;"56 
with obvious shortcomings; cf Kriek J in Natal Die Casting v President, Industrial Court (1987) !Ll 245 (D) at 
253J: " .. .the legislature, in 1979 saw fit to cut, trim, stretch, adapt and generally doctor the old Act in order to 
accommodate and give effect to the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission instead of scrapping the old 
Act and producing an intelligible piece of legislation which clearly and unequivocally expressed its intentions." 
Unfortunately, the 1988 amendments discussed below were also to a large extent unsatisfactory. 
NMC, Dispute Settlement, Levels of Collective Bargaining and Related Matters, RP 115/1986 at 79-94; Cameron 
et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989, 71 . 
Act 83 of 1988 consisted of 31 sections and inter alia attempted to codify the unfair labour practice concept 
earlier introduced into the Labour Relations Act by the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979. 
Secondary or sympathy strikes were thus declared unfair per se. 
So-called repeat strikes were thus declared unfair per se. 
All illegal strikes were thus declared unfair per se, and could therefore be interdicted. Paragraph (h) of the 
definition also declared trade union product and service boycotts to be unfair. However, the mere fact that the 
strike was illegal did not prevent the reinstatement of dismissed strikers on that ground alone; see JD Group v 
CCA WUSA (1990) !Ll 192 (IC). 
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It now became possible for the court to pronounce on the legitimacy of collective bargaining 
procedures and demands whenever it was called upon to decide over the fairness of 
subsequent industrial action. In a number of decisions the lawfulness of a strike was 
regarded as an important but inconclusive element in deciding whether strikers should be 
given protection by the industrial court. The courts often required that the strike must have 
been used as an integral part of the collective bargaining process and then only as an ultimum 
remedium for the strike to fall outside the definition of an unfair labour practice.57 Strikes 
could thus be interdicted on the basis of unfairness and such interdicts - often granted on 
short notice and even ex parte - soon became a popular weapon in the hands of the 
58 
employers. 
The fact that industrial action was for the first time brought within the scope of the unfair 
labour practice definition elicited intense union reaction. Large-scale industrial unrest and 
mass action broke out and again forced the government to amend the Labour Relations Act 
of 1956. 
5.4.3 The 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act 
On 1 May 1991 another Labour Relations Amendment Act came into effect.59 The 
amending Act effectively re-introduced the earlier unfair labour practice definition which 
explicitly excluded strikes and lock-outs from its ambit,60 with the result that the Industrial 
57 
58 
59 
60 
See Rycroft in Rycroft & Jordaan, A Guide to South African Labour Law, 1992, 276-277; NUM v Libanon Gold 
Mining Co Ltd (1988) ILi 832 (IC); BA WU v Edward Hotel (1989) ILi 357 (IC); FBWU v Hercules Cold Storage 
(Pty) Ltd (I 990) ILi 4 7 (LAC); Stocks & Stocks Natal (Pty) Ltd v BA WU (I 990) ILi 369 (IC); Buthelezi v Labour 
for Africa (1991) ILi 588 (IC). 
The legislature also tried to contain the rising tide of industrial action by amending section 79 of the Act: union 
members, office-bearers and officials who instigated illegal strikes were now deemed to be acting with due 
authority on behalf of their trade unions unless the contrary was proved. 
Act 9 of 1991. President F.W. de Klerk's sweeping announcements on 2 February 1990 had far-reaching 
implications and all participants in the industrial relations arena seemed to realise that a need existed for political, 
economic and social restructuring of the country; the essence of Act 9 of 1991 was agreed upon in the broad-
ranging Laboria Minute, a historic tripartite agreement between labour, management and the government, 
concluded on 14 September 1990. Cf also the !LO Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission Report on South 
Africa discussed in Chapter 6. 
Strikes and lock-outs could thus not be the subject of litigation in the Industrial Court in terms of sections 
17(1l)(a),46 and 46(9) of the Act. 
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Court could no longer interdict either forms of industrial action on the basis of unfaimess.61 
Section 17(1 l)(aA) did, however, give the Industrial Court the power - concurrently with the 
(pre-existing) power of the Supreme Court - to interdict strikes and lock-outs on the basis of 
unlawfulness, i.e. non-compliance with the provisions of section 65 of the Act. Section 17D 
was also introduced which required employers to give reasonable notice of any intention to 
interdict strikes .62 
Even though strikes and lock-outs were excluded from the unfair labour practice definition, a 
dismissal following upon a strike,63 or an employer's retaliatory measures during a strike,64 
could still be declared an unfair labour practice by the Industrial Court.65 
5.4.4 Strike law immediately preceding the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
Although the 1995 Labour Relations Act introduced far-reaching changes to the law relating 
to strikes, facets of the preceding law remain relevant. It is thus important to give a short 
exposition of the law as it stood immediately before 11November1996. 
5.4.4.l The legality of strikes 
Section 65 of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 (as amended)66 specified the circumstances 
which had to prevail and the procedures which had to be followed before a strike67 (and lock-
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
It could, however, still do so in respect of industrial action falling short of a "strike" or "lock-out" as defined. 
Section 79(2) of the previous Act, which held unions vicariously liable for certain delicts of its members, office-
bearers and officials unless the contrary was proved, was also removed by the 1991 amendments. 
Sasol Industries (Pty) Ltd v SACWU (1990) JU 1010 (LAC). 
See CWIU v BP South Africa (1991) IU 599 (IC) and NUM v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) JU 
1221 (A) in this regard. 
The process that led to the promulgation of the new Labour Relations·Act of 1995 will be dealt with in Chapter 6. 
For the remainder of the chapter to be referred to as "the Act". 
It should be noted that if a strike was committed for any purpose other than a purpose referred to in the Act's 
strike definition, it would not be a strike as defined and section 65 of the Act would thus not apply. See 
Chapter 1 for the Act's definition of a "strike". Cf also Dunlop SA Ltd v MA WU (1985) JU 167 (D); Barlows 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v MA WU (1990) IU 35 (T); Buthelezi v Labour for Africa (Pty) Ltd (1991) JU 588 (IC); 
Ndamane v Marble Lime & Associated Industries Ltd (1991) JU 148 (IC); CWIU v Boardman Bros (Pty) Ltd 
(1991) IU 864 (IC); Amcoal Colliery & Industrial Operations Ltd v NUM (1992) JU 359 (IC); Nestle SA (Pty) 
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out) could be classified as lawful.68 It created an absolute prohibition on strikes in the 
following circumstances: 
a. during the period of the currency of any binding agreement, award or determination 
which regulated the issue in dispute;69 
b. during the period of one year reckoned from the date of a binding wage 
determination which regulated the issue in dispute;70 
c. if the employees concerned in the strike were employees engaged in essential 
. 71 
services; or 
d. if the issue in dispute was referred to arbitration, until the cessation of the arbitration 
proceedings or the making of an award, whichever event occurred first.72 
If the absolute prohibitions were not applicable, a strike could be classified as legal only if 
the other requirements of section 65 of the Act were met, which provided that a strike could 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
LtdvFBWU(1992) ILi 1623 (ARB). 
In terms of the common law, participation in a strike constitutes a fundamental breach of the contract of 
employment which entitles the employer summarily to terminate the contract (cf R v Smit 1955(1) SA 239 (C); 
Ngewu v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co 1982(4) SA 390 (N)). The Supreme Court initially held the view 
that as the Labour Relations Act of 1956 did not alter the common law, employees were not granted the right to 
strike and could thus be summarily dismissed by their employer (Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v NUM 
(1986) ILi 108 (W)). However, the inadequacy of the common law of strikes and its inability to govern the 
complexities of industrial action was recognised by the Industrial Court, and the right to strike was gradually 
recognised (cf SACWU v Sentrachem Ltd (1988) ILi 410 (IC); NUMSA v Elm Street Plastics t/a ADV Plastics 
(1989) ILi 328 (IC); SACWUv Sasollndustries (Pty) Ltd (1989) ILi 1031 (IC)). 
Section 65(1)(a) of the Act. Cf Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd v De Klerk NO (1991) ILi 289 (A); BA WU v Asoka 
Hotel (1989) ILi 167 (IC). 
Section 65(1)(b) of the Act. It concerned a determination made under section 14(2) of the Wage Act 5 of 1957. 
Cf also Vereeniging Refractories Ltd v BCA WU (1989) ILi 79 (W). 
Section 65(1)(c) of the Act. These employees were statutorily prohibited from striking under any circumstances 
and were compelled to submit to compulsory arbitration in the event of an unsolved dispute. Cf SABMA WU v 
Kagiso Town Council (1989) ILi 1085 (IC); Rand Water Board v MSFA WU (1991) ILi 893 (IC); Langeberg 
Foods Ltd v FA WU (1992) ILi 548 (E). This ban on strikes was not uncontroversial: see Benjamin, "The big ban 
theory: Strikes in essential services", Employment Law, 1989, 6 at 44 and Cooper, "Strikes in Essential Services", 
Industrial Law Journal, 1994, 903. Furthermore, what constitutes an essential service differs from country to 
country, proving that strikes by a particular group of employees do not necessarily cause irreparable harm to 
society in general. See also section BB of the Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 1968, section 
55A(l) of the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act 56 of 1974 and section 40(2) of 
the Nursing Act 50 of 1978. 
Section 65(1)(d)(iii) of the Act. Cf also section 65(2)(a) of the Act which provided that no strike shall take place 
by a party to an industrial council "the constitution of which provides that disputes which cannot be settled by the 
council shall be referred to arbitration". 
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not be held: 
a. unless the issue in dispute had been considered by an industrial council with 
jurisdiction and until the council had reported thereon or a period of 30 days had 
expired, whichever event occurred first; 73 or 
b. if there was no such council, unless a conciliation board had been established for the 
consideration of the issue in dispute and until the board had reported thereon or a 
period of 30 days had expired, whichever event occurred first;74 and 
c. unless the majority of the members of the union had voted by ballot in favour of the 
strike action.75 
Even though the Act did not explicitly recognise the right to strike,76 it clearly acknowledged 
strikes to be an indispensable feature of a free collective bargaining system. 
The law favoured legal strikers in four ways.77 Firstly, strikers and their unions were 
immune from the criminal sanctions which industrial action would otherwise have 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Cf NUMSA v Jumbo Products CC (1991) IU 1048 (IC); Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1992) IU 345 (T) 
(industrial council without jurisdiction). In NTE Ltd v Ngubane (1992) IU 910 (LAC) it was stated that the 
purpose of this requirement was to preclude a party to a dispute from resorting to unilateral industrial action until 
the dispute resolution mechanisms were exhausted. 
Cf Dunlop SA Ltd v MA WU (1985) IU 167 (D); Chamber of Mines v NUM (1987) IU 68 (A); CWIU v 
Boardman Bros (Pty) Ltd (1991) IU 864 (IC);Hessel's Cash & Carry CCv SACCA WU(l992) IU 554 (E). 
The holding of a ballot went beyond a mere formality and the following guidelines had to be complied with: (1) 
the ballot procedure prescribed by the union's constitution must be adhered to; (2) a ballot officer must be 
appointed; (3) the employer must be notified of the place and time of the ballot; (4) the ballot must be held in a 
quiet and orderly fashion (preferably on the employer's premises); (5) a member is entitled to only one (secret) 
vote; (6) the ballot issue must be the same as the issue considered by the industrial council or the conciliation 
board and must be described in clear and concise terms; (7) after counting and recounting the votes, the ballot 
officer must issue a certificate indicating specified information regarding the voting. The failure to hold a pre-
strike ballot resulted in an illegal strike; see NUM v Dee/kraal Gold Mining Co (Pty) Ltd (1987) IU 147 (IC); 
CWIU v Bevaloid (Pty) Ltd (1988) IU 447 (IC) Sasol Industries (Pty) Ltd v SACWU (1990) IU 1010 (LAC); 
NUMSA v Jumbo Products CC (1991) JU 1048 (IC); Edgars Stores v SACCA WU (1992) IU 177 (IC) and SA 
Nylon Spinners (Pty) Ltd v SACWU (1992) JU 1014 (IC). 
In 1991, the Labour Appeal Court held that the Act does not introduce a fundamental right to strike; see Perslwr v 
Media Workers Association of SA (1991) 12 IU 86 (LAC) and NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd (1991) 12 JU 
564 (LAC) in this regard. See, however, the decision by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in NUMSA 
v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd (1996) JU 455 (A), as well as the discussion thereon by Fabricius, "The Dismissal of 
Strikers: A New Value Judgement?", Industrial Law Journal, 1996, 611. 
See Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989, 85-88; Le Roux, "The legal consequences of industrial 
action", Contemporary Labour Law, 1992, 105; Wallis, Labour and Employment Law, 1992, Par 55; Van 
Jaarsveld & Fourie, The Law of South Africa, Volume 13, 1995, 250. 
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attracted. Secondly, civil indemnity (contractual and delictual) was effected by the 
provisions of section 79(1) of the Act.79 Thirdly, no interdicts could be brought against those 
instigating or participating in a legal strike.so Finally, dismissal of legal strikers was 
normally inappropriate unless business operations dictated otherwise and then only if the 
business faced extinction or irreparable harm.s1 
The following were further consequences of lawful strike action under the Act: (1) for the 
duration of a strike the employees received no wages in terms of the principle "no work no 
pay";s2 (2) employees willing to work (but being unable to do so because of the strike) were 
in principle entitled to their wages;s3 (3) striking employees were not entitled to any 
unemployment benefits in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1966;s4 and (4) if 
the employer's enterprise was disrupted by the striking employees, temporary replacement 
labour could be recruited to keep the enterprise running. 
As appears from the aforegoing, a strike was regarded as illegal if it took place contrary to 
the provisions of section 65(1) and (2) of the Act. The illegality of a strike often had serious 
consequences for the organisers as well as employees who participated in the strike, as the 
indemnity against contractual and delictual liability provided by section 79 of the Act did not 
apply to illegal strikes.s5 An employer could also apply for an interdict in an attempt to 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
The statutory offences are set out in section 65(3) of the Act. However, the criminal provisions were not enforced 
in practice. 
The indemnity was only applicable if the strike was lawful in terms of section 65 of the Act and if the action did 
not constitute a criminal offence. Compare also the statutory delict that was created by section 79(2) of the Act, 
namely that of an interference with the contractual relationship between an employer and an employee resulting in 
the breach of the contract: see Cameron et al, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989, 87-88. 
See section 17(1 l)(aA) of the Act in this regard. 
BA WU v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel (1993) ILJ 963 (LAC); Laeveld Kooperasie Bpk (Tobacco 
Division) v SACCA WU (1993) ILJ 1354 (IC); see 5.4.4.3 for more detail in this regard. 
Nampak Products Ltd v PPWA WU (1992) ILJ 1292 (ARB); Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd v FBWU (1992) ILJ 1623 (ARB). 
Johannesburg Municipality v O'Sullivan 1923 AD 201. The employer remains bound to remunerate the 
employee for as long as the employee makes his or her services available to the employer (unless, of course, the 
employer's obligation to pay becomes objectively impossible). The tender of services must be real and should be 
brought to the employer's attention. Cf Claasen, Stakingsreg in Diensverband in SA, 1975, 177. 
Section 35(13)(d) of Act 30 of 1966; the section did, however, provide for certain exceptions. 
see 5.4.4.4 for more detail in this regard. 
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prevent an illegal strike.86 
Since the dismissal of striking employees was evaluated against the background of the 
fairness of such dismissals, the mere legality of a strike was not in itself decisive. And yet 
illegal strikers were generally less likely to receive the protection of the court.87 
5.4.4.2 The dismissal of striking employees 
As stated above, a strike constitutes a material breach of the contract of employment in terms 
of the common law, which entitles the employer to summarily terminate the contract.88 
However, the introduction of the industrial court's unfair labour practice jurisdiction in 1979 
provided a mechanism whereby the employer's common-law right of dismissal could be 
limited .89 A dismissal following upon a strike could be declared an unfair labour practice by 
the Industrial Court. Unfortunately, the court's approach to this complex and controversial 
issue was not always consistent, which led to a certain degree of incoherence in the law 
relating to the dismissal of strikers. 
The first decision in which this vexing question was considered in some detail was Raad van 
Mynvakbonde v Die Kamer van Mynwese van SA .90 The court was of the opinion that it was 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Section 17D(l) of the Act required that 48 hours' notice of the application for an interdict or other order should be 
given to the respondent (the court could permit a shorter period under certain circumstances). The industrial court 
has consistently required that the applicant must establish urgency, even where 48 hours' notice of the application 
has been given; see Olivier, "Lawful and unlawful strikes",De Rebus, 1993, 194 for more detail. 
See Gauntlett & Rogers, "When all else has failed: illegal strikes, ultimatums and mass dismissals", Industrial 
Law Journal, 1991, 1171 at 1175: " ... a serious disregard for the prescribed machinery will generally render the 
further prospect of conciliation remote. It will bring about a degree of industrial anarchy in which an employer 
must generally be free to resort to the ultimate weapon. The doors of the court are not automatically barred to the 
participant in the illegal strike who is dismissed. He will, however, have to establish exceptional circumstances 
which render his dismissal an unfair labour practice". Cf also Olivier, "The dismissal of striking workers: illegal 
strikes", De Rebus, 1993, 595. 
A contractual approach to the dismissal of strikers was followed in Perskor v MWASA (1991) IU 86 (LAC) where 
it was stated that the mere fact that the strike was legal in the sense that it did not contravene section 65 of the Act 
did not mean that striking employees could not be dismissed. Cf also NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd (1991) 
IU 564 (LAC); Le Roux & Yan Niekerk, The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal, 1994, 296-298. 
It should be noted that the limitations imposed upon the employer's right to dismiss strikers did not bring forth a 
right to strike; see Jordaan in Rycroft & Jordaan, A Guide to South African Labour Law, 1992, 216-217 in this 
regard. 
(1984) IU 344 (IC). The Raad van Mynvakbonde case was the origin of the so-called "basket of factors" 
approach, which was subsequently endorsed in NUM v Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd (1986) IU 123 (IC) 
and MA WU v Natal Die Casting Co (1986) IU 520 (IC). 
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possible that the lawful dismissal of legal strikers could constitute an unfair labour practice, 
and formulated a list of general factors to be taken into account in determining the fairness of 
such a dismissal. These included: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
91 92 . the cause, nature, extent, and purpose of the stnke 
the circumstances of the employer and the employees 
the duration of the strike 93 
the consequences and result of the strike94 
the purposes of the Act and the principles of collective bargaining 
the presence or absence of negotiations in good faith95 
the provisions of the relevant contracts of employment, particularly those provisions 
dealing with employees' participation in an illegal strike 
the manner in which the employer and employees conducted themselves during the 
strike.96 
This "basket of factors" approach was followed in numerous subsequent decisions in an 
attempt to define when a strike will be "legitimate" or "acceptable". No single factor was 
regarded as definitive97 and the importance of a specific factor thus largely depended on the 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
See for example CW/U v Bevaloid (Pty) Ltd (1988) IU 447 (IC); BA WU v Palm Beach Hotel (1988) IU 1016 
(IC); BTR Dunlop v NUMSA (2) (1989) IU 701 (IC). 
Cf FA WU v Spekenham Supreme (1988) IU 628 (IC) ("wild-cat" strike); Kolatsoeu v Afro-Sun Investments (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Releke Zezame Supermarket (1990) IU 754 (IC) (sit-in); SASTA WUv Motorvia (Pty) Ltd (1991) IU 1058 
(IC) (go-slow). 
It is not the duration of the strike that matters as such, but whether the strike has in fact achieved its purpose; cf 
FBWU v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd (1990) IU 47 (LAC); Seven Able CC t/a The Crest Hotel v HARWU 
(1990) IU 504 (LAC). 
See FBWU v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd (1990) IU 47 (LAC) where the maximum losses possible were 
caused to the employer. 
See for example Kolatsoeu v Afro-Sun Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Releke Zezame Supermarket (1990) IU 754 (IC); 
Sentraal-Wes (Kooperatief) Bpk v FA WU (1990) IU 977 (LAC). 
Cf Themba v Nico van Rooyen Tuksidermie (1984) JU 245 (IC); SACWU v Pharma Natura (Pty) Ltd (1986) IU 
696 (IC); BHA WU v Garden City Clinic (1987) JU 462 (IC); Ntsaba v Eastern Province Textiles (Pty) Ltd (1987) 
JU 470 (IC); Mshumi v Rohen Packaging (Pty) Ltd t/a Ultrapak (1988) JU 619; SACWUv Sasol Industries (Pty) 
Ltd (2) (1989) JU 1031 (IC); Buthelezi v Labour for Africa (Pty) Ltd (1991) JU 588 (IC); Performing Arts 
Council of the Transvaal v PPWA WU (1994) IU 65 (A). 
Even though the legality of the strike was not cited as a specific factor in the Raad van Mynvakbonde case, it has 
also played an important role in the development of the law; see MWASA v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 
(1984) IU 16 (IC); PPWA WU v Uniply (Pty) Ltd (1985) JU 255 (IC); Tshabalala v Minister of Health and 
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circumstances of the case in question .98 This did not lead to any legal certainty, and in this 
regard the gradual development in recent years of the so-called "functional" approach to 
determine the acceptability of strike action and the consequential dismissal of striking 
employees, was certainly welcomed. 
In BA WU v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel99 the functional approach, which had 
the advantage of relative simplicity, was expressed as follows: 
"The Act contemplates that the right to strike should trump concerns for the economic losses 
which the exercise of that right causes. That is because collective bargaining is necessarily a 
sham and a chimera if it is not bolstered and supported by the ultimate threat of the exercise 
of economic force by one or other of the parties, or indeed by both. Of course there are 
exceptions to this general proposition; the denial of essential services causes such harm that 
the social and/or economic considerations of such harm are deemed to be sufficient to 
outweigh the usual protection of the right to strike. That is why the Act provides, at section 
46, the next best alternative to a negotiated settlement - arbitration - as the means of resolving 
disputes in essential services. So too the threat of extinction of an enterprise or of irreparable 
h . d . f h . h 'k "]()() arm to 1t may superse e protec!ion o t e ng t to stn e. 
The functional approach thus emphasised two factors, namely the strike 's vital function in the 
11 . b . . 101 d h . . f h 1 102 d co ective argammg arena an t e economic cucumstances o t e emp oyer, an was 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Welfare (1986) ILl 168 (W); MA WU v Siemens Ltd (1986) ILl 547 (IC) and SACWU v Pharma Natura (Pty) Ltd 
(1986) ILl 696 (IC) in this regard. 
See for more detail on the "basket of factors" approach Cheadle in Brassey et al, The New Labour Law, 1987, 
257; Jordaan in Rycroft & Jordaan,A Guide to South African Labour Law, 1992, 217; Basson, "The dismissal of 
strikers in South Africa (Part 2)", SA Mercantile Law Journal, 1993, 20; Olivier, "Die ontslag van stakende 
werkers", De Rebus, 1993, 295, 405, 492, 595 & 684; Van Jaarsveld & Fourie, The Law of South Africa, Volume 
13, 1995, 255 and Le Roux & Van Niekerk, The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal, 1994, 298. 
(1993) ILl 963 (LAC) at 9720-F. The existence of the right to strike was at long last accepted in this decision: cf 
Basson, "The Labour Appeal Court and the Right to Strike",SA Mercantile Law Journal, 1994, 104. 
The court's approach is summarised as follows by Le Roux & Van Niekerk, The South African Law of Unfair 
Dismissal, 1994 at 307: " .. .legal strikes are functional to collective bargaining. They therefore do not constitute 
misconduct and strikers may not be dismissed on this ground. However, if the employer can show that its 
business faces 'the threat of extinction' or of 'irreparable harm', dismissal may be justified - not on the grounds of 
misconduct but rather because of the operational requirements of the business." 
Cf Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v MA WU ( 1990) ILl 35 (D; NUM v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd 
(1991) ILl 1221 (A); Le Roux, "The Use of Economic Power during Industrial Action: Some Thoughts on 
National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 ILl 1221 (A)", SA Mercantile 
Law Journal, 1992, 16; Le Roux & Van Niekerk, The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal, 1994, 304-310. 
The question of when the operational requirements of the business will justify dismissal, is obviously a difficult 
one to answer; see Perskorporasie van SA Bpk v MWASA (1993) ILl 938 (LAC); Rycroft, "The Employer's 'Level 
of Tolerance' in a Lawful Strike",lndustrial Law Journal, 1993, 285; Le Roux & Van Niekerk, The South African 
Law of Unfair Dismissal, 1994, 308-309. 
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seen as an important step in the development of a "right to strike" .103 
Where the dismissal of legal strikers was found to be unfair, the industrial court made the 
f 11 . d (1) . . hl04 . h 105 o owmg or ers: remstatement wit or wit out retrospective effect; (2) 
compensation;106 (3) that strikers be treated the same as non-strikers as regards wages;107 (4) 
compelling the employer to commence bona fide negotiations.108 
5.4.4.3 The employer's rights and remedies 
Firstly, an employer threatened with an illegal strike could apply for an interdict in terms of 
section 17(11)(aA) of the Act in an attempt to prevent the strike.109 The 1991 amendments 
to the Act inserted section 17D which confirmed the industrial court's view at the time that 
such interdicts should not be granted as a matter of course, but with circumspection.110 
Secondly, as stated above, an employer was able to dismiss workers who took part in a strike 
where such strike was not "legitimate", "acceptable" or "functional".111 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
It is important to note that the Labour Relations Act of 1995 attempts to maintain a significant degree of 
continuity in the law relating to the dismissal of strikers: cf 6.4.3 in this regard. 
BA WUv Edward Hotel (1989) ILi 357 (IC);BA WUv Asoka Hotel (1989) ILi 167 (IC). 
SACWU v Cape Lime Ltd (1988) ILi 441 (IC); Buthelezi v Labour for Africa (1991) ILi 588 (IC). 
Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter (1993) ILi 974 (LAC). 
NUMvEast Rand Gold& Uranium (1989) ILi 103 (IC); (1991) ILi 1221 (A). 
SACWU v Control Chemicals (1988) ILi 606 (IC). 
For example Dunlop SA Ltd v MA WU (1985) ILi 167 (D); Libanon Gold Mining Co Ltd v NUM (1985) ILi 180 
(W); Murray & Roberts Buildings (Cape Town) (Pty) Ltd v SAA WU (1987) ILi 325 (IC). Cf also Van Eck, 
"Bevoegdheid van die nywerheidshof om interdikte te verleen", THRHR, 1992, 67 and Landman, "The striking 
value of interdicts", Contemporary Labour Law, 1994, 41. 
Section 170 of the Act inter alia required employers to give 48 hours' notice of any application to interdict a 
strike. 
The basis for such dismissal was the breach of the contract of employment. (As no right to strike existed even 
workers taking part in a lawful strike could thus in theory be dismissed on the basis of the breach of the contract 
of employment.) In practice it was required of an employer to first give a timely ultimatum of its intention to 
dismiss before such dismissal would be regarded as fair; see BA WU v Edward Hotel (1989) ILi 357 (IC); Liberty 
Box & Bag Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd v PPWA WU (1990) ILi 427 (ARB). 
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Thirdly, an employer could resort to its ultimate economic weapon, the lock-out. 112 The Act 
treated strikes and lock-outs on the same basis. Section 65 set the same requirements for the 
legality of both forms of industrial action, while section 79 granted immunity from civil 
liability for legal strikes as well as legal lock-outs.113 
The above definition of a lock-out included the possibility that an employer could lock out 
an employee by dismissing such employee. The fact that lock-outs were excluded from the 
definition of an unfair labour practice led to the argument that employees who were 
dismissed as part of a lock-out would not be entitled to approach the industrial court for 
relief in terms of section 46(9) of the Act. The courts were generally not willing to 
countenance this argument on the basis that, where a lock-out is instituted with the intention 
of terminating the employment relationship permanently instead of compelling compliance 
with one of the demands provided for in the Act's definition, this no longer constituted a 
lock-out as an essential element of the definition was missing.114 
5.4.4.4 The limited ambit of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 
The Act did not apply to farmworkers, domestic servants and public sector workers such as 
112 
113 
114 
The lock-out was defined as follows in the Act: "any one or more of the following acts or omissions by a person 
who is or has been an employer - (a) the exclusion by him of any body or number of persons who are or have 
been in his employ from any premises on or in which work provided by him is or has been performed; or (b) the 
total or partial discontinuance by him of his business or of the provision of work; or (c) the breach or termination 
by him of the contracts of employment of any body or number of persons in his employ; or (d) the refusal or 
failure by him to re-employ any body or number of persons who have been in his employ, if the purpose of that 
exclusion, discontinuance, breach, termination, refusal or failure is to induce or compel any persons, who are or 
have been in his employ or in the employ of other persons - (i) to agree to or comply with any demands or 
proposals concerning terms or conditions of employment or other matters made by him or on his behalf or by or 
on behalf of any other person who is or has been an employer; or (ii) to accept any change in terms or conditions 
of employment; or (iii) to agree to the employment or the suspension or termination of the employment of any 
person." Cf NUTWv Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd (1982) ILl 39 (W); Ngewu v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co 
Ltd 1982 (4) SA 390 (N); NTE Ltd v SACWU (1990) ILJ 43 (N); BCA WU v Thorpe Timber Co (1991) ILJ 843 
(IC); NTE Limited v Ngubane (1992) ILJ 910 (LAC); Sappi Fine Paper (Pty) Ltd v Pienaar (1994) ILJ 137 
(LAC). 
An employer could thus refuse to pay the locked out employees their wages as the employer was protected 
from civil liabilities by the provisions of section 79 of the Act. 
CCA WUSA v Game Discount World Ltd (1990) ILJ 162 (IC); FA WU v Middevrystaatse Suiwel Kooperasie Bpk 
(1990) ILJ 776 (IC); CWIU v Indian Ocean Fertilizer (1991) ILJ 822 (IC). See Trollip, "Lock-outs in South 
African law", in Benjamin et al, Strikes, Loclwuts & Arbitration in South African Law, 1989, 83; Moodley, "The 
key to unlocking the 'lock-out'?", Industrial Law Journal, 1990, l; Rycroft in Rycroft & Jordaan, A Guide to 
South African Labour Law, 1992, 290; Grogan, Collective Labour Law, 1993, 109; Le Roux, "The lock-out and 
the unfair labour practice", Contemporary Labour Law, 1994, 87; Le Roux & Van Niekerk, The South African 
Law of Unfair Dismissal, 1994, 316 for more detail in this regard. 
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t h b f h 1. . . 1 d l' k 115 eac ers, nurses, mem ers o t e po ice, umvers1ty ecturers an par iament wor ers. 
Most of these employees' terms of employment were regulated under separate pieces of 
legislation which replicated some of the Act's features. 116 The public sector employee's right 
to strike will now briefly be discussed. 
The public sector employee's terms of employment were regulated by the Public Service 
Labour Relations Act (PSLRA).117 The PSLRA created a new labour relations dispensation 
for the state, civil servants and employee organisations in the public service. It retained the 
traditional administrative law remedies,118 but also offered extended protection to striking 
public servants. The PSLRA recognised in principle that public servants had the right to 
strike.119 The definition of the word "strike" in section 1 of the PSLRA made it clear that 
only labour-related objectives and specifically objectives related to the change of conditions 
of service, were classified thereunder. 
The position of striking public servants was absolutely protected for 30 days, unless the 
strike was "conducted in an unfair manner", in which case the 30-day protection was 
forfeited.120 Striking public servants could be dismissed (i) if the strike was illegal (i.e. if the 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
Cf the 1995 Labour Relations Act which applies to all workers, except members of the National Defence Force, 
the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Setvice. 
See, for example, the Defence Act 44 of 1957; the Police Act 7 of 1958; the Armaments Development and 
Production Act 57 of 1968 and the Nursing Act 50 of 1978. 
Act 102 of 1993. The Act excluded uniformed personnel attached to the defence force, police and correctional 
setvices, as well as teaching personnel employed at state schools (cf the Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 
1993), from its ambit, as separate labour relations dispensations were envisaged for these sectors. Compare also 
the Public Seivice Act 111 of 1984 (which still exists); Grogan, "Strike dismissals in the Public sector", Industrial 
Law Journal, 1991, 1; Tshabalala v Minister of Health & Welfare (1986) ILJ 168 (W); Mayekiso v Minister of 
Health & Welfare (1988) ILJ 227 (W); Mokoena vAdministrator, Transvaal 1988 ( 4) SA 912 (T); Administrator, 
Orange Free State v Mokopanele 1990 (3) SA 780 (A); Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile (1991) ILJ 259 (A); 
Ngongoma v Minister of Education & Culture (1992) ILJ 329 (D) and Minister of Health, Kwazulu v Ntozakhe 
1993 (1) SA 442 (A). 
If a decision was taken that adversely affected a public seivant in his or her rights, liberty and property, or where 
his or her legitimate expectations were affected, such public setvant could invoke the so-called rules of natural 
justice. 
Section 19(1) of the PSLRA. Employees in essential seivices were, however, not allowed to strike. 
Section l 9(10)(a) of the PSLRA; the useful mechanism of final and binding arbitration was thus replaced by a 30-
day arrangement and it was furthermore difficult to establish when a strike was "conducted in an unfair manner". 
See for more detail Olivier, "Labour Relations Legislation for the Public Setvice: An International and 
Comparative Perspective",/ndustria/ Law Journal, 1993, 1371. 
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procedural requirements, for example the statutory conciliation requirements, the ballot 
provisions or the 10 days' strike notice, have not been complied with); (ii) if the strike 
continued for more than 30 days; or (iii) if the strike was "conducted in an unfair manner", 
irrespective of whether the period of 30 days had elapsed or not. Before dismissing the 
employer had to give an ultimatum to return to work within one day and then strikers had 
three days to make individual representations on why they should not be dismissed. 
It should thus be clear that the PSLRA suffered from more or less the same shortcomings as 
the Labour Relations Act, namely complex and lengthy pre-strike procedures, onerous ballot 
provisions, no adequate protection from dismissal for strikers, no protection against damages 
claims and interdicts where the strike is illegal for some technical reason, and a prohibition 
on striking over socio-economic and political issues. 
CHAPTER 6 - THE LABOUR REIATIONS ACT OF 1995 
6.1 Introduction 
It is clear from the previous chapter that the Labour Relations Act of 1956 was seriously 
defective. In addition, provisions in the old law on industrial action did not pass 
constitutional muster and were also contrary to internationally accepted standards. The 
major failures in this regard were: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
complicated and technical pre-strike procedures; 
onerous ballot provisions; 
the criminalisation of strikes and lock-outs; 
the prohibition of socio-economic strikes; 
the ready availability of interdicts and damages claims; 
the absence of statutory protection from dismissal for striking employees.1 
It is against this background that the prov1s1ons relating to strikes m the new Labour 
Relations Act of 19952 will now be discussed. 
The chapter starts with a brief look at the recent intemationai3 and constitutional4 influences 
on the South African law relating to strikes, whereafter the Labour Relations Act of 1995 
will be analysed and discussed.5 
Explanatory Memorandum, Government Gazette 16259, 10 February 1995, 128; Cheadle et al, Current Labour 
Law, 1995,49. 
2 Act 66of1995. 
3 See 6.2. 
4 See 6.3. 
5 See 6.4. 
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6.2 The ILO Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission 
On 11 May 1988, COSATU lodged a complaint with the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) that the proposed amendments to the Labour Relations Act of 1956 infringed the ILO's 
principles of freedom of association by inter alia infringing the freedom to strike. Despite 
this, the Labour Relations Act was amended in 1988 in accordance with the proposed 
changes of the previous year's draft bill. This led to two major stay-aways by the main trade 
union federations' members during June 1988 and September 1989, followed by extended 
negotiations during 1989 and 1990 between COSATU, NACTU and SACCOLA which 
eventually resulted in the COSATU/NACTU/SACCOLA Accord in May 1990. The Accord 
set out a number of proposals for amending the Labour Relations Act, but the 1991 
amendments to the Labour Relations Act did not fundamentally address the issues outlined 
in the complaint to the ILO. 
On 19 February 1991, after it had committed itself to the 1991 amendments to the Labour 
Relations Act, the government consented6 to COSATU's complaint being investigated by an 
ILO Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission. The Commission visited South Africa 
during February 1992 "to deliberate on and consider the present situation in South Africa 
insofar as it relates to labour matters with particular emphasis on freedom of association" .7 
The Commission's report contained a fairly detailed analysis of South African strike law and 
pointed out the following aspects thereof that did not comply with ILO guidelines:8 
(i) 
6 
7 
8 
the complicated nature of the pre-strike procedures found in the Labour Relations Act 
Where the complaint concerns a country that is not a member of the ILO (South Africa was a member of the ILO 
from its inception in 1919 until 1964), it can only be investigated with the consent of the government concerned: 
see Saley & Benjamin, "The Context of the ILO Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission Report on South 
Africa" ,Industrial Law Journal, 1992, 731-738 for more detail in this regard. 
The Commission examines complaints of alleged infringements of trade union rights referred to it with a view to 
securing the removal of these infringements: see Saley & Benjamin, "The Context of the !LO Fact Finding and 
Conciliation Commission Report on South Africa",Industrial Law Journal, 1992, 731-738 for more detail on the 
Commission. 
See the Report of the Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association concerning the 
Republic of South Africa, International Labour Office (Geneva), 1992, paragraphs 639-670 for more detail in this 
regard. 
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of 1956, the length of time needed to comply with them, as well as the onerous ballot 
provisions requiring an absolute majority of union members in an undertaking to vote 
in favour of strike action;9 
(ii) the restriction contained in section 65(1A) of the Act on strikes over disputes not 
classified as "industrial disputes"; 10 
(iii) the Act's broad definition of essential services, the fact that not all workers employed 
in essential services have dispute resolution machinery, for example arbitration, 
available to them, as well as the unsatisfactory dispute resolution procedures found in 
the Act for essential service employees; 11 
(iv) the various criminal and other sanctions which could be utilised against picketers 
d . 'k 12 d unng a stn e; an 
(v) the sanctions (such as interdicts, claims for damages, penal sanctions, and the 
dismissal of strikers) which employers could invoke in terms of the Act against 
unions and employees who instigated or participated in a strike.13 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Cf the Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the 
/LO, 1985, paragraph 377: "The conditions that have to be fulfilled under the law in order to render a strike lawful 
should be reasonable and in any event not such as to place a substantial limitation on the means of action open to 
trade union organisations". 
Cf the General Survey, International Labour Conference 69th Session, 1983, Report Ill, paragraph 216: "The 
Committee considers that trade union organisations ought to have the possibility of recourse to protest strikes, in 
particular where aimed at criticising a government's economic and social policies. However, strikes that are 
purely political in character do not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association". It is 
interesting to note that the Commission did not consider the legal position of sympathy strikes. 
The Commission recommended that only employees who are involved in the provision of "genuinely essential" 
services should be prevented from striking. 
The Commission argued that peaceful picketing should be protected by the law and that the use of criminal and 
civil sanctions should be confined to situations of violence. 
Cf the Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the 
!LO, 1985, paragraphs 444-445: "The use of extremely serious measures, such as dismissal of workers for having 
participated in a strike and refusal to re-employ them, implies a serious risk of abuse and constitutes a violation of 
freedom of association .... .lndustrial relations troubled by the collective dismissal of strikers can be greatly 
improved if the employers concerned give serious consideration to the possibility of reinstating the persons thus 
sanctioned". 
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It is clear that the Commission's analysis and recommendations played a significant role 
when the 1995 Act was drafted. 
63 The Impact of the Constitution 
The 27th of April 1994 saw both the first fully democratic election in the history of South 
Africa and the birth of the interim Constitution.14 The interim Constitution brought about a 
radical and fundamental change to the South African constitutional system, and the 
introduction of a Bill of Rights in Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution led to a lively debate 
concerning the inclusion and protection of certain labour rights. Section 27 of the interim 
Constitution provided as follows: 
"(1) Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall have the right to form 
and join employers' organisations. 
(3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively. 
( 4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
(5) Employers' recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be impaired, 
subject to section 33(1)."15 
On 8 May 1996 the Constitutional Assembly adopted a new constitutional text which was 
referred to the Constitutional Court for certification in May 1996. On 6 September 1996 the 
court gave judgement and found that the new text failed to comply with the Constitutional 
Principles contained in Schedule 4 to the interim Constitution and declined to certify the new 
14 
15 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
Section 33(1) provided as follows: "The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general 
application, provided that such limitation - (a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is - (i) reasonable; and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and (b) shall not negate the 
essential content of the right in question, ... ". The force of the impact of the interim Constitution on labour 
legislation was also temporarily blunted by section 33(5)(a) which provided as follows: "The provisions of a law 
in force at the commencement of this Constitution promoting fair employment practices, orderly and equitable 
collective bargaining and the regulation of industrial action shall remain of full force and effect until repealed or 
amended by the legislature." See Olivier, "A charter for fundamental rights for South Africa: Implications for 
labour law and industrial relations", Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, 1993, 651; Beatty, "Constitutional Labour 
Rights: Pros and Cons",Industrial Law Journal, 1993, 1; Cheadle, "Impact of the Constitution on Labour Law", 
Current Labour Law, 1994, 94; Brassey, "Labour Relations under the New Constitution", South African Journal 
on Human Rights, 1994, 179; Basson, "Labour Law and the Constitution", Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg, 1994, 498; Basson, South Africa's Interim Constitution, 1995, 40; Brassey in Chaskalson et al, 
Constitutional Law of South Africa, 1996, 30-1; Mbelu v MEC for Health & Welfare, Eastern Cape (1997) IU 
462 (HC) and Cape Local Authorities Employers Organisation v Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union 
1997(3) BCLR 306 (C) for more detail in this regard. 
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text. 
The Constitutional Court inter alia held that the omission in section 23 of the new text of the 
right of employers to lock out workers was not in conflict with Constitutional Principle 
XXVIII which required recognition and protection of the right of employers and employees 
to join and form employer organisations and trade unions and to engage in collective 
bargaining. The failure of section 23 to entrench a right of individual employers to engage in 
collective bargaining was, however, held to be in conflict with the aforesaid Constitutional 
Principle since the text failed to recognise that individual employers could and did engage in 
collective bargaining with their workers.16 
The Constitutional Assembly reconvened and on 11 October 1996 it passed an amended text 
which was certified by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996.17 The new 
Constitution came into operation on 4 February 1997, 18 thereby repealing the interim 
Constitution. Chapter 2 of the new Constitution contains the Bill of Rights which has 
several provisions that specifically regulate labour relations. Of these the most important is 
_ section 23: 
"(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
16 
17 
18 
Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
Every worker has the right -
(a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and 
(c) to strike. 
Every employer has the right -
(a) to form and join an employers' organisation; and 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers' organisation. 
Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the right -
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities; 
(b) to organise; and 
(c) to form and join a federation. 
Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective 
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 19961996(4) SA 744 (CC) at 7940- 797C. 
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997(2) SA 97 (CC). 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that 
the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1). 
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements contained in collective agreements. 
To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with 
section 36(1)." 19 
The constitutional entrenchment of the right to strike in section 23(2)(c) forms the logical 
conclusion to the developments in strike law over the past few years, and should play an 
important role in deciding the question of the fairness of the dismissal of (legal) strikers.20 
The concept of a "strike" is not defined in the Constitution, and it will probably be given its 
ordinary meaning, namely a concerted cessation of work in support of an industrial demand. 
The aims which the strikers may pursue are no longer limited as was the case in the interim 
Constitution as the strike need not be "for the purpose of collective bargaining". 
Even though the above section of the Constitution now places the issue of a right to strike 
beyond question, the impact of the Constitution on the outcome of labour disputes would 
probably not be as forceful as one might have expected. As Brassey put it: 
19 
20 
21 
"For seventy years our legislature has been modernising our system of labour law, and for 
the last twenty years the labour courts have been doing the same under the aegis of the unfair 
labour practice. As a result, labour law already has a kind of charter of fundamental rights of 
its own. There is, no doubt, a lot that still needs to be done, but the Constitutional Court may 
not be the best place to do it in."21 
It should be noted that all the "rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in 
section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill" (section 7(3) of the Constitution). Section 36(1) reads as follows: "The rights 
in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of 
the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose." 
In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v Nation Construction Building & Allied Workers Union 
(1997) ILl 550 (LC) Basson J stated as follows at 552: " ... when the court is called upon to interpret the 
provisions of the Act (the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995) which limit a fundamental right which is entrenched 
in the Constitution, such as the right to strike, such provisions must rather be given a more restrictive 
interpretation, in keeping with the statutory obligation to interpret the Act so as to give effect to the fundamental 
rights conferred by the Constitution and to interpret the Act in compliance with the Constitution." 
Brassey in Chaskalson et al, Constitutional Law of South Africa, 1996, at 30-13. 
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6.4 The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
Shortly after the April 1994 elections the new Minister of Labour, Tito Mboweni, appointed 
a task team to overhaul the laws regulating labour relations and to prepare a draft Labour 
Relations Bill to initiate a process of public discussion and negotiation by organised labour 
and business as well as other interested parties. Its brief was to draft a Bill which would 
inter alia -
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
comply with ILO Conventions 87, 98 and 111, among others, and with the findings 
of the ILO's Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission 
comply with the Constitution 
promote and facilitate collective bargaining in the workplace and at industry level 
provide simple procedures for the resolution of disputes through statutory 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration and the licensing of independent alternative 
dispute resolution services 
entrench the constitutional right to strike subject to limitations which are reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on values of freedom and 
equality, and regulate lock-outs in a similar manner 
provide for the decriminalisation of labour legislation.22 
After months of negotiation between all the interested parties, an agreement was finally 
hammered out and adopted by parliament on 13 September 1995. However, the 1995 Act 
could not come into effect immediately as new institutions such as the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, the new Labour Court and the new Labour Appeal 
Court had to be established. 
The Labour Relations Act of 199523 finally came into operation on 11 November 1996, and 
thereby announced the start of a new era in labour relations in South Africa; today South 
Africa has a new Labour Relations Act based, for the first time, on a negotiated consensus 
between labour and capital. 
22 Explanatory Memorandum, Government Gazette 16259, 10 February 1995, 128. 
23 Hereinafter referred to as the Act. 
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In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building & 
Allied Workers Union (1)24 the Court said the following about the interpretation of the Act:25 
"In my op1mon it is not appropriate to jettison the golden rule and avoid a literal 
interpretation. The retention of a literalist approach is compatible with a broad purposive 
approach to the interpretation of the Act and with an interpretation seeking to ensure 
compliance with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution." 
After summarising the democratic manner in which the Act was drafted the Court continued 
as follows (at 719E): 
"In some ways the Labour Relations Act 1995 is the supreme collective bargaining 
agreement entered into between employees, employers and the representatives of civil 
society. This, in my view, indicates that it ought to be treated and interpreted, except insofar 
as it relates to the Bill of Rights, as a collective agreement. It contains checks and balances; 
trade-offs and compromises. Few are expressly articulated. They occurred in the bargaining 
chambers but their results are plain to see. A literal interpretation which assumes, justifiably 
in my opinion, that the Labour Relations Act 1995 means what it says, ought not to be 
disturbed for the sake of a liberal interpretation. Trade-offs should not be disturbed lest the 
bargain be unravelled. This would disturb the confidence of the bargaining partners and lead 
to a loss of acceptance and legitimacy of the Act."26 
Chapter IV (sections 64-77) of the Act deals with the issue of strikes and lock-outs and the 
relevant sections will now be analysed and discussed. 
6.4.1 Protected and unprotected strikes 
As in the previous Act, both substantive and procedural requirements for strike action are set 
out in the new Act. A distinction is still drawn between two types of strikes, referred to in 
the Act as protected strikes and unprotected strikes.27 Section 64 contains the procedural 
requirements for the holding of a protected strike (or lock-out) and reads as follows: 
24 
25 
26 
27 
(1997) IU 716 (LC) at 719A. 
See further on the interpretation of the Act Business South Africa v COSATU & another (1997) IU 474 (LAC), 
discussed in 6.4.10. 
Cf NUMSA v The Benicon Group (1997) IU 123 (LAC) at 142: "The court should therefore purge itself of 
misdirected sympathy with the workers in the light of the subsequently successful negotiations, which culminated 
in the democratic transition". 
The 1995 Act decriminalised strike law; strikes that do not comply with the relevant provisions of the Act will no 
longer constitute criminal offences and be "illegal" or "unlawful", but will fail to receive the protections which 
flow from compliance and will thus be so-called "unprotected" strikes. 
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"64. Right to strike and recourse to lock-out 
(1) Every employee has the right to strike and every employer has recourse to lock-out if -
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
28 
(a) the issue in dispute has been referred to a council or to the Commission as required by this 
Act, and -
(i) a certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved has been issued; or 
(ii) a period of 30 days, or any extension of that period agreed to between the parties to 
the dispute, has elapsed since the referral was received by the council or the 
Commission; and after that -
(b) in the case of a proposed strike, at least 48 hours' notice of the commencement of the strike, 
in writing, has been given to the employer, unless -
(i) the issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be concluded in a council, in 
which case, notice must have been given to that council; or 
(ii) the employer is a member of an employers' organisation that is a party to the 
dispute, in which case, notice must have been given to that employers' organisation; 
or 
(c) in the case of a proposed lock-out, at least 48 hours' notice of the commencement of the lock-
out, in writing, has been given to any trade union that is a party to the dispute, or, if there is 
no such trade union, to the employees, unless the issue in dispute relates to a collective 
agreement to be concluded in a council, in which case, notice must have been given to that 
council; or 
(d) in the case of a proposed strike or lock-out where the State is the employer, at least seven 
days' notice of the commencement of the strike or lock-out has been given to the parties 
contemplated in paragraphs (b) and (c). 
If the issue in dispute concerns a refusal to bargain, an advisory award must have been made in terms 
of section 135(3)(c) before notice is given in terms of subsection (l)(b) or (c).28 A refusal to bargain 
includes -
(a) a refusal -
(i) to recognise a trade union as a collective bargaining agent; or 
(ii) to agree to establish a bargaining council; 
(b) a withdrawal of recognition of a collective bargaining agent; 
(c) a resignation of a party from a bargaining council; 
(d) a dispute about -
(i) appropriate bargaining units; 
(ii) appropriate bargaining levels; or 
(iii) bargaining subjects. 
The requirements of subsection (1) do not apply to a strike or a lock-out if -
(a) the parties to the dispute are members of a council, and the dispute has been dealt with by 
that council in accordance with its constitution; 
(b) the strike or lock-out conforms with the procedures in a collective agreement; 
(c) the employees strike in response to a lock-out by their employer that does not comply with 
the provisions of this Chapter; 
(d) the employer locks out its employees in response to their taking part in a strike that does not 
conform with the provisions of this Chapter; or 
(e) the employer fails to comply with the requirements of subsections ( 4) and (5). 
Any employee who or any trade union that refers a dispute about a unilateral change to terms and 
conditions of employment to a council or the Commission in terms of subsection (l)(a) may, in the 
referral, and for the period referred to in subsection (l)(a) -
(a) require the employer not to implement unilaterally the change to terms and conditions of 
employment; or 
(b) if the employer has already implemented the change unilaterally, require the employer to 
restore the terms and conditions of employment that applied before the change. 
Section 135 of the Act contains provisions relating to dispute resolution by the Commission through conciliation. 
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(5) The employer must comply with a requirement in terms of subsection (4) within 48 hours of service of 
the referral on the employer." 
In certain respects the procedural requirements for the holding of a protected strike remain 
similar to the requirements of the old Act.29 The issue in dispute has to be referred to a 
bargaining or statutory council or to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (replacing the conciliation board) for conciliation and a period of 30 days has to 
elapse before action can be taken. 
There is a new requirement that at least 48 hours' (or seven days' where the State is the 
employer) written notice of the commencement of the strike must have been given to the 
party against whom the action is to be taken. In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary 
Ware v Nation Construction Building & Allied Workers Union (2/0 the union sent a faxed 
letter to the employer headed "NOTICE TO COMMENCE STRIKE" and stating that "this 
serves to inform the company that a strike shall start at any time after 48 hours from the date 
of this notice". The court found that the provisions of section 64(1)(b) were not complied 
with:31 
"The section's specific purpose is to give an employer advance warning of the proposed 
strike so that an employer may prepare for the power-play that will follow. That specific 
purpose is defeated if the employer is not informed in the written notice in exact terms when 
the proposed strike will commence. In the present case the notice is defective for that 
reason." 
The main difference between the old Act and the new as regards procedures is that there is 
no longer a strike ballot requirement. In the past employers relied on various technical 
irregularities in the balloting procedure to interdict strikes and to justify the dismissal of 
strikers, which will now no longer be possible. Although the traditional strike ballot 
requirement has been abolished by the Act, it nevertheless recognises the need for 
democratic decision-making processes within trade unions regarding the decision whether to 
29 
30 
31 
See 1.3.2 for a discussion on the definition of a strike. 
(1997) ILi 671 (LAC) at 675-677. 
Cf the differing decisions of Basson J and Landman AJ in the courts a quo: (1997) ILi 550 (LC) and (1997) ILi 
716 (LC). 
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strike or not.32 
The new procedure relating to a refusal to bargain (defined to include the refusal to recognise 
a union or establish a bargaining council) should also be noted. The intention of the 
legislature is that there should be no legal duty to bargain enforced by the courts.33 The Act 
thus provides that disputes concerning the issue of a refusal to bargain must first be referred 
to advisory arbitration before notice can be given of the commencement of the strike. 
The Act emphasises voluntarism and self-regulation in labour relations. Consequently, the 
general requirements do not apply where the parties to the dispute are members of a council 
whose constitution contains procedures for regulating the dispute, or where the parties 
themselves have set out their own procedures in a collective agreement. 
In North East Cape Forests v SA Agricultural Plantation & Allied Workers Union & others34 
the applicant company approached the Labour Court to obtain an urgent interdict against 
strike action.35 It contended that the strike was unprotected because the wage dispute over 
which the strike had been embarked upon had not been referred to the CCMA in terms of 
section 64(1) of the Act. However, the company and the union had concluded a recognition 
agreement which also contained a dispute settlement procedure. The Court analysed the 
collective agreement between the parties and concluded that the company's submission was 
devoid of substance. It stated that section 64(3)(b) of the Act "gives recognition to domestic 
arrangements between parties so that, where there is a collective agreement between parties 
which contains pre-strike dispute settlement procedures, there is no obligation on them to use 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Section 95(5) provides as follows in this regard: "The constitution of any trade union or employers' organisation 
that intends to register must - (p) provide that the trade union or employers' organisation, before calling a strike or 
lock-out, must conduct a ballot of those of its members in respect of whom it intends to call the strike or lock-out; 
(q) provide that members of the trade union or employers' organisation may not be disciplined or have their 
membership terminated for failure or refusal to participate in a strike or lock-out if - (i) no ballot was held about 
the strike or lock-out; or (ii) a ballot was held but a majority of the members who voted did not vote in favour of 
the strike or lock-out;". See also section 67(7) in this regard. 
See Cooper & Cheadle, "Strikes and Lock-outs", in Current Labour Law, 1995, 51. 
(1997) ILi 729 (LC). 
The Court found that the company had failed to show that the matter was one of urgency as the company failed to 
interdict the threatened strike for three and a half months, as the strike had been in progress for two weeks before 
the company had applied for the interdict and as the company had failed to substantiate the financial losses it 
allegedly suffered as a result of the strike. The Court nevertheless dealt with the matter on the merits. 
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the statutory pre-strike procedures after they have exhausted the internal procedure" .:'6 The 
application was accordingly dismissed.37 
The general requirements also do not apply where the strike is in response to an unprotected 
lock-out or where the employer does not comply with the provisions pertaining to unilateral 
changes to terms and conditions of employment.38 
Section 65 of the Act contains the limitations on strike action and reads as follows: 
"65. Limitations on right to strike or recourse to lock-out 
(1) No person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of 
a strike or a lock-out if -
(2) 
(3) 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
(a) that person is bound by a collective agreement that prohibits a strike or lock-out in respect of 
the issue in dispute; 
(b) that person is bound by an agreement that requires the issue in dispute to be referred to 
arbitration; 
(c) the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour 
Court in terms of this Act; 
( d) that person is engaged in -
(a) 
(i) an essential service; or 
(ii) a maintenance service.39 
Despite section 65(1)(c), a person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in 
contemplation or in furtherance of a strike or lock-out if the issue in dispute is about any 
matter dealt with in sections 12 to 15.40 
(b) If the registered trade union has given notice of the proposed strike in terms of section 64(1) 
in respect of an issue in dispute referred to in paragraph (a), it may not exercise the right to 
refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of section 21 for a period of 12 months from the date 
of the notice. 
Subject to a collective agreement, no person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in 
contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock-out -
(a) if that person is bound by -
(i) any arbitration award or collective agreement that regulates the issue in dispute; or 
At 7371-J. It should be noted that parties were required to exhaust the statutory dispute resolution procedures in 
addition to their own agreed domestic dispute settlement procedures under the provisions of the old Act. Section 
64(3)(b) of the Act now eliminates this unnecessary duplication. 
The Court did not consider whether the parties' intention at the time of entering into the agreement should have 
been considered. See Grogan, "First judgements", Employment Law, 1997, 98 for more detail. 
In the past our courts have found that the unilateral change of conditions of employment is unfair if imposed 
before parties have bargained to impasse; see Cooper & Cheadle, "Strikes and lock-outs", in Current Labour Law, 
1995, 52. 
Essential services, agreed minimum services and maintenance services are dealt with in 6.4.7 below. 
These sections deal with organisational rights, and specifically with trade union access to workplace, deduction of 
trade union subscriptions or levies, trade union representatives and leave for trade union activities. 
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(ii) any determination made in terms of section 44 by the Minister that regulates the 
issue in dispute; or 
(b) any determination made in terms of the Wage Act and that regulates the issue in dispute, 
during the first year of that determination." 
It is clear that the limitations on strike action remam similar to those in the old Act. 
Employees may not strike where the issue in dispute is regulated by an arbitration award or 
collective agreement, or a Wage Act determination during its first year of operation,41 or 
where the employee is engaged in an essential service. New limitations on strike action are 
where the employee is engaged in a so-called maintenance service, where the employee has 
the right to refer the issue in dispute to arbitration or the Labour Court,42 or where the issue 
in dispute is regulated by a section 44 ministerial determination. 
In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building & 
Allied Workers Union (2/3 the issues that gave rise to the strike were (1) a dispute relating to 
the payment of wages during a previous work stoppage; (2) a dispute about the alleged 
harassment of shop stewards and employees by certain company officials; and (3) a dispute 
concerning production targets. In an urgent application the company claimed that the 
aforesaid issues were all arbitrable or justiciable in terms of the Act, and therefore could not 
form the subject-matter of a protected strike (section 65(1)(c) of the Act). A rule nisi was 
issued and the Court confirmed that the alleged harassment amounted to victimisation in 
contravention of section 4 of the Act, and that such a dispute was justiciable by the Labour 
Court (section 9(4) of the Act). The dispute could accordingly not form the subject-matter of 
a protected strike.44 
41 
42 
43 
44 
However, the previous Act did not make these prohibitions subject to a collective agreement, which again 
emphasises the notion of voluntarism in the Act. 
This limitation effectively means that strikes over what are currently known as "rights" disputes are no longer 
permissible. These include disputes concerning freedom of association, the interpretation and application of 
collective agreements, matters which are the subject of joint decision-making by workplace forums, dismissals 
and disciplinary action, and workplace equality. Cf Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanita1y Ware v National 
Construction Building&Allied Workers Union (2) (1997) IU 671 (LAC). 
(1997) IU 671 (LAC). The Court also added the following about the interpretation of the Act: "For the purpose 
of this case it must be accepted that the provisions of the Act, insofar as they deal with the right to strike, are 
constitutionally valid .... Where constitutional validity is not an issue it seems that an interpretation that accords 
best with the general purpose of the Act (as set out in s I) and the more specific purpose of a particular section, 
should be followed. Such a purposive interpretation may not then necessarily be least restrictive of the 
fundamental right at stake ... "(at 675G-H). 
Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union & 
others (1997) IU 550 (LC). 
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On the return day of the rule nisi the Labour Court avoided this result by characterising the 
subject-matter of the dispute as also a demand for the dismissal of the offending company 
officials. Since this was a dismissal demand which was neither justiciable nor arbitrable, the 
Labour Court ruled that issue (2) could legitimately form the basis of a protected strike.45 
The Court granted leave to appeal to the company against that part of the order whereby 
portion of the rule nisi was discharged, and the Labour Appeal Court thus had to decide 
whether the disputed issue relating to the alleged harassment of employees by the company 
officials could form the subject-matter of a protected strike in terms of the Act.46 
It found that the Labour Court could not decide the matter on the aforesaid characterisation 
for the simple reason that that factual basis was not raised by the union or the employees in 
their opposing affidavits or in the original referral to the CCMA. Moreover, the union's 
initial complaint was the alleged harassment of union officials and employees. That was a 
justiciable rights dispute with a specific remedy to be pursued in the Labour Court. It 
continued: 
"The union could not convert the nature of that underlying dispute into a non-justiciable one 
simply by adding a demand for a remedy falling outside those provided for by the Act. The 
tail cannot wag the dog. If such an approach is allowed, an underlying rights dispute 
normally justiciable or arbitrable in terms of the Act could be transformed into a strikeable 
issue simply by adding a demand for a remedy not provided for in the Act. That would be 
unacceptable." 
The Court accordingly found that the proposed strike was unlawful. It upheld the appeal 
with costs. 
The importance of organisational rights is recognised by the legislature in that provision is 
made for the right to strike over such rights despite the aforesaid prohibition on strike action 
where employees have the right to refer the issue in dispute to arbitration or the Labour 
Court.47 
45 
46 
47 
Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union & 
others (1997) 11.J 716 (LC). 
The other issue dealt with on appeal, namely whether the notice of the strike complied with the provisions of 
section 64(1)(b), is discussed above together with the other provisions of section 64 of the Act. 
Note, however, the provisions of section 65(2)(b) that seeks to avoid a situation where a registered trade union can 
utilise both industrial action and arbitration to achieve its goals: cf Metal & Electrical Workers Union of South 
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In line with the Act's commitment to self-regulation in labour relations, the Act allows 
employees to contract out of the right to strike where a collective agreement prohibits a strike 
in respect of the issue in dispute, or where an employee is bound by an agreement48 that 
requires the issue in dispute to be referred to arbitration. 
6.4.2 The consequences of a protected strike 
The consequences of a protected strike are set out in section 67 of the Act which is to the 
following effect: 
"67. Strike or lock-out in compliance with this Act 
(1) In this Chapter, "protected strike" means a strike that complies with the provisions of this Chapter and 
"protected lock-out" means a lock-out that complies with the provisions of this Chapter. 
(2) A person does not commit a delict or a breach of contract by taking part in -
(a) a protected strike or a protected lock-out; or 
(b) any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike or a protected lock-out. 
(3) Despite subsection (2), an employer is not obliged to remunerate an employee for services that the 
employee does not render during a protected strike or a protected lock-out, however -
(a) if the employee's remuneration includes payment in kind in respect of accommodation, the 
provision of food and other basic amenities of life, the employer, at the request of the 
employee, must not discontinue payment in kind during the strike or lock-out; and 
(b) after the end of the strike or lock-out, the employer may recover the monetary value of the 
payment in kind made at the request of the employee during the strike or lock-out from the 
employee by way of civil proceedings instituted in the Labour Court. 
(4) An employer may not dismiss an employee for participating in a protected strike or for any conduct in 
contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not preclude an employer from fairly dismissing an employee in accordance with 
the provisions of Chapter VIII for a reason related to the employee's conduct during the strike, or for a 
reason based on the employer's operational requirements.49 
48 
49 
Africa v Cape Gate and Fence (Pty) Ltd ( 1992) SALLR 39 (IC) and Food & General Workers Union v Lanko Co-
op Ltd (1994) SALLR 127 (IC) in this regard. 
The agreement apparently need not be a collective agreement in contrast with the position under section 65(l)(a). 
Theoretically speaking, an employer could thus, by means of an ordinary contract of employment, require an 
employee to agree that all disputes be referred to arbitration. It is doubtful whether this result was in fact intended 
by the legislature: see Rudd & Yan Zyl, Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations Act (Part 1), 1996, 233. 
Chapter VIII (sections 185-197) deals with unfair dismissals and section 187 provides as follows: "A dismissal is 
automatically unfair ... if the reason for the dismissal is - (a) that the employee participated in or supported, or 
indicated an intention to participate in or support, a strike or protest action that complies with the provisions of 
Chapter IV; (b) that the employee refused, or indicated an intention to refuse, to do any work normally done by an 
employee who at the time was taking part in a strike that complies with the provisions of Chapter IV or was 
locked out, unless that work is necessary to prevent an actual danger to life, personal safety or health; ... ". 
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(6) Civil legal proceedings may not be instituted against any person for -
(a) participating in a protected strike or a protected lock-out; or 
(b) any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike or a protected lock-out. 
(7) The failure by a registered trade union or a registered employers' organisation to comply with a 
provision in its constitution requiring it to conduct a ballot of those of its members in respect of whom 
it intends to call a strike or lock-out may not give rise to, or constitute a ground for, any litigation that 
will affect the legality of, and the protection conferred by this section on, the strike or lock-out. 
(8) The provisions of subsections (2) and (6) do not apply to any act in contemplation or in furtherance of 
a strike or lock-out, if that act is an offence. 
(9) Any act in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike or a protected lock-out that is a 
contravention of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act or the Wage Act does not constitute an 
offence." 
Compliance with the provisions of the Act attracts certain protections. An employee who 
takes part in a protected strike or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a 
protected strike does not commit a delict50 or a breach of contract and is protected from civil 
legal proceedings51 and from dismissal in that regard, except where the act in contemplation 
or in furtherance of the strike constitutes an offence.52 The protection against dismissal does 
not, however, preclude an employer from fairly dismissing an employee for a reason relating 
to the employee's conduct during the strike, or to the employer's operational requirements.53 
In line with international jurisprudence an employer is furthermore not obliged to remunerate 
an employee during a protected strike (or a protected lock-out). However, to protect 
employees such as farm workers who depend on an employer for their basic amenities of 
life, the Act provides that the employer, at the request of the employee, must not discontinue 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Compare section 79 of the previous Act which excluded the delict of defamation from indemnity. No such 
exception appears in the 1995 Act. 
In Afrox Ltd v SA Chemical Workers Union (2) (1997) !LI 406 (LC) at 410 Landman J says the following about 
section 67(6) after discussing section 67(2) of the Act: "In addition and probably ex abundata cautela the 
legislature has opted for a belt and braces approach. Not only do the protected strikers not commit breaches of 
contract nor delicts, the strikers also enjoy immunity from the institution of civil legal proceedings ... The 
reference to civil legal proceedings is, in my opinion, a reference to civil legal proceedings in the High Court and 
other courts of law of this country and to proceedings in the Labour Court. A strike which is a protected one is 
beyond the jurisdiction of this court and every other court of law. The clear intention is to leave it to the 
economic muscle of the parties involved. The general rule is that the courts are to refrain from intervening in a 
protected strike and from influencing the outcome of the powerplay inherent in a strike." Cf also Lomati Mill 
Barberton v PPWA WU (1997) !LI 178 (LC) at 183. 
The term "criminal offence" was used in the comparable section 79(1) of the previous Act and presumably section 
67(8) of the Act also refers to a criminal offence, as opposed to an internal disciplinary offence. 
See 6.4.3 below for more detail on strike dismissals. 
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such payment in kind during the strike.54 At the end of the strike, however, the employer 
may recover the monetary value of the payment in kind through civil proceedings in the 
Labour Court. 
6.4.3 Unprotected strikes: the employer '.s rights and remedies 
Section 68 of the Act deals with strikes (and lock-outs) that are not in compliance with the 
Act, and provides as follows: 
"68. Strike or lock-out not in compliance with this Act 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
54 
In the case of any strike or lock-out, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike or 
lock-out, that does not comply with the provisions of this Chapter, the Labour Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction -
(a) to grant an interdict or order to restrain -
(i) any person from participating in a strike or any conduct in contemplation or in 
furtherance of a strike; or 
(ii) any person from participating in a lock-out or any conduct in contemplation or in 
furtherance of a lock-out; 
(b) to order the payment of just and equitable compensation for any loss attributable to the strike 
or lock-out, having regard to -
(i) whether -
(aa) attempts were made to comply with the provisions of this Chapter and the 
extent of those attempts; 
(bb) the strike or lock-out was premeditated; 
(cc) the strike or lock-out was in response to unjustified conduct by another 
party to the dispute; and 
( dd) there was compliance with an order granted in terms of paragraph (a); 
(ii) the interests of orderly collective bargaining; 
(iii) the duration of the strike or lock-out; and 
(iv) the financial position of the employer, trade union or employees respectively. 
The Labour Court may not grant any order in terms of subsection (l)(a) unless 48 hours' notice of the 
application has been given to the respondent: However, the Court may permit a shorter period of 
notice if -
(a) the applicant has given written notice to the respondent of the applicant's intention to apply 
for the granting of an order; 
(b) the respondent has been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard before a decision 
concerning that application is taken; and 
(c) the applicant has shown good cause why a period shorter than 48 hours should be permitted. 
Despite subsection (2), if written notice of the commencement of the proposed strike or lock-out was 
given to the applicant at least 10 days before the commencement of the proposed strike or lock-out, 
the applicant must give at least five days' notice to the respondent of an application for an order in 
terms of subsection (l)(a). 
This provision will limit the tactical measures (for example eviction orders) open to an employer to try to 
discourage a strike or bring it to an end quickly. It remains to be seen, however, what other items (apart from 
those listed) will be held to constitute basic amenities of life: see Rudd & Van Zyl, Guide to the 1995 Labour 
Relations Act (Part 1), 1996, 236-237 in this regard. 
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( 4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to an employer or an employee engaged in an essential service or 
a maintenance service. 
(5) Participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of this Chapter, or conduct in 
contemplation or in furtherance of that strike, may constitute a fair reason for dismissal. In 
determining whether or not the dismissal is fair, the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in Schedule 8 
must be taken into account."55 
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction56 to deal with strikes not in compliance with the 
provisions of the Act.57 The court may grant an interdict or order to restrain any employee 
from participating in a strike, or it may order the payment of just and equitable compensation 
for any loss attributable to the strike.58 
The contentious issue of the dismissal of strikers is also dealt with in the above section of the 
Act.59 Although participation in an unprotected strike amounts to misconduct, it is 
recognised that it will not always be fair to dismiss an employee for participating in an 
unprotected strike. The substantive fairness of dismissals in such cases must be determined 
in the light of the facts of each case and with reference to section 6(1) of the Code of Good 
Practice on dismissal contained in Schedule 8 to the Act which is to the following effect: 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
See the discussion on section 6 of Schedule 8 of the Act below. 
The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of violations of the Constitution 
and disputes over the constitutionality of executive and administrative acts. 
Under the previous labour law regime, relief in the form of, for example, interdicts could be obtained in the 
former Industrial Court and the Supreme Court (now High Court). In Sappi Fine Papers (Pty) Ltd (Adamas Mill) 
v PPWA WU & others (unreported) the High Court was called upon to decide whether it had the necessary 
jurisdiction to interdict unlawful conduct committed during the course of a protected strike. Referring to the long 
title of the Act and its purpose, the court held that the granting of urgent interim relief against unlawful conduct 
clearly promoted that purpose and that it was the Labour Court which had exclusive jurisdiction to do so, 
regardless as to whether the strike was protected or unprotected. In the court's view, any other interpretation 
would render section 157(1) of the Act meaningless. See "Latest court cases", Employment Law, 1997, 131 for 
more detail in this regard. 
Under the previous Act the option of recovering damages in the Industrial Court in respect of illegal strikes did 
not exist, and such compensation could presumably only be recovered in the Supreme Court: see Rudd & Van 
Zyl, Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations Act (Part 1), 1996, 276-277 in this regard. Due to the the Labour 
Court's exclusive jurisdiction as outlined above, an aggrieved party would no longer be able to claim damages at 
common law. 
As far as protected strikes are concerned, section 67(4) of the Act is at first glance unequivocal: "An employer 
may not dismiss an employee for participating in a protected strike ... ". Section 187(1) also classifies as 
automatically unfair the dismissal of protected strikers (for that reason alone) and the dismissal of employees who 
refuse to do the work of such strikers. However, section 67(5) contains two exceptions to this seemingly blanket 
protection. Employees may be dismissed for misconduct during a strike, and for a reason based on the employer's 
operational requirements. 
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"(l) Participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of Chapter IV is misconduct. 
However, like any other act of misconduct, it does not always deserve dismissal. The substantive 
fairness of dismissal in these circumstances must be determined in the light of the facts of the case, 
including -
(a) the seriousness of the contravention of this Act; 
(b) attempts made to comply with this Act; and 
(c) whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer."60 
The procedural fairness requirements of the dismissal of strikers are set out in section 6(2) of 
the above Code of Good Practice on dismissals and reads as follows: 
"(2) Prior to dismissal the employer should, at the earliest opportunity, contact a trade union official to 
discuss the course of action it intends to adopt. The employer should issue an ultimatum in clear and 
unambiguous terms that should state what is required of the employees and what sanction will be 
imposed if they do not comply with the ultimatum.61 The employees should be allowed sufficient 
time to reflect on the ultimatum and respond to it, either by complying with it or rejecting it. If the 
employer cannot reasonably be expected to extend these steps to the employees in question, the 
employer may dispense with them." 
Even though strike dismissals are categorised as misconduct dismissals in terms of the Act, 
the above subsection clearly omits the requirement to hold a disciplinary hearing before 
dismissing striking employees. This is in line with the position under the previous Act in 
terms of which disciplinary hearings have been held to fall within the domain of individual 
dismissals rather than collective strike dismissals.62 
In light of the aforegoing, it is clear that the Act's provisions relating to the dismissal of 
strikers largely reflect the complex jurisprudence that developed under the previous Labour 
Relations Act in this regard. 
60 
61 
62 
It is submitted that, in light of the collective nature of strike action, the only factors to be considered in 
determining the substantive fairness of a strike dismissal are these "collective" factors, and not those personal 
factors (such as the individual employee's previous record) normally relevant to the determination of the fairness 
of the sanction in misconduct cases. See also the following cases for examples of unjustified conduct by an 
employer: MA WU v Natal Die Castings Co Ltd (1986) IU 520 (JC) and FBWU v Transvaal Atlas Wholesale 
Meat Distributors (Pty) Ltd (1987) ILi 335 (IC). 
Compare the following decisions in which the requirements for rendering an ultimatum fair have been considered: 
NUMSA v Elm Street Plastics (1989) ILi 328 (IC); BA WU v Edward Hotel (1989) IU 357 (IC); Liberty Box & 
Bag Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd v PPWA WU (1990) ILi 427 (ARB); NUMSA v Tek Corporation Ltd (1990) ILi 
721 (IC) and Administrator, OFS v Mokopanele 1990 (3) SA 780 (A). 
Compare Rudd & Van Zyl, Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations Act (Part 1), 1996, 258 and the cases discussed at 
272-274 in this regard. 
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6.4.4 Secondary strikes 
Secondary strikes are governed by section 66 of the Act which is to the following effect: 
"66. Secondary strikes 
(1) In this section "secondary strike" means a strike, or conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a 
strike, that is in support of a strike by other employees against their employer, but does not include a 
strike in pursuit of a demand that has been referred to a council if the striking employees, employed 
within the registered scope of that council, have a material interest in that demand. 
(2) No person may take part in a secondary strike unless -
(a) the strike that is to be supported complies with the provisions of sections 64 and 65; 
(b) the employer of the employees taking part in the secondary strike or, where appropriate, the 
employers' organisation of which that employer is a member, has received written notice of 
the proposed secondary strike at least seven days prior to its commencement; and 
(c) the nature and extent of the secondary strike is reasonable in relation to the possible direct or 
indirect effect that the secondary strike may have on the business of the primary employer. 
(3) Subject to section 68(2) and (3), a secondary employer may apply to the Labour Court for an interdict 
to prohibit or limit a secondary strike that contravenes subsection (2). 
(4) Any person who is a party to proceedings in terms of subsection (3), or the Labour Court, may request 
the Commission to conduct an urgent investigation to assist the Court to determine whether the 
requirements of subsection 2(c) have been met. 
(5) On receipt of a request made in terms of subsection (4), the Commission must appoint a suitably 
qualified person to conduct the investigation, and then submit, as soon as possible, a report to the 
Labour Court. 
(6) The Labour Court must take account of the Commission's report in terms of subsection (5) before 
making an order." 
Under the previous Act a strike was defined so as to include persons employed "either by the 
same employer or by different employers" and the courts accepted that the definition was 
broad enough to include secondary or sympathy strikes.63 By providing separate procedural 
and substantive requirements for the holding of a protected secondary strike, the Act seeks to 
provide clarity on the legality requirements for sympathy strikes developed under the 
. A 64 previous ct. 
63 
64 
Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v MA WU (1988) IL.I 995 (IC); Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v MA WU (1990) 
IL.I 35 (T); it is interesting to note that the 1988 unfair labour practice definition effectively prohibited secondary 
strikes by including "any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work, if the employer is not directly involved in the 
dispute which gives rise to the strike, lock-out or stoppage of work". 
See 1.3.2 for a discussion on the definition of a secondary strike. 
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For a secondary strike to fall within the ambit of the above section and to be a protected 
strike, three requirements must be met. Firstly, the primary strike must satisfy the procedural 
and substantive requirements for the holding of a protected strike set out in sections 64 and 
65 of the Act.65 
Secondly, the secondary strikers must give their employer written notice of the proposed 
strike at least seven days before it starts.66 
Thirdly, the nature and extent of the secondary strike must be reasonable in relation to its 
possible direct or indirect effect on the business of the primary employer.67 In other words, 
the secondary strike must be functionally related to the purpose of the primary strike. The 
underlying idea is that a secondary employer can only be expected to suffer the losses 
incurred by a secondary strike if such losses are in some way proportional to the impact that 
the strike may have on the business of the primary employer. The requirement is thus based 
on the notion of proportionality and effectively curtails secondary strikes where the primary 
and secondary strikers work in totally unrelated occupations or sectors of the economy .68 
In Sealy of South Africa & others v PPWAWu69 the Labour Court inter alia considered the 
effect of section 66(2)(c) of the Act and stated that " ... there must be some relationship or 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
This requirement is in line with international jurisprudence, which requires that the primary strike must be legal 
for the secondary strike to be lawful; see Cooper & Cheadle, "Strikes and lock-outs", in Current Labour Law, 
1995,53. 
This notice period is longer than the normal 48 hours' notice period in respect of primary strikes (see section 
64(1)(b) of the Act). 
Compare section 66(2)(c) with the test developed by Goldstone J in Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v MA WU 
(1990) IU 35 (T), namely that for a secondary strike to be lawful in terms of the definition of a strike under the 
previous Act "it must ... appear from the evidence as a reasonable possibility that its purpose is to induce or 
compel compliance with its demands and that the purpose may reasonably be achieved" (at 42F). 
See Du Toil et al, The Labour Relations Act of 1995, 1996, 202: "Where the impact (on the primary employer) is 
likely to be substantial, for example where the secondary employer is a customer or supplier of the primary 
employer, a supplier of temporary labour, or is in some other way associated with the primary employer, greater 
latitude must be permitted when evaluating the reasonableness of the nature and extent of the strike. On the other 
hand, where the impact on the primary employer is likely to be insignificant, for example where the primary and 
secondary employers have no business relationship whatsoever, a more restrictive approach must be adopted". 
See also Le Roux, "The Labour Court: some early decisions", in Contemporary Labour Law, 1997, 74-76. 
(1997) IU 392 (LC); the Court found that the first two requirements of section 66(2) were met and then went on 
to consider the requirements of section 66(2)(c) of the Act. 
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nexus between the primary employer and the secondary employer(s) for the proposed strike 
at the business of the secondary employer(s) to have a possible direct or indirect effect on the 
business of the primary employer in such a way as to make the nature and extent of the 
secondary strike 'reasonable'." 
In the Sealy case the secondary employers were all involved in the furniture manufacturing 
industry, whereas the primary employer, Mondi Paper, manufactured paper and pulp. 
Consequently, none of the secondary employers operated in the same sector as the primary 
employer and there was further also no link in production or financial terms between the 
secondary employers and the primary employer. The only remote link between the primary 
and secondary employers which could be identified was that the Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa had some interest in the companies concerned. On the facts, 
however, the Court found this tenuous link insufficient and granted an interdict in terms of 
section 68(1) of the Act to restrain the trade union from promoting, inciting, or instigating 
the unprotected secondary strike action. However, an exception was made with respect to 
the third applicant. The Court found that the fact that the third applicant was a customer of 
the primary employer constituted a strong enough link between the parties to comply with 
the section 66(2)(c) requirement.70 
This decision highlights the complicated factual investigations the Court could be faced with 
to determine whether a sufficient link has been established between the primary employer 
and the secondary employer. As appears from subsections 66(4)-(6), the CCMA is supposed 
to assist the Court in this regard. 
6.4.5 Essential services 
Employees engaged in essential (and maintenance) services are prohibited from striking in 
terms of section 65(1)(d) of the Act. The relevant statutory provisions in respect of the 
determination of essential services are sections 70-71 and 73-74 which are to the following 
effect: 
70 See Le Roux, "The Labour Court: some early decisions", Contemporary Labour Law, 1997, 74-76 and Grogan, 
"First Judgements", Employment Law, 1997, 100 for more detail on the Sealy case. 
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"70. Essential services committee 
(1) The Minister, after consulting NEDLAC, and in consultation with the Minister for the Public Service 
and Administration, must establish an essential services committee under the auspices of the 
Commission and appoint to that committee, on any terms, persons who have knowledge and 
experience of labour law and labour relations. 
(2) The functions of the essential services committee are -
(a) to conduct investigations as to whether or not the whole or a part of any service is an 
essential service, and then to decide whether or not to designate the whole or a part of that 
service as an essential service; 
(b) to determine disputes as to whether or not the whole or a part of any service is an essential 
service; and 
(c) to determine whether or not the whole or a part of any service is a maintenance service. 
(3) At the request of a bargaining council, the essential services committee must conduct an investigation 
in terms of subsection (2)(a). 
71. Designating a service as an essential service 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
71 
The essential services committee must give notice in the Government Gazette of any investigation that 
it is to conduct as to whether the whole or a part of a service is an essential service. 
The notice must indicate the service or the part of a service that is to be the subject of the investigation 
and must invite interested parties, within a period stated in the notice -
(a) to submit written representations; and 
(b) to indicate whether or not they require an opportunity to make oral representations. 
Any interested party may inspect any written representations made pursuant to the notice, at the 
Commission's offices. 
The Commission must provide a certified copy of, or extract from, any written representations to any 
person who has paid the prescribed fee. 
The essential services committee must advise parties who wish to make oral representations of the 
place and time at which they may be made. 
Oral representations must be made in public. 
After having considered any written and oral representations, the essential services committee must 
decide whether or not to designate the whole or a part of the service that was the subject of the 
investigation as an essential service. 
If the essential services committee designates the whole or a part of a service as an essential service, 
the committee must publish a notice to that effect in the Government Gazette. 
The essential services committee may vary or cancel the designation of the whole or a part of a service 
as an essential service, by following the provisions set out in subsections (1) to (8), read with the 
changes required by the context. 
The Parliamentary service and the South African Police Service are deemed to have been designated 
an essential service in terms of this section .71 
An essential service is defined in section 213 as follows: "essential service" means - (a) a service the interruption 
of which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the whole or any part of the population; (b) the 
Parliamentary service; (c) the South African Police Services. 
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73. Disputes about whether a service is an essential service 
(1) Any party to a dispute about either of the following issues may refer the dispute in writing to the 
essential services committee -
(a) whether or not a service is an essential service; or 
(b) whether or not an employee or employer is engaged in a service designated as an essential 
service. 
(2) The party who refers the dispute to the essential services committee must satisfy it that a copy of the 
referral has been served on all the other parties to the dispute. 
(3) The essential services committee must determine the dispute as soon as possible. 
74. Disputes in essential services 
(1) Any party to a dispute that is precluded from participating in a strike or a lock-out because that party is 
engaged in an essential service may refer the dispute in writing to -
(a) a council, if the parties to the dispute fall within the registered scope of that council; or 
(b) the Commission, if no council has jurisdiction. 
(2) The party who refers the dispute must satisfy the council or the Commission that a copy of the referral 
has been served on all the other parties to the dispute. 
(3) The council or the Commission must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 
( 4) If the dispute remains unresolved, any party to the dispute may request that the dispute be resolved 
through arbitration by the council or the Commission. 
(5) Any arbitration award in terms of subsection ( 4) made in respect of the State and that has financial 
implications for the State becomes binding -
(a) 14 days after the date of the award, unless a Minister has tabled the award in Parliament 
within that period; or 
(b) 14 days after the date of tabling the award, unless Parliament has passed a resolution that the 
award is not binding. 
(6) If Parliament passes a resolution that the award is not binding, the dispute must be referred back to the 
Commission for further conciliation between the parties to the dispute and if that fails, any party to the 
dispute may request the Commission to arbitrate. 
(7) If Parliament is not in session on the expiry of -
(a) the period referred to in subsection (S)(a), that period or the balance of that period will run 
from the beginning of the next session of parliament; 
(b) the period referred to in subsection (S)(b), that period will run from the expiry of the period 
referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection or from the beginning of the next session of 
Parliament." 
The set list of services in which strikes were prohibited in terms of the previous Act (as well 
as the PSLRA) was too broad and fell foul of the ILO definition of essential services: "Any 
service, the interruption of which threatens the health, safety or life of the population or a 
part thereof" .72 The 1995 Act takes the ILO requirements as its starting point in designating 
72 Cf Explanatory Memorandum, IU, 1995, 304; Cooper, "Strikes in Essential Services", Industrial Law Journal, 
1994, 904. 
essential services and provides procedures for the determination of essential services on an 
ongoing basis, thus introducing a more flexible approach.73 
Investigations into whether a service is an essential service will normally be conducted by 
the Essential Services Committee.74 The Act provides for a transparent process whereby 
notification of an investigation must be given in the Government Gazette. Interested parties 
may submit written submissions or appear at public oral hearings. The designation of a 
service as essential must appear in the Government Gazette .75 
The ILO recognises that the right to strike may be limited in ·certain 'circumstances, but 
requires that "restrictions on the right to strike should be accompanied by adequate, impartial 
and speedy conciliation and arbitration proceedings in which the parties concerned can take 
part at every stage ... and awards, once made, are fully and promptly implemented" .7~ The 
previous Act's (and the PSLRA's) procedures for compulsory arbitration were time 
consuming and cumbersome. The 1995 Act seeks to remedy these shortcomings by 
providing for conciliation and arbitration by a council or the CCMA. Although no time 
frames are set, the conciliation and arbitration under the Act are expected to be "adequate" 
and "speedy" as required by the ILO. 
6.4.6 Minimum services 
Minimum services are dealt with in se,ction 72 which is to the following effect: 
"72. Minimum services 
The essential services committee may ratify any collective agreement that provides for the maintenance of 
minimum services in a service designated as an essential service, in which case -
73 
74 
75 
76 
Cf the definition of essential services in section 213 of the Act quoted above. 
The CCMA can assist the Essential Services Committee in this regard: the Essential Services internet website 
is linked to the CCMA website, and can be located at www.ccma.org.za for more detail in this regard. 
Cf Government Gazette No. 18276of12 September 1997 in which the Essential Services Committee designated 
inter alia the following services as essential services: municipal traffic services and policing; municipal health; 
municipal security; the supply and distribution of water; the generation, transmission and distribution of power; 
fire fighting; the services required for the functioning of courts; correctional services. 
Explanatory Memorandum, 11.J, 1995, 301. 
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(a) the agreed minimum seivices are to be regarded as an essential seivice in respect of the employer and 
its employees; and 
(b) the provisions of section 74 do not apply." 
The Act allows for self-regulation by providing that collective agreements may provide for 
the maintenance of minimum services in an essential service. Once the Essential Services 
Committee has ratified such an agreement, the minimum service will be regarded as an 
essential service in respect of the employer and its employees. In such cases, workers may 
go on a protected strike except in the agreed minimum service. 
6.4. 7 Maintenance services 
Maintenance services are dealt with in section 75 which is to the following effect: 
"75. Maintenance se1Vices 
(1) A seivice is a maintenance seivice if the interruption of that seivice has the effect of material physical 
destruction to any working area, plant or machinery. 
(2) If there is no collective agreement relating to the provision of a maintenance seivice, an employer may 
apply in writing to the essential seivices committee for a determination that the whole or a part of the 
employer's business or seivice is a maintenance seivice. 
(3) The employer must satisfy the essential seivices committee that a copy of the application has been 
seived on all interested parties. 
( 4) The essential seivices committee must determine, as soon as possible, whether or not the whole or a 
part of the employer's business or seivice is a maintenance seivice. 
(5) As part of its determination in terms of subsection ( 4), the essential seivices committee may direct that 
any dispute in respect of which the employees engaged in a maintenance seivice would have had the 
right to strike, but for the provisions of section 65(1)(d)(ii), be referred to arbitration. 
(6) The committee may not make a direction in terms of subsection (5) if -
(a) the terms and conditions of employment of the employees engaged in the maintenance 
seivice are determined by collective bargaining; or 
(b) the number of employees prohibited from striking because they are engaged in the 
maintenance seivice does not exceed the number of employees who are entitled to strike. 
(7) If a direction in terms of subsection (5) requires a dispute to be resolved by arbitration -
(a) the provisions of section 74 will apply to the arbitration; and 
(b) any arbitration award will be binding on the employees engaged in the maintenance seivice 
and their employer, unless the terms of the award are varied by a collective agreement."77 
The Act introduces the concept of a maintenance service. It prohibits strike action in breach 
77 Subsections (5)-(7) were added to section 75 by the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1996. 
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of a collective agreement, an Essential Services Committee determination, or an arbitration 
award concerning maintenance services. The Act does not provide for compulsory 
arbitration in respect of maintenance service disputes, which means that employees engaged 
in maintenance services must continue working while their fellow employees are on strike, 
but only for the purposes of maintenance. The justification for this prohibition on the right 
to strike is the concern to contain collective action which goes beyond the infliction of 
economic harm, to the material physical destruction of the wealth-generating capacity of the 
working area, plant or machinery. 
6.4.8 Replacement labour 
The relevant statutory provision is section 76 which is to the following effect: 
'76. Replacement labour 
(1) An employer may not take into employment any person -
(a) to continue or maintain production during a protected strike if the whole or a part of the 
employer's seivice has been designated a maintenance seivice; or 
(b) for the purpose of performing the work of any employee that is locked out, unless the lock-
out is in response to a strike. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, 'take into employment' includes engaging the seivices of a temporary 
employment seivice or an independent contractor." 
Apart from the withdrawal of wages, the other serious disincentive for striking employees is 
the ability of their employer to continue production with the help of scab labour.78 As under 
the previous law, employers remain free to take on scab labour. However, the Act prohibits 
the employment of such labour for the purpose of maintaining production during a protected 
strike if any part of the employer's service has been designated as a maintenance service, or 
for the purpose of performing the work of locked out employees, unless the lock-out is in 
response to a strike. 
6.4.9 Picketing 
Picketing is regulated by section 69 of the Act which is to the following effect: 
78 See "Strikes and lock-outs", in Employment Law, 1996, 7 in this regard. 
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"69. Picketing 
(1) A registered trade union may authorise a picket by its members and supporters for the purposes of 
peacefully demonstrating -
(a) in support of any protected strike; or 
(b) in opposition to any lock-out. 
(2) Despite any law regulating the right of assembly, a picket authorised in terms of subsection (1), may 
be held-
(a) in any place to which the public has access but outside the premises of an employer; or 
(b) with the permission of the employer, inside the employer's premises. 
(3) The permission referred to in subsection (2)(b) may not be unreasonably withheld. 
( 4) If requested to do so by the registered trade union or employer, the Commission must attempt to 
secure an agreement between the parties to the dispute on rules that should apply to any picket in 
relation to that strike or lock-out. 
(5) If there is no agreement, the Commission must establish picketing rules, and in doing so must take 
account of -
(a) the particular circumstances of the workplace or other premises where it is intended that the 
right to picket is to be exercised; and 
(b) any relevant code of good practice. 
(6) The rules established by the Commission may provide for picketing by employees on their employer's 
premises if the Commission is satisfied that the employer's permission has been unreasonably 
withheld. 
(7) The provisions of section 67, read with the changes required by the context, apply to the call for, 
organisation of, or participation in a picket that complies with the provisions of this section. 
(8) Any party to a dispute about any of the following issues may refer the dispute in writing to the 
Commission -
(a) an allegation that the effective use of the right to picket is being undermined; 
(b) an alleged material contravention of subsection (1) or (2); 
(c) an alleged material breach of an agreement concluded in terms of subsection ( 4); or 
(d) an alleged material breach of a rule established in terms of subsection (5). 
(9) The party who refers the dispute to the Commission must satisfy it that a copy of the referral has been 
served on all the other parties to the dispute. 
(10) The Commission must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 
(11) If the dispute remains unresolved, any party to the dispute may refer it to the Labour Court for 
adjudication." 
... It is a fact of life that strike action is also quasi-political, in the sense that the strikers may 
desire and need to mobilise public support or sympathy. The right to demonstrate in support 
of a strike has traditionally been viewed as coercive and a threat to the public order. Under 
the previous labour dispensation the law of picketing was primarily based on general 
common law principles. Even though the Courts had accepted the existence of a right to 
picket, picketers still exposed themselves to civil liability based on breach of contract or 
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delictual principles.79 Today the right to picket is protected m the Constitution80 and 
specifically regulated in the Act.81 
The Act provides detailed procedures for the orderly regulation of the right to picket during a 
strike. The most significant limitations on the right to picket are that it can be authorised 
only by a registered union, must be peaceful, can only be in support of a protected strike or 
in opposition to a lock-out, and must take place outside the employer's premises (unless the 
employer agrees otherwise). Pickets authorised by the Act may be held despite any laws 
regulating the right of assembly. The same protection is given to pickets in conformity with 
the Act as to protected strikes, with the result that an employer should be able to interdict the 
actions of picketers where the actions of the person involved amount to a criminal offence. 
The employer's other option in the case of an unprotected picket would be to utilise the 
provisions of section 69(8) of the Act. If this fails, the matter may be referred to the Labour 
Court for adjudication.82 
The use of section 69(8) was considered in Lomati Mill Barberton (A Division of Sappi 
Timber Industries) v PPWAWU & others.83 The facts of the case can be summarised as 
follows: the respondent employees were involved in a protected secondary strike. In 
preparation for this strike, the applicant employer and the shop stewards concerned entered 
into two agreements, a code of conduct for picketing and a code of conduct for striking. The 
employer alleged that these collective agreements had been breached, and approached the 
court in terms of section 69(8). The fact that the aforesaid picketing code was not entered 
into with the assistance of the CCMA as required by section 69(8)( c) was deemed by the 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Cf Davis & Arendse, "Picketing", Industrial Law Journal, 1988, 26 and Rycroft in Rycroft & Jordaan, A Guide to 
South African Labour Law, 289. 
The Constitution states in section 17: "Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to 
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions" (the right to picket, like other rights, may be limited by the 
operation of section 36(1) of the Constitution). 
It should be noted that neither the Constitution nor the Act defines or describes a picket; cf 1.3 .2 in this regard. 
See generally Landman, "The new right to picket", Contemporary Labour Law, 1996, 41 and Le Roux, "The 
Labour Court: some early decisions", Contemporary Labour Law, 1997, 76. 
Pending the adjudication it may be possible to obtain interim relief in terms of section 158(1 )(a) of the Act. 
(1997) IL.I 178 (LC). See Le Roux, "The Labour Court: some early decisions", Contemporary Labour Law, 
1997, 77-78 for a detailed discussion of this case. 
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Court to be immaterial. The Court also condoned the absence of conciliation by the CCMA 
and argued that it had the right to dispense with this requirement on the basis of the 
provisions of section 157(4) of the Act. The employees were accordingly interdicted from 
interfering with traffic entering and leaving the employer's premises and from assaulting or 
intimidating replacement workers, and were ordered to adhere to the picketing rules. 
The Court also considered the effect of the other collective agreement pertaining to conduct 
during the strike. It held that, as the agreement did more than incorporate picketing rules, it 
could not enforce it while there was a protected strike in progress. The distinction between 
the two agreements was that the picketing agreement was specifically authorised in terms of 
the Act.84 
6.4.10 Protest action 
Protest action to promote or defend the socio-economic interests of workers is regulated by 
section 77 of the Act which is to the following effect: 
"77. Protest action to promote or defend socio-economic interests of workers 
(1) Every employee who is not engaged in an essential service or a maintenance service has the right to 
take part in protest action if -
(2) 
84 
(a) the protest action has been called by a registered trade union or federation of trade unions; 
(b) the registered trade union or federation of trade unions has served a notice on NEDLAC 
stating 
(i) the reasons for the protest action; and 
(ii) the nature of the protest action; 
(c) the matter giving rise to the intended protest action has been considered by NEDLAC or any 
other appropriate forum in which the parties concerned are able to participate in order to 
resolve the matter; and 
(d) at least 14 days before the commencement of the protest action, the registered trade union or 
federation of trade unions has served a notice on NEDLAC of its intention to proceed with 
the protest action. 
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction -
(a) to grant any order to restrain any person from taking part in protest action or in any conduct 
in contemplation or in furtherance of protest action that does not comply with subsection (1); 
(b) in respect of protest action that complies with subsection (1), to grant a declaratory order 
Le Roux, "The Labour Court: some early decisions", Contemporary Labour Law, 1997, 78 comments as follows 
in this regard: "This distinction may be justifiable in terms of the specific wording of the LRA. It is, however, a 
profoundly disturbing one. One of the underlying premises of the LRA is the importance of collective bargaining 
as a means of regulating relationships between employers, employees and unions. The mere fact that the 
employees have embarked on a protected strike should not absolve them of the duty to comply with the provisions 
of a collective agreement regulating their conduct during the strike". 
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contemplated by subsection ( 4), after having considered 
(i) the nature and duration of the protest action; 
(ii) the steps taken by the registered trade union or federation of trade unions to 
minimise the harm caused by the protest action; and 
(iii) the conduct of the participants in the protest action. 
(3) A person who takes part in protest action or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of protest 
action that complies with subsection (1), enjoys the protections conferred by section 67. 
( 4) Despite the provisions of subsection (3), an employee forfeits the protection against dismissal 
conferred by that subsection, if the employee -
(a) takes part in protest action or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of protest action 
in breach of an order of the Labour Court; or 
(b) otherwise acts in contempt of an order of the Labour Court made in terms of this section." 
Under the provisions of the old Act the kind of protest action envisaged in the above section 
(work-stoppages such as stay-aways and mass action) would have been branded as unlawful, 
in contravention of section 65(1A) of the old Act and "an act of misconduct which 
justified ... taking disciplinary action against those who participated in it" .85 The ILO 's Fact 
Finding and Conciliation Commission (FFCC) regarded the old Act's limitation of strikes to 
collective bargaining matters as one of the more flagrant breaches of the right of freedom of 
association. The FFCC and the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association regard it as 
fundamental that workers have the right to collective action in order to promote or defend 
their socio-economic interests.86 The Act seeks to achieve a balance between this right and 
the needs of the economy by providing for specific constraints in the exercise of such 
collective action.87 
The ambit of the right to protest action will depend, of course, on the benevolence with 
which the phrase "socio-economic interests"88 will be interpreted by the courts. In light of 
the inextricable connection between general socio-economic interests and politics, the phrase 
is likely to be interpreted generously. This would confirm the right of employees to 
withdraw their labour in furtherance of political objectives.89 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
NUM v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd 1996 (1) SA 442 (A) at 447E-F. 
Explanatory Memorandum, IU, 1995, 307. 
See the definition of protest action in 1.3.2. 
See the definition of protest action in Chapter 1 (the Act does not provide a definition of socio-economic 
interests). 
See "Strikes and lock-outs", in Employment Law, 1997, 11 in this regard. 
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In Business South Africa v COSATU & another90 the Labour Appeal Court (sitting as a court 
of first instance) was given the opportunity to analyse the provisions of section 77 of the Act. 
The facts can be summarised as follows: on 23 February 1996 the Minister of Labour 
published a Green Paper on Employment Standards. NEDLAC established a negotiating 
committee on employment standards and after a number of meetings a draft Employment 
Standards Bill was tabled by government on 9 July 1996. After a number of meetings held 
between the parties the negotiations stalled and no further meetings were held after 
November 1996. On 18 February 1997 COSATU wrote a letter to NEDLAC in which it was 
informed of COSATU's "Programme of Action". The letter stated that a deadlock had been 
reached on "key issues such as paid maternity, working week, child labour, Sunday work, 
and variations" and that "if no sufficient progress has been made a general strike planned for 
12 May will be sanctioned". This stimulated certain exchanges between the parties but on 21 
April 1997 COSATU wrote a letter to NEDLAC giving notice of its intention to commence 
protest action at 12:00 on 12 May 1997. On 23 April 1997 a NED LAC meeting was held to 
consider the bill and how negotiations on it should take place. On 5 May 1997 Business 
South Africa (BSA) launched an urgent application in which it sought a declaratory order, an 
interdict, and a mandamus alternatively, a request for directions in terms of section 77(2)(b) 
of the Act. 
The majority of the Court (Myburgh JP and Froneman DJP) distinguished protest action 
from strike action and commented as follows on the interpretation of section 77 of the Act: 
"Because of the different nature and character of the right to take part in protest action in 
terms of the Act, the interpretation and application of that right needs to be assessed in a 
broader context than the fundamental labour rights' which form part of the primary objects of 
the Act in terms of s 1. The application and interpretation of the latter takes place in the 
context of their contribution, in general, to collective bargaining ... Not so in the case of 
protest action. Collective bargaining is not at stake. The extent of the right to protest action 
involves the weighing up of that right, taking not only the rights of employees and employers 
into consideration, but also, importantly, the interests of the public at large and, in a case such 
as this, the effect on the national economy ... of the Act. In a nutshell: the purpose of the Act 
does not necessarily require an expansive or liberal interpretation of s 77, in the sense that the 
exercise of the right to protest action must be restricted as little as possible. "91 
90 (1997) IU 474 (LAC). 
91 At 481 D-G. 
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In his minority judgement Nicholson JA dissented. He was of the opinion that protest action 
falls outside the context of an ordinary strike and deseives a liberal rather than a restrictive 
interpretation. 
The Court further found that it was common cause between the parties that the provisions of 
section 77(1)(a) had been complied with as COSATU was a registered federation of trade 
unions. After stressing the importance of the remaining provisions of the subsection, the 
Court found that COSATU's letter of 18 February 1997 constituted compliance with the 
provisions of section 77(1)(b) and that its letter of 21 April 1997 complied with the 
provisions of section 77(1)(d), even though COSATU did not complete the Act's prescribed 
forms in this regard. The only question that remained was whether the "key issues" giving 
rise to the intended protest action was considered by NEDLAC between 18 February and 21 
April in order to resolve the dispute. The majority of the Court found that the key issues had 
not been considered by NEDLAC and granted the relief sought, save for the interdict which 
the Court thought unwise to grant. 
Nicholson JA dissented. He found that NEDLAC had properly considered the issues under 
the circumstances and would have dismissed the application, which shows just how far the 
elastic term "considered" can be stretched.92 
6.4.11 The lock-out 
As in the previous Act, the procedural and other provisions regarding strike action apply to 
lock-outs.93 On the face of it, the restrictions on the right to strike apply equally to lock-outs. 
But, while acknowledging the right to strike, the Act does not extend the same status to 
lock-outs and provides only for "recourse" to the lock-out.94 
92 
93 
94 
See Grogan, "First Judgements", Employment Law, 1997, 101 for more detail in this regard. 
Section 213 of the Act defines a "lock-out" as follows: "the exclusion by an employer of employees from the 
employer's workplace, for the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the employer breaches those employees' 
contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of that exclusion". See generally Le Roux, "The lock-
out and the unfair labour practice", Contemporary Labour Law, 1994, 87 and Landman, "The right to strike and 
the right to lock-out in a new labour dispensation", Contemporary Labour Law, 1995, 85. 
The Act's wording follows the wording of the interim Constitution in this regard: see 6.3 for more detail. The 
final Constitution does not even mention the lock-out and thereby reduces the lock-out's status even further. 
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The Act settles the disputed question whether employers may lawfully dismiss employees in 
pursuance of a lock-out: they may not, since among the list of automatically unfair 
dismissals is a dismissal "to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any 
matter of mutual interest between the employer and the employee" - by definition the 
objective of a lock-out.95 Not only are locked out employees thus protected against 
dismissal, but an employer may not employ replacement labour in their stead, save where the 
lock-out is in response to a strike. 
95 
However, section 241 of the Constitution insulates all the provisions of the 1995 Labour Relations Act from 
constitutional attack until they are amended or repealed. Jordaan, "A look at the lock-out", Employment Law, 
1997, 97 states as follows in this regard: " ... The repeal of the lock-out provisions in the new LRA will not have a 
marked impact where employees take the initiative and embark on full-scale industrial action in support of their 
demands. Employers will still be permitted to take the initiative in pursuing their demands as nothing prevents 
them from varying conditions of service unilaterally. Repeal will, however, tilt the balance against employers 
faced with partially protected strikes. If only for this reason, the Act should at least allow defensive lock-outs and 
termination for operational reasons in instances where agreement cannot be reached on employer initiated 
amendments to terms and conditions of service - subject, of course, to the safeguards provided in Chapter VIII of 
the Act. 
The definition of a lock-out also does not provide for such dismissals: see "Strikes and lock-outs", in Employment 
Law, 1997, 12 in this regard. 
C. COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
CHAPTER 7 - COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
7 .1 Introduction 
The previous six chapters provided an overview of the historical development as well as the 
state of the current law relating to strikes in the Netherlands and South Africa. Perhaps the 
most striking difference between the two countries in this regard is the reluctance to legislate 
in the field of industrial action in the Netherlands. The Dutch legislature has thus far failed 
to produce a statute to regulate collective action. Consequently, strike law in the Netherlands 
is for the greater part, judge-made law. In South Africa, however, the legislature has over the 
years passed a number of statutes to regulate the strike phenomenon. Ironically, the South 
African labour legislation does not provide more certainty than the Dutch judge-made law in 
respect of the law relating to strikes. In both legal systems there are a number of grey areas 
that will continue to generate litigation. 
In this final chapter, the South African strike law of today will be looked at from a Dutch 
perspective. The idea is not to provide a detailed comparison, but to highlight some of the 
major differences and to point to some of the similarities between the two legal systems. 
7.2 Substantive Limitations 
7.2.1 Right to strike conferred on individual employees 
Section 64(1) of the Labour Relations Act of 19951 provides that "every employee has the 
right to strike ... " .2 The right to strike is thus an individual right exercised by a collectivity of 
Act 66 of 1995, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 
2 Cf also section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, referred to 
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workers, and no distinction is drawn between strikes organised by trade unions and so-called 
wildcat strikes. In the Netherlands, the directly binding article 6(4) of the European Social 
Charter (ESC) speaks of "the right of workers and employers to collective action .. .including 
the right to strike ... ". In both South Africa and the Netherlands the right to strike is thus 
conferred on individual employees and not on organisations. This is in line with 
international jurisprudence .3 
7.2.2 Collective agreements 
In terms of section 65(1)(a) of the Act no person may take part in a strike or in any conduct 
in contemplation or furtherance of a strike if that person is bound by a collective agreement4 
that prohibits a strike in respect of the issue in dispute. According to section 65(3)(a)(i) of 
the Act, a strike (or any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike) is furthermore 
unprotected if the employee is bound by a collective agreement (or arbitration award) that 
regulates the issue in dispute .5 
Under Dutch law the position is the same. Article 6(4) of the ESC speaks of "the right of 
workers and employers to collective action ... subject to obligations that might arise out of 
collective agreements previously entered into." As collective agreements are legally binding 
contracts, the parties are also bound by any so-called vredesplichtclausules or "duty of 
peace" clauses contained therein.6 A distinction is drawn between a relative and an absolute 
duty of peace. The operation of a relative duty of peace can be compared with the regulation 
3 
4 
5 
6 
hereinafter as the Constitution. 
See 3.3.3 for more detail in this regard. 
A "collective agreement" is defined in section 213 of the Act as "a written agreement concerning terms and 
conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or more trade unions, on the 
one hand and, on the other hand - (a) one or more employers; (b) one or more registered employers' organisations; 
or (c) one or more employers and one or more registered employers' organisations;". 
It should be noted that the previous Labour Relations Act only provided for a limited "peace clause", for example, 
a strike could not be called if an industrial council or conciliation board agreement was binding. As most 
agreements were concerned with minimum terms and conditions of employment the clause was of little use. In 
addition, an undertaking by workers or their union not to strike for a specified period was hardly worth the paper 
it was written on: see Landman, "The right to strike and the right to lock-out in a new labour dispensation", 
Contemporary Labour Law, 1995, 87. 
See 3.3.2 for more detail in this regard. 
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of an issue in dispute in a collective agreement in terms of section 65(3)(a)(i) of the Act. 
Similarly, the absolute duty of peace can be compared to the prohibition of a strike in a 
collective agreement in terms of section 65(l)(a) of the Act. Consequently, the law relating 
to strikes in both countries gives effect to the notion of voluntarism in labour relations. 
7.2.3 Agreement requiring referral of a dispute to arbitration 
In terms of section 65(1)(b) of the Act no person may take part in industrial action if that 
person is bound by an agreement7 that requires the issue in dispute to be referred to 
arbitration. As stated above, the Dutch law also recognises self-regulation in labour relations 
by giving effect to the collective agreement provision of article 6(4) of the ESC. 
As regards the mechanics of arbitration procedures in Dutch practice,8 it is necessary to 
briefly refer to the Advice and Arbitration Commission, a state commission created in 1984. 
The purpose of the commission is to avoid unilateral decisions by the government on the 
labour conditions of civil servants, and to ensure open, genuine and responsible bargaining 
between the parties. The commission plays an important role in countering the disparity in 
bargaining power between government and civil servants. Once a dispute has been referred 
to the commission, it reduces the likelihood that civil servants will resort to strikes. Since its 
establishment, the commission has given advice on a number of occasions, although it has 
thusfar not played a major role in the arbitration of disputes.9 It is not clear why the 
arbitration procedure in the public sector is not extended to the private sector. After all, there 
exists a similar disparity in bargaining power in the private sector, with an equal need for 
7 
8 
9 
The subsection does not refer to a collective agreement and appears to include agreements between individual 
employees and employers. It is doubtful whether this result was in fact intended by the legislature; cf Du Toil et 
al, The Labour Relations Act of 1995, 1996, 188. 
The Labour Disputes Act of 1923 played an important role in the development of voluntary arbitration procedures 
in the Netherlands. The Act created offices for independent experts, the public conciliators, whose main duty was 
finding acceptable solutions to labour conflicts between parties. The public conciliators offered their assistance 
on request and the parties were free to make their own choice in this regard. Even though the Labour Disputes 
Act of 1923 was never formally abolished, it virtually ceased to operate when the tasks of the conciliators were 
fundamentally altered after the German invasion in 1940. The Extraordinary Decree on Labour Relations of 1945 
reinstituted a board of public conciliators. 
Cf De Groot, "De advies- en arbitragecommissie en het recht", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1988, 281; Becking, 
"De Advies- en Arbitragecommissie Rijksdienst", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1992, 445; Tilstra, Grenzen aan 
het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 54. 
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open and serious bargaining between management and employees.10 
7.2.4 Conflicts of interests 
Section 65(1)(c) of the Act prohibits a strike if the issue in dispute is one that a party has the 
right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of the Act. Although no mention 
is made of conflicts of interests or conflicts of rights, the intention of the legislature appears 
to be the prohibition of "rights disputes" (or what may be described under the Act as 
"justiciable disputes") .11 
In the Netherlands specific mention is made of the concept conflict of interests. The directly 
binding article 6(4) of the ESC refers to "the right of workers and employers to collective 
action in cases of conflicts of interests, including the right to strike ... " .12 
7.2.5 Protest action 
In line with international jurisprudence and following the advice of the ILO's Fact Finding 
and Conciliation Commission, section 77 of the Act provides for protest action to promote or 
defend socio-economic interests of workers.13 In these types of action the employer is 
effectively prevented from meeting and unable to negotiate the strikers' demands. The 
demands and the objective sought to be attained are entirely beyond the employer's control. 
The Act does not provide a definition of the phrase "socio-economic interests", but the 
phrase is likely to be construed generously. 
The approach followed under Dutch law to determine the lawfulness of protest action also 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The provisions of article 6(3) of the ESC is not directly binding on the Netherlands, but it has persuasive authority 
and should be noted in this regard: "With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain 
collectively, the Contracting Parties undertake: 1.. .. ; 2 .... ; 3. to promote the establishment and use of the 
appropriate machinery for conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes;". Cf Van 
Voorden, "Derdeninterventie in de arbeidsverhoudingen", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1991, 664 and Jacobs, 
"Post-industrieel stakingsrecht", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1991, 6 73. 
See 6.4.1 for more detail in this regard. 
See 3.3.1 for more detail in this regard. 
See 6.4.10 for more detail in this regard. 
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emphasise the specific purpose of the collective action. If collective action is aimed at 
government policy, the Dutch Supreme Court will only allow it if the collective action is 
functional to collective bargaining. Those actions whose purpose clearly fall outside the 
ambit of collective bargaining have no claim on the protection of article 6(4) of the ESC.14 
The Dutch Supreme Court thus makes a distinction between collective action aimed at 
government policy regarding labour conditions (which are or ought to have been the subject 
of collective bargaining), and purely political actions aimed at government policy of a 
different kind.15 Furthermore, it classifies an employer as a third party to the conflict with 
the result that the employer's economic interests can affect the lawfulness of the protest 
action in terms of article 31 of the ESC.16 
In both legal systems the ambit of an employee's right to protest action remains dependent on 
a court's interpretation of largely vague criteria in the circumstances of each case.17 
7.2.6 Secondary strikes 
As with protest action, the Act provides separate procedural and substantive requirements for 
the holding of a protected secondary strike .18 Firstly, the primary strike must comply with 
the provisions of sections 64 and 65 of the Act. Secondly, the employer must have received 
written notice of the proposed secondary strike, and, thirdly, the nature and extent of the 
secondary strike must be reasonable in relation to its possible direct or indirect effect on the 
business of the primary employer.19 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
In the Netherlands there are no procedural requirements for these types of action as required in South Africa by 
section 77(1)(b)-(d) of the Act. 
Even though purely political action is not protected by the ESC, it does not mean that the action is automatically 
unlawful. See 33.3.1.l and 3.3.3.1.2 for more detail in this regard. 
In South Africa, the specific constraints provided for in section 77 of the Act has to protect the employer's 
economic interests against the misuse of this form of extended industrial action. 
It can perhaps be argued that the South African system is more flexible than the Dutch system in this regard in 
that the protection against dismissal can be lifted in certain circumstances: compare section 77(4) of the Act. 
See the definition of a "secondary strike" in section 66(1) of the Act from which it appears that it "does not 
include a strike in pursuit of a demand and referred to a council if the striking employees, employed within the 
registered scope of that council, have a material interest in that demand". Cf in this regard the distinction made 
between "pure" solidarity strikes and other solidarity strikes (in which the rights or interests of the secondary 
strikers could be influenced by the primary strike) in the Dutch literature. 
See 6.4.4 for more detail in this regard. 
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In contrast to the situation in South Africa, secondary strikes are rare and play an 
insignificant role in the Netherlands.2° In 1960, the Supreme Court held that employees 
engaged in such action would, in principle, be guilty of a breach of contract, except if the 
purpose of the action was closely connected to the public interest or important moral 
principles. Since then the Supreme Court has had no opportunity to deal with these types of 
action, and the current state of the law remains uncertain.21 
7.2. 7 Wage determinations 
Section 65(3)(a)(ii) and (b) of the Act provides that subject to a collective agreement, no 
person may take part in industrial action if that person is bound by any Ministerial 
determination made in terms of section 44 (similar to a wage determination) or any 
determination made in terms of the Wage Act (during the first year of that determination) 
which regulates the issue in dispute. 
In the Netherlands, a different system of wage negotiation led to a different practice in this 
regard. After many years of government interference in wage negotiations, the Dutch Wage 
Act was amended in 1987.22 Since the amendment, the government could only interfere in 
wage negotiations if so justified by a serious threat to the national economy .23 No such wage 
determination has yet been made, and in practice wages are agreed upon between the parties 
. 11 . 24 m co echve agreements. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
See 3 .3 .3 .1.3 for more detail in this regard. 
The lower courts have in the past restricted secondary strikes on the ground that they violate the rights of the 
immediate employer who is not the real opponent. 
See Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 182-193 and Rood, International Encyclopaedia for 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1995, 71 for more detail in this regard. 
Section 10(1) of the Wet op de Loonvorming van 1970 provides as follows: "Onze Minister kan, indien naar zijn 
oordeel een zich plotseling voordoende noodsituatie van de nationale economie, veroorzaakt door een of meer 
schoksgewijze optredende externe factoren, het nemen van maatregelen ten aanzien van het peil van de 
loonkosten vereist, algemene regelen vaststellen betreffende lonen en andere op geld waardeerbare 
arbeidsvoorwaarden". 
In terms of section 4 of the Wet op de Loonvorming the Minister must, however, be notified of the conclusion of 
collective agreements. 
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7.3 Procedural Requirements 
7.3.1 Referral of issue in dispute to council or Commission 
According to section 64(1)(a) and (b) of the Act a strike is protected only if the issue in 
dispute has been referred to a bargaining council or statutory council with jurisdiction or to 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and, thereafter, a 
certificate has been obtained from either the council or the CCMA stating that the dispute 
remains unresolved or, alternatively, a period of 30 days (or an extension of that period 
agreed between the parties) has elapsed since the referral was received by the council or the 
CCMA. 
Even though there are no institutions such as bargaining councils and statutory councils in 
the Netherlands, the Dutch jurisprudence also prescribes certain procedural rules that must be 
adhered to before a strike may be embarked upon. One of these procedural rules requires 
that the strike may only be resorted to after serious negotiations between the parties have 
reached a deadlock. Another procedural rule related to this ultimum remedium requirement 
should also be noted. Even when deadlock has been reached in negotiations, the union may 
not organise a strike if the conflict can still be resolved by means of another legal course at 
the parties' disposal.25 These procedural requirements, coupled with the willingness of the 
social partners to solve their problems by consultation and co-operation,26 ensure genuine 
collective bargaining between the parties to the conflict.27 The introduction of obligatory 
conciliation procedures appears superfluous against the backdrop of the effective collective 
25 
26 
27 
For example, if civil servants have referred a dispute to the Advice and Arbitration Commission for its 
consideration, no strike may be organised until such time as the commission has reported on the dispute. 
Similarly, if the parties have agreed to advisory arbitration in the case of a conflict, no strike may be organised 
until such time as the arbitration procedure is completed. Cf HR 19 April 1991, NJ 1991, 690. 
The willingness of the social partners to solve their problems by consultation and co-operation led to the 
establishment in 1945 of the Foundation of Labour, a national body composed of representatives of the major 
employers' organisations and trade unions. The Foundation seeks to constantly promote consultation between 
employers and employees. It can also conciliate informally if there is consent between the social partners 
concerned. See Rood, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 1993, 17-19 for 
more detail in this regard, as well as a discussion on the Social Economic Council (an independent tripartite body 
advising government on socio-economic policy). 
See the Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst 1927, Wet op het algemeen verbindend en het onverbindend 
verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten 1937, SER-besluit Fusiegedragsregels 1975 and 
the Wet op de loonvorming 1970 for detail on the Dutch system of collective bargaining. 
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bargaining system in the Netherlands. 
The provisions of section 64(3)(b) of the Act must not be overlooked. In line with the Dutch 
jurisprudence in this regard, the Act promotes voluntarism and self-regulation in South 
African labour relations and provides that the formal requirements outlined above do not 
apply where the parties themselves have set out their own procedures in a collective 
agreement. 
7.3.2 Referral of issue in dispute to advisory arbitration 
Section 64(2) of the Act provides that if the issue in dispute concerns a refusal to bargain, an 
advisory arbitration award must be made by a commissioner before notice can be given of 
the commencement of the strike. The intention of the legislature is that there should be no 
legal duty to bargain enforced by the courts. 
In the Netherlands an employer has no legal obligation to bargain with a trade union, except 
in the case of collective dismissals28 and in the case of mergers.29 Nevertheless, the system 
of collective bargaining is generally accepted in practice and as a result no problems 
regarding the duty to bargain are encountered.30 Bargaining generally occurs on an industry-
wide basis and seldom at company level. Union activity at company level is limited and has 
been replaced by a system of institutional participation which occurs chiefly through works 
councils (ondernemingsraden) .31 The works council and the employer hold joint 
consultation meetings at least six times a year. The Act provides works councils with a right 
28 
29 
30 
31 
The Wet melding collectief ontslag 1976 creates a legal duty to bargain in the case of a proposed (operational 
requirement) dismissal of more than 20 employees: see Bakels, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, 1992, 
109 for more detail on the aforesaid Act. 
The SER-besluit Fusiegedragsregels 1975 contains procedural rules to be followed in the case of mergers. 
See Brink, "Een 'recht' op collectief onderhandelen?", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 1988, 184 and Rb. Utrecht, 31 
December 1986, 4 November 1987, NJ 1988, 676 for more detail in this regard. 
A works council is an independent body of employee representatives and should be distinguished from a trade 
union. The Works Council Act or Wet op de ondernemingsraden 1971 provides for the establishment of works 
councils in all enterprises with more than 35 employees. (A simplified form of participation also exists for 
enterprises where at least 10 persons but less than 35 are employed. In such enterprises the employer must hold a 
meeting with his personnel at least twice a year.) See Rood, International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, 1995, 81 for more detail in this regard. 
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to information, a right to prior consultation on important company decisions, and a right to 
co-determination on certain specified social issues. The aforesaid statutory rights appear to 
imply an extension of collective bargaining to company level. However, the activities of 
councils are not regarded in that light. As consultative bodies they are participating in the 
operation of the business, rather than bargaining on behalf of employees.32 
7.3.3 Notice of the strike to the employer 
Section 64(1 )(b) of the Act requires that for a strike to be protected at least 48 hours' written 
notice of the commencement of the strike must be given to the employer.33 
The Dutch Supreme Court has developed a similar rule which requires the timely 
announcement of the strike. The court classified it as a weighty procedural rule which could 
lead to the unlawfulness of collective action if it was not observed. No fixed period is 
specified, and the courts generally decide after the event whether there was a reasonable 
lapse of time between the announcement and the commencement of the strike.34 
7.3.4 Balloting requirements 
Even though the traditional strike ballot requirement has been abolished by the Act, it still 
recognises the need for democratic decision-making processes within trade unions regarding 
the decision whether to strike or not.35 
32 
33 
34 
35 
For this reason these bodies cannot easily be equated with the workplace forums under South African law which 
are essentially trade union driven institutions. Cf also Schut, "Stakingsrecht en (uitleg) cao; betekenis 
vredesplicht", Tijdschrift voor Vennootschappen, Verenigingen en Stichtingen, 1996, 231 for detail on the 
interaction between trade unions and works councils. 
This amounts to a considerable "cooling off" period in light of the fact that notice can be given only after a 
certificate has been issued by a council or the Commission or, alternatively, after the lapse of a period of 30 days. 
A period of five days will in most cases be regarded as reasonable. See Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 
1994, 87 and Pres.Rb. Rotterdam, 25 November 1983, KG 1983, 356 (three days' notice regarded as sufficient). 
Section 95(5) provides as follows in this regard: "The constitution of any trade union or employers' organisation 
that intends to register must - (p) provide that the trade union pr employers' organisation, before calling a strike or 
lock-out, must conduct a ballot of those of its members in respect of whom it intends to call the strike or lock-out; 
(q) provide that members of the trade union or employers' organisation may not be disciplined or have their 
membership terminated for failure or refusal to participate in a strike or lock-out if - (i) no ballot was held about 
the strike or lock-out; or (ii) a ballot was held but a majority of the members who voted did not vote in favour of 
the strike or lock-out;". 
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The situation in the Netherlands is different. Trade unions are treated as associations in 
general,36 and registration is not required.37 No general strike ballot requirement exists and 
each trade union has its own strike ballot regulations. In most unions the initiation of strike 
action requires the agreement of 75% of the members. 
7.4 The Consequences of a Strike 
7.4.1 Civil liability 
In both South Africa and the Netherlands neither a delict nor a breach of the individual 
contract of employment is committed by an employee participating in protected or lawful 
strike action.38 
When employees embark on unprotected strike action in South Africa, the Labour Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to grant an interdict or order to restrain any employee from 
participating in a strike.39 It may also order the payment of compensation for any loss 
attributable to the strike. The Act creates a sui generis cause of action according to which a 
plaintiff is not necessarily entitled to the full amount of its proven damages but only to such 
compensation as is "just and equitable" .40 
In the Netherlands, however, the Supreme Court did not leave much room for civil liability 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
An association must set out its articles of association in a notarial deed in order to conclude contracts. Only 
unions having explicitly stated in their articles of association that their objective is to conclude collective 
agreements are allowed to do so. 
Consequently, no ballot requirement as a condition for registration exists. As in South Africa, every trade union 
has the right to regulate its own affairs without state interference. 
See 4.2.1 and 6.4.2 for more detail in this regard. In South Africa section 67(8) of the Act provides that the civil 
indemnity falls away if an act in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike constitutes "an offence". 
The aforesaid section presumably refers to criminal offences, and corresponds with the Dutch courts' intolerance 
of action in support of main strikes. 
See section 68(1)(a) of the Act. 
Compensation is the issue and not a claim for damages. See section 68(1)(b) of the Act and the list of factors 
which the court must take into account to determine what the compensation should be. See also Du Toil et al, The 
Labour Relations Act of 1995, 1996, 198 in this regard. 
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m respect of illegal strike action:·· This is mainly because it is recognised that striking 
employees would not easily know whether their action will be judged as lawful or not.42 As 
a result, an employer cannot penalise individual employees until such time as a court has 
decided on the lawfulness of the strike action. Where strike action is held to be illegal (i.e., 
not covered by article 6(4) of the ESC), individual employees are not held liable for their 
conduct up to that date,43 provided that the strike was an official one sanctioned by the trade 
union.44 But where the employees continue with strike action after a declaration of illegality 
by a court, they may be held liable for their actions.45 However, the role of sanctions is 
insignificant in practice, as a finding of illegality is normally respected by all disputing 
parties. 
7.4.2 Dismissal 
According to section 67(4) of the Act, an employer may not dismiss an employee for 
participating in a protected strike or for any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a 
protected strike.46 The protection against dismissal does not, however, preclude an employer 
from fairly dismissing an employee for a reason relating to the employee's conduct during 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Cf also the view of the Committee of Experts in this regard: "The Committee is of the opinion that no violation of 
the Charter is involved in the application of legal provisions or principles making individual members of trade 
unions or employers' associations criminally or civilly liable in the event of their organisation resorting to illegal 
collective action, on the understanding that legislation enacted in this field be in keeping with the Charter" 
(Conclusions I, l969no, 39). 
However, if it was perfectly clear to a striking employee that his or her actions exceeded the limits of lawfulness, 
he or she is not safeguarded against disciplinary action by the employer. This will only be the case in exceptional 
circumstances: see 4.2.1 for more detail in this regard. 
Theoretically speaking, a trade union may be held liable for all damage suffered by an employer during an illegal 
strike. In practice, however, the employers rarely institute damages claims against the unions, mostly because of 
the detrimental effect such claims would have on the ongoing relationship between the social partners. See, 
however, the Elka case (discussed under 3.33.3) where the unions were ordered to pay damages to the two 
directors. 
In the case of an unofficial (wildcat) strike, the employer may claim damages from the individual strikers. 
However, wildcat strikes do not have much practical significance in the Netherlands. Only a few of these strikes 
have broken out in the past, and no damage claims were instituted against the strikers. 
See Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 341, who argues that damages can only be claimed from an 
employee if one or more of the interests under article 31 of the ESC are negatively affected by the strike action. 
Such a dismissal would be automatically unfair in terms of section 187(l)(a) of the Act: see 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 for 
more detail. 
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the strike, or to the employer's operational requirements.47 The Act further recognises that it 
will not always be fair to dismiss an employee for participating in an unprotected strike.48 
In the Netherlands - as in South Africa - the question whether strikers may fairly be 
dismissed is not determined by the strike's lawfulness per se. An employee may not be 
dismissed for participating in strike action covered by article 6( 4) of the ESC.49 As with 
civil liability, it is recognised that striking employees would not easily know whether their 
action will be judged as lawful or not. Where strike action is held to be illegal, individual 
employees cannot be dismissed for their conduct up to that date, provided that the strike was 
an official one sanctioned by the trade union.50 However, if the employees continue with 
strike action after a declaration of illegality by a court, they may not automatically be 
dismissed. The Supreme Court stated that an employer must then take the following factors 
into consideration before resorting to the drastic remedy of dismissal: the duration of the 
collective action, the nature of the business, the length of service of the employee as well as 
the willingness of the employee to make up for time lost due to the collective action.51 
Unlike South Africa,52 however, the dismissal of strikers plays an insignificant role in 
practice,53 as a finding of illegality is usually respected by all disputing parties. 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Section 67(5) of the Act. 
See 6.4.3 for more detail in this regard. 
Cf 3.4 for a discussion on the restrictions contained in article 31 of the ESC which can influence the lawfulness of 
collective action. 
Even in the case of an unofficial (wildcat) strike, the employer may not automatically dismiss the individual 
strikers (see below). 
Cf HR 25 November 1977, NJ 1978, 176; Duk, "Wie staakt wordt niet gestraft", Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 
1988, 535; Jacobs, "De rechtspositie van de stakende werknemer", Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en 
Registratie, 1989, 21. 
The new labour courts in South Africa have thus far mainly dealt with the question whether the industrial action 
concerned was protected under the new Act. A more thorny question will arise when employers dismiss strikers 
for what they perceive to be unprotected strikes. That will entail an enquiry into the vexed issue of whether 
employers can unleash their ultimate weapon against strikers who have not complied with the provisions of the 
Act. Cf Grogan, "First judgements", Employment Law, 1997, 102. 
The Dutch courts view the dismissal of strikers as extremely serious and only tolerates it if exceptional 
circumstances exist: see Tilstra, Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 344. Cf the view held by the ILO's 
supervisory bodies in this regard: "The use of extremely serious measures, such as dismissal of workers for having 
participated in a strike and refusal to re-employ them, implies a serious risk of abuse and constitutes a violation of 
freedom of association" (Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the !LO, 1985, para 444). 
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7.4.3 Remuneration 
In line with international jurisprudence an employer in South Africa is not obliged to 
remunerate an employee during a protected strike.54 The Act provides for an exception 
where an employee's remuneration includes payment in kind in respect of accommodation, 
provision of food and other basic amenities of life. After the end of the strike the employer 
may recover the monetary value of the payment in kind made at the request of the 
employee.ss The employer also remains bound to remunerate non-strikers for as long as they 
make their services available to the employer.56 
The situation in the Netherlands is similar: as long as employees strike they receive no 
remuneration, and neither are they entitled to social security benefits. Insofar as they are 
members of the trade union organising the strike, they are, however, financially supported by 
that union.57 Unlike South Africa, no exception applies to the rule that an employee who is 
on strike loses his or her right to claim remuneration from the employer. As far as payment 
of wages to non-strikers are concerned, the Supreme Court have held that only employees 
who are prevented from working as a result of unorganised (wildcat) collective action of a 
protest nature are entitled to be paid by their employer .58 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Section 67(3) of the Act. 
Section 67(3)(a)&(b). Cf Grogan, "Few striking changes", Employment Law, 1995, 91 who comments that a 
"surer recipe for bedeviling industrial relations in the wake of a strike can hardly be imagined". 
Johannesburg Municipality v O'Sullivan 1923 AD 201. The tender of services must obviously be real and should 
be brought to the employer's attention: see Jordaan in Rycroft and Jordaan,A Guide to South African Labour Law, 
1992, 72-76 for more detail in this regard. 
See 4.2.1 for more detail in this regard. 
See 4.2.2 for more detail in this regard. 
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7 .5 Miscellaneous Issues 
7.5.1 Essential services 
Employees engaged in essential (and maintenance) services are prohibited from striking in 
terms of the Act. Provision is made for the establishment of an Essential Services 
Committee which has to decide the difficult question whether or not a certain service or part 
of a service is an essential services in terms of the Act. The parties can also agree on the 
extent to which certain minimum services will be maintained during a strike in an essential 
service, thus allowing for an element of self-regulation.59 
No such procedures exist in the Netherlands. The courts restrict the right to strike in terms of 
article 31 - the so-called public order clause - of the ESC insofar as it is "necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the 
protection of public interest, national security, public health or morals" .60 The restrictions 
are vaguely formulated and no real assistance can be gathered from the documentation 
compiled by the ESC's supervisory bodies in this regard.61 The Committee of Experts did, 
however, indicate that a person engaged in "essential services" is prohibited from striking in 
terms of the article 31 restrictions. It defined "essential services" as "services whose 
interruption would jeopardise the existence or well-being of the whole or part of the 
population" .62 
59 
60 
61 
62 
See 6.4.5 for more detail in this regard. 
See for example Pres.Rb. Utrecht, 2 May 1986, KG no. 180/86 (a strike in the dairy industries was forbidden 
because of its possible negative environmental consequences) and HR 22 November 1991, NJ 1992, 508 
(collective actions executed by nursing staff were held to be lawful, but certain limitations were placed on the 
actions: the protection of the public health played a major role in this regard). The Dutch government intends to 
statutorily regulate the military's right to strike in the near future (Aanhangsel Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1989-
1990, No. 635, 1277). 
Cf Schut, "Collectief actierecht tegenover rechten van derden", Nederlands Juristenblad, 1988, 1473 and Tilstra, 
Grenzen aan het Stakingsrecht, 1994, 226 and onwards, who seek assistance in this regard from the comparable 
articles 8-11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
1950. See also Heringa, Socia le Grondrechten, 1989, 121 who propagates a narrow interpretation of the article 31 
restrictions. 
Conclusions IV, 1975, 8. Cf also the following extract from Conclusions Xll-1, 1992, 25: "While the Committee 
has accepted that, in a particularly serious economic situation or to maintain essential services, a government 
might be able to set certain limits to collective bargaining, any total ban on the right to bargain collectively or on 
the right to strike over an extended period of time cannot be accepted and in any such situation, covering the 
whole or part only of the work-force, a government must justify its actions on the basis of Article 31 ". 
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7.5.2 Picketing 
In South Africa, picketing is comprehensively regulated in section 69 of the Act.63 Picketing 
authorised by the Act may be held despite any laws regulating the right of assembly. The 
term "picketing" is not defined in the Act. In the Netherlands, picketing resorts under the 
generic term "collective action" in the ESC, and is in itself regarded as lawful.64 Striking 
employees may, by means of peaceful action, try to convince the willing employees to also 
take part in the strike. Even though the regulation of picketing thus differs in the two 
countries, the employees have more or less the same rights and freedoms in respect of 
picketing. 
7 .6 Conclusion 
The strike has become generally accepted as a weapon in labour disputes in industrialised 
democracies, and both South Africa and the Netherlands are no exception in this regard. 
As stated above, the South African labour legislation does not provide more certainty than 
the Dutch judge-made law concerning the law relating to strikes. In South Africa both 
capital and labour are still to come to grips with the provisions of the 1995 Labour Relations 
Act. Although many of the Act's provisions are little more than a codification of principles 
that were applied before the Act came into operation, the interpretation of the new provisions 
creates a fair amount of uncertainty. Accordingly, the parties rely heavily on guidance 
offered by the courts in the interpretation of the statutory provisions. 
In the Netherlands, the parties rely heavily on the courts' interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the ESC. Seen from this perspective, there is little difference between the two 
countries. This is even more so if the purpose of the Labour Relations Act is noted. Section 
1 of the Act states that one of the primary objects of the Act is "to give effect to obligations 
63 
64 
See 6.4.9 for more detail in this regard. 
The judges in the Netherlands do not readily tolerate other collective action in support of main strikes, e.g. 
blockades at the entrance to a business: see 3.3.3.4 for more detail in this regard. 
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incurred by the Republic as a mem~er state of the International Labour Organisation". 
Emphasis is thus placed on the emulation of international standards, and one can assume that 
the South African labour courts will continue to look at international trends in interpreting 
the new Act. 
Nevertheless, the South African law relating to strikes is regulated in much more detail than 
the Dutch law in this regard.65 However, it is interesting to note that, even though different 
methods are used by the judges in the two countries, the same result is often achieved in both 
legal systems.66 
Regarding the future resolution of industrial conflict in the two countries, it is difficult to 
envisage the likelihood of any major changes.67 In recent years, there has been little change 
in the nature or manifestation of strikes and other forms of collective action. However, the 
strike phenomenon is to a large extent influenced by non-legal factors such as governmental 
policy and the character of the employer-employee relationship, and these factors will, to a 
large extent, determine the future of this weapon. 
Internationally, however, the strike seems to be losing some of its effectiveness in practice. 
Multinational companies have helped create a new "global village" society, with their 
influence reaching across the world. New technology and communications have helped 
create ways for management of such companies to circumvent the pressure traditionally 
exerted by strike action.68 It can therefore be expected that the working population will 
continue to look at all possible ways to maintain a balance of power, including self-
65 
66 
67 
68 
This is probably the result of the tremendous difference between the industrial relations systems of the two 
countries. In the Netherlands, there is a high degree of co-operation between the "social partners" in a peaceful 
social climate. South Africa, on the other hand, had a turbulent history of industrial relations which in turn led to 
a high incidence of industrial action. It is an open question whether the new Act will reduce the number of 
strikes. 
Cf the procedural limitations placed on the right to strike in the two countries. 
Cf Clarke, "Industrial Conflict: Perspectives and Trends", in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies, 1990, 195, who states as follows: "There is nothing new about the successful 
resolution of industrial conflict: it remains, as it has always been, a function of good management and a simple, 
expeditious, effective and trusted set of procedures for dealing with the terms of collective relations and individual 
grievances". 
See Jacobs, "The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs", in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies, 1993, 452 and Blanpain & Engels, European Labour Law, 1993, 227. 
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regulation and arbitration. The following comment by Jacobs provides an excellent summary 
in this regard: 
"I will not be amazed if the decades to come see a growing interest in the development of 
new techniques, e.g. final offer arbitration, for the peaceful solution of interest conflicts in the 
labour market. I think the aim of every civilized society should not be to outlaw strikes 
altogether but to stimulate as much as possible the replacement of the use of this weapon in 
the resolution of industrial conflict by other less harmful techniques."69 
Fortunately, employers and employees in both South Africa and the Netherlands have shown 
a willingness to overcome the stumbling blocks in the field of industrial disputes. This 
attitude should stimulate the development of other techniques to resolve industrial conflict, 
and thereby streamline the law relating to strikes in the two countries. 
69 Jacobs, "The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs", in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial relations in 
Industrialised Market Economies, 1993, 453. See also generally Van der Heijden, "Post-industrieel arbeidsrecht", 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 1993, 297. 
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